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Selected Legal Applications for Bayesian Methods
Edward K. Cheng
This dissertation offers three contexts in which Bayesian methods can address
tricky problems in the legal system. Chapter 1 offers a method for attacking case
publication bias, the possibility that certain legal outcomes may be more likely to
be published or observed than others. It builds on ideas from multiple systems
estimation (MSE), a technique traditionally used for estimating hidden populations,
to detect and correct case publication bias. Chapter 2 proposes new methods for
dividing attorneys’ fees in complex litigation involving multiple firms. It investigates
optimization and statistical approaches that use peer reports of each firm’s relative
contribution to estimate a “fair” or consensus division of the fees. The methods
proposed have lower informational requirements than previous work and appear to
be robust to collusive behavior by the firms. Chapter 3 introduces a statistical method
for classifying legal cases by doctrinal area or subject matter. It proposes using a
latent space approach based on case citations as an alternative to the traditional
manual coding of cases, reducing subjectivity, arbitrariness, and confirmation bias in
the classification process.
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Two decades before R.A. Fisher began his pathbreaking statistical work at Rotham-
sted Experimental Station, future United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes had already predicted that “for the rational study of the law the black-
letter man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of
statistics and the master of economics.” (Holmes, 1897). On the economics score,
the rise (and in some spheres, the dominance) of “law and economics” in modern
legal thought has proven Holmes prescient. And while Holmes’s prediction about law
and statistics has not yet come entirely to pass, recent trends toward empirical legal
scholarship, electronic discovery, and the use of machine learning in legal contexts
suggest that we may be on the cusp of his envisioned world.
This dissertation offers some exciting ways in which statistics can help solve legal
problems. It examines three difficult law-related problems — the assessment of judi-
cial behavior, the division of attorneys’ fees, and the classification of cases — and asks
how modern statistical tools can aid or replace traditional expert intuition and judg-
ment in these contexts. Chapter 1 addresses case publication bias. In trying to assess
the current state of law, lawyers have typically relied on the available (published)
case law. What happens if that case law exhibits publication bias, in which certain
outcomes are more likely to be observed than others? Is there a way to de-bias our
assessments? Chapter 2 tackles the division of attorneys’ fees. Often at the end of
mass litigation, courts must divide a pool of attorneys’ fees among the participating
firms. Traditionally, such division is done in ad hoc ways by the judge or a special
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master. Can statistical tools provide a better mechanism? Finally, Chapter 3 exam-
ines case classification. Historically, cases are classified manually and subjectively.
Can statistics provide a more objective and automated classification method?
These three legal problems may seem entirely disparate, and indeed each of the
the three chapters develops its own statistical models to address the specific problem
posed. But taking a broader view suggests some deeper conceptual connections. All
three solutions are (at least in part) solved using latent variable models. The case
publication bias solution involves multiple systems estimation, in which a model infers
the size of a hidden (unobserved) population based on the observed members. One
of the fee division models infers the (hidden) just distribution of fees based on peer
ratings. And finally, the case classification model uses case citations to infer a latent
case space. That latent space enables us to locate a case’s proximity to other cases.
That latent variable models have so much to offer the legal system is in many
ways unsurprising. At the heart of most legal tasks is the need or desire to reveal
some hidden truth. Latent space models are therefore a natural fit. What follows
offers a glimpse of the power and versatility of latent space models in solving legal
questions. Going forward, one suspects that we have only scratched the surface.
2
1 Detection and Correction of Case Publication
Bias1
The observable case law in databases like Westlaw or Lexis is not a representative
sample of the universe of legal decisions. To be captured in such a database, two
things must happen. First, the court must decide to write an opinion, rather than
rule orally or issue a summary order. Second, the database must somehow capture
that opinion. For example, the court may choose to publish the opinion in an official
reporter, which will make inclusion in a database highly likely. Or the court may
leave the opinion “unpublished,” in which case inclusion in the database will be less
likely and depend on the specific database’s mechanisms for collection and selection.
If these paths to observation happen to be correlated with case outcome, then the
observable case law will suffer from selection bias, and any inferences drawn about
the law will be invalid. This possibility that certain legal outcomes may be more
likely observed than others is what I term “case publication bias.”
Case publication bias presents a serious problem for both legal practice and re-
search. Like other hazards, it perhaps poses the greatest danger to those unaware
of it. For example, legal academics, attorneys, and jurists often conduct informal
reviews of the case law to detect trends in the law or to predict outcomes.2 If the
observable case law is biased, then those impressions and predictions will be distorted
and misleading.
1This chapter is forthcoming in Journal of Legal Studies (2018).
2These informal reviews of course have many dangers, but are frequently done anyway. (Baude
et al., 2017).
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But even for those cognizant of the problem, case publication bias presents a
formidable obstacle. Researchers doing systematic studies of the case law need some
way to detect and remove the bias to produce valid studies. Conventionally, re-
searchers have tried to find comprehensive data sources that exhaustively catalog all
case outcomes, but these are often unavailable or limited in scope. Thus, even careful
researchers are frequently forced to muddle through using the observed case law. The
best they can do is acknowledge their limitations and make arguments as to why the
bias may not be severe.
In this Chapter, I explore the problem of case publication bias, with a particular
emphasis on evidence law. I argue that there are structural reasons to believe that
the case publication bias problem is particularly acute in evidence (although similar
conditions may pertain elsewhere). Consequently, we cannot merely muddle through
using the observable case law on evidence; we need to address the bias directly. Then,
I propose a new method for detecting and correcting case publication bias based on
ideas from multiple systems estimation (MSE), a technique traditionally used for
estimating hidden populations in fields like ecology, human rights, and public health.
The goal of the chapter is thus not only to increase awareness of case publication
bias, but also to provide the academy, bench, and bar with a tool to address it.
The Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.1 motivates the discussion by describ-
ing the reasons why case publication bias may be especially acute in the evidentiary
context. Section 1.2 discusses methods for detecting and correcting publication bias.
It surveys existing approaches, introduces the intuition behind multiple systems esti-
mation, and then develops a series of detection models. Section 1.3 turns to applica-
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tions. To validate the method, I first apply the proposed model to simulated datasets
in which I control the level of publication bias present. I then apply the model to
a newly compiled dataset of evidentiary rulings dealing with false confession expert
testimony. Section 1.4 discusses the assumptions and limitations of the model and
some of the policy implications arising out of the results.
1.1 The Problem
Case publication bias creates problems for both informal (non-systematic) reviews of
case law as well as more sophisticated analyses. For better or worse, informal reviews
of existing case law are practically ubiquitous in the legal world. (Baude et al.,
2017). Associates produce case law surveys to provide background to a legal team and
support for motions or briefs. Traditional doctrinal treatises and law review articles
use case law databases to detect trends or ascertain the state of the law. Courts in
turn rely on and are influenced by these works or their own reviews, especially when
they have discretion or lack expertise, or when the state of the law is uncertain.
For example, in the wake of Crawford v. Washington (2004), when the “testimo-
nial” status of 911 calls was unclear, courts such as the Sixth Circuit in United States
v. Hadley (2005) cataloged the published decisions of other courts in detail before
making their own decision. (See also United States v. Brito, 2005). With respect
to false confession expert testimony, courts have similarly relied on such reviews to
determine admissibility as well as to assess ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
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(Vent v. State, 2003; State v. Buechler, 1998).3 To be sure, courts do not treat these
informal reviews as dispositive or as a mere head-counting exercise, but the influence
and persuasive power of them is unavoidable. The influence exists whether the cases
are selected for “official” publication or not, as well as whether they are classified
as “precedential” or not, because the existing body of available case law frames the
terms of the debate. Even if not explicitly acknowledged, they exert social pressure
on judges. (See, e.g., Nolan et al., 2008, 913).
Left undetected, the consequences of case publication bias can be considerable
for informal reviews. (Cf. Delgado and Stefancic, 1989). Biased conclusions may
influence judges in making their decisions. Attorneys may erroneously conclude that
their preferred theory has no chance of success, and thus encourage their client to
plea or not take a case at all. Legal treatises may codify the biased picture of the
case law and compound the problem by passing the misimpression along to readers.
More rigorous, systematic surveys of case law eliminate many of the weakness and
pitfalls of informal reviews, but they must still contend with the case publication bias
problem to reach valid conclusions.4 One solution is to use comprehensive databases
that include all unpublished cases (or even all filed cases), such as the well-known
dataset from the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which tracks all
3Indeed, in Lunbery v. Hornbreak (2010), a concurring judge argued that counsel’s failure
to offer false confession expert testimony was unreasonable given its admissibility in other cases.
(Lunbery v. Hornbreak, 2010, 764). One curious if not Kafkaesque example is found in Brooks v.
State (1999), in which the Mississippi Supreme Court relied on a set of cases – including a later
proven wrongful conviction – to justify blanket admissibility for bitemark evidence. The defendant
in Brooks was ultimately exonerated through DNA evidence. (Fabricant and Carrington, 2016, 8–9).
4For example, Fitzpatrick (2010b) criticizes previous studies of class action settlements for rely-
ing entirely on “district court opinions that were published in Westlaw or Lexis.”(Fitzpatrick, 2010b,
829)
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cases in the federal system. (Hubbard, 2013). The problem is that the AO database
contains limited information, and depending on the research question, an appropriate
comprehensive database may not be available. As the legal academy and the broader
legal community shift toward more systematic reviews of case law, (Baude et al.,
2017; Bar-Gill et al., 2017), the need to detect and address case publication bias will
only grow.
1.1.1 Case Publication Bias in Evidence
In some contexts, the structure of legal decisionmaking makes concerns over case
publication bias especially acute. Evidence is one of those contexts. Trial judges
make many evidentiary decisions throughout the course of a trial, but efficiency and
practicality militate that most of those decisions be oral or accompanied by limited
written orders, making them unlikely to be included in databases. What then causes
a trial judge to produce a written evidentiary opinion? Presumably, there are many
factors, including the novelty of the issue and the judge’s intellectual interests, but
one situation likely to result in a written opinion is when a court excludes critical
evidence offered by a criminal defendant. Because the evidence is critical, the ruling
may be outcome determinative or nearly so. And because the court is excluding not
admitting evidence, the ultimate responsibility for the outcome now rests with the
judge, not the jury (as in the case of admissions). In these situations, a judge may
therefore feel a particular obligation to produce an opinion in keeping with the rule
of law, and as a consequence, legal reporting services may be more likely to capture
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high-stakes exclusion decisions, as opposed to admissions or non-critical exclusions.
Further, since appellate courts write and publish opinions more regularly than
trial courts, the typical way to observe evidentiary decisions is through appellate
decisions, not trial ones. But because appeals themselves are not representative of
the underlying case population, we have yet another potential biasing mechanism.
(Stith, 1990). For example, because of double jeopardy rules (and the rarity of inter-
locutory appeals), most criminal appeals arise from defendant convictions. Appeals
of criminal convictions, however, will tend to feature trial court evidentiary decisions
that were adverse to the defendant, including exclusions of the defendant’s evidence.
(Risinger, 2007, 468-69). Appellate opinions will thus tend to feature exclusions of
the defendant’s evidence rather than admissions of the defendant’s evidence. And
because evidentiary decisions are usually only reviewed deferentially on appeal, the
appellate courts will tend to affirm those exclusions.5
False confession expert testimony (FCET) is a perfect storm of the biasing mech-
anisms just discussed. False confession experts, psychologists or sociologists who
testify about the psychological factors that enhance the risk of a false confession,
are often critical witnesses for criminal defendants. Confessions are highly damaging
evidence against the defendant, and lay jurors are likely to find counterintuitive (if
not implausible) the idea that someone would confess to a crime that he did not
commit. Consider what happens with these admissibility decisions: If the court ex-
cludes a false confession expert, it may write an opinion explaining why it is excluding
5The deferentially standard of review necessarily means that affirmances carry less precedential
weight, but recall that our focus is on the impression given by the observable case law and its
psychological effect, rather than the strictly legal value.
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critical evidence and effectively gutting the defendant’s case. The opinion may then
be selected for publication in an official reporter, or at minimum, will be captured
by an electronic database. By contrast, if the court admits the expert, the witness
becomes just another witness at trial, generating no special need to write an opin-
ion. Databases are thus more likely to capture exclusions than admissions. A similar
bias appears at the appellate level. If the trial court excludes the expert, conviction
is likely – after all, the defendant confessed.6 By contrast, if the court admits the
expert, conviction is less likely, at least on the assumption that false confession ex-
perts are helpful to the defense. Thus, the pool of cases seen by the appellate court
will be skewed toward exclusion, and given the deferential review standard, all of
the appealed (and subsequently observed) cases are more likely to be affirmances of
exclusions.
1.1.2 Case Publication Bias Generally
Publication bias writ large is of course well known in fields like medicine (Easterbrook
et al., 1991), economics (Roberts and Stanley, 2006), and psychology (Rosenthal,
1979). The problem of case publication bias in the legal world, however, has received
comparatively less attention, though a number of scholars have noted its presence
and expressed concerns. (Hubbard, 2017; Fitzpatrick, 2010b). There have also been
a few prior studies specifically attempting to detect and quantify the severity of the
6An alternative possibility is that a plea bargain will occur after the evidentiary determination,
making the case disappear from the observable record. However, given these are false confession
cases, one might expect innocent defendants to press on with the litigation. There is no particular
reason to believe that the availability of pleas will skew the pool in one direction or the other.
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bias. Siegelman and Donohue (1990) showed that the rate at which employment dis-
crimination cases appeared in the published case law was dependent on case outcome.
To measure the level of bias, it compared the prevalence of case outcomes in the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts (AO) dataset with the published case
law. (Siegelman and Donohue, 1990). Lizotte (2007) reported similar bias among
summary judgment motions. It found that “[s]ummary judgments awarded to plain-
tiffs were more likely to appear online than were judgments awarded to defendants,
and appealed judgments were more likely to be available that those that were not
appealed.”(Lizotte, 2007). Merritt and Brudney (2001) considered factors that lead
to appellate opinions being published in official case reporters, though it did not test
specifically for the influence of case outcome.7
Most recently, Wininger and Cecil (2015) explored differences among the sources
of data commonly used for empirical legal studies, expressing concerns about possible
biased sampling. Wininger and Cecil (2015) collected 12(b)(6) dismissal orders from
three electronic sources: Westlaw, PACER, and the federal judiciary’s Case Manage-
ment / Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system. The authors found that while none
of the databases were perfect, some were better at capturing certain courts or types
of cases than others. Notably, the study did not find a significant difference in legal
outcomes between the Westlaw and PACER databases. (Wininger and Cecil, 2015,
17).
7The article does report that certain circuits “encourage[] or require[] publication of decisions
reversing the lower court or agency,” though the article’s definition of publication is restricted to
appearance in official reporters.(Merritt and Brudney, 2001, 77, 81)
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1.2 Methods
1.2.1 Bias Detection Methods
As previously discussed, the primary way to detect and address case publication bias
thus far has been through the use of a comprehensive comparison dataset, such as
the one provided by the AO. Finding a comprehensive comparison dataset, however,
is difficult in many contexts. For example, there is no obvious way to construct such
a dataset for studying evidentiary rulings. The AO neither codes for evidentiary de-
terminations (because they are not the “topic” of a case or the substantive claim),
nor does it cover state courts. At the same time, manual compilation of a complete
dataset on evidentiary rulings is infeasible. The vast majority of evidentiary rulings
are made orally and recorded only in trial transcripts, which are often available only
in paper form, geographically dispersed, and expensive to obtain.8 Worse yet, specific
evidentiary contexts, such as rulings on false confession expert testimony, are thinly
distributed among the population of transcripts, rendering traditional sampling tech-
niques ineffective. This thin distribution makes direct surveys of judges infeasible as
well, since most judges will have had no exposure to FCET and will be reluctant to
comment on matters that may arise in the future.
Standard approaches to publication bias from the scientific and social scientific
literatures are also inapplicable to case publication bias. Publication bias in scien-
tific journals arises from p-value bias, the desire of journals to publish statistically
8In many jurisdictions, trial transcripts are the property of the court reporter, who sells copies
to interested parties.
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significant results. The approaches for detecting and correcting p-value publication
bias accordingly take advantage of the underlying statistical structure. For example,
one conventional method for detecting publication bias, the funnel plot, plots the
reported effect sizes in the published studies against the estimated variances. (Duval
and Tweedie, 2000; Givens et al., 1997). Asymmetries in the plots then become the
basis for detecting and correcting publication bias.9 Another method proposed by
Simonsohn et al. (2014) uses the expected distribution of p-values among a group of
studies to do correction and detection. Case publication bias lacks these underlying
quantitative structures, preventing the use of these techniques.
1.2.2 Multiple Systems Estimation
To remedy some of the limitations discussed above, this Chapter proposes tackling
the legal publication bias problem using techniques from multiple systems estimation
(MSE). Multiple systems estimation has its conceptual origin in capture-recapture
methods used in ecological studies. (Amstrup et al., 2005). The intuition behind
MSE is readily shown through an ecology example: Suppose a researcher wishes to
determine the number of fish in a pond. On Day 1, the researcher catches, tags, and
releases ten fish from the pond. On Day 2, the researcher catches another ten fish,
and from this, she is able to estimate the pond population. If the researcher catches
9Across multiple studies, we expect the reported effect sizes to be symmetrically distributed
around the “true” effect size. The tightness of that distribution will be a function of the estimated
variance – for example, large samples sizes will have tighter distributions. When we plot effect size
against the reciprocal of the estimated variance for all available studies, we expect a funnel-shaped
scatterplot that is wide for high-variance studies and narrow for low-variance studies. Asymmetries
in the funnel plot imply publication bias, because the “missing” points are instances in which journals
chose not to publish negative results. One can then “complete” of fill-in the funnel to correct the
publication bias. (Duval and Tweedie, 2000)
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only tagged fish, then the population is likely close to ten. Since we assume the
researcher catches fish at random, it is highly unlikely that she will keep catching the
same ten fish unless those are the only fish available for catching. If the researcher
catches no tagged fish, then the population is at least twenty, but likely far larger,
since the chance of catching at least one tagged fish is fairly high unless there are
many other individuals to select from.
Conceptually, the capture-recapture method estimates population size using over-
laps between different lists. The fish from Day 1 represent one list, or one sample
from the population. The fish from Day 2 represent a second list or sample. The
tagging is merely the means by which we keep track of the overlap between the two
lists. Heavy overlap suggests a small underlying population, whereas light overlap
suggests a large underlying population.
Capture-recapture implicitly makes several, strong assumptions. For example, all
fish and all lists have the same probability of capture – i.e., no subgroup of fish is
particularly gullible, and the Day 1 and Day 2 catches are of equal number. MSE
provides the means for relaxing these assumptions. It uses regression modeling to
control for differences in capture probabilities, enabling researchers to use existing
lists, rather than collecting independent samples as in the fish pond example. Among
other things, researchers have used MSE to estimate the number of deaths or human
rights violations in conflict areas, (Lum et al., 2013; Seybolt et al., 2013; Fienberg
and Manrique-Vallier, 2009; Asher et al., 2008), to estimate populations for public
health research, (Laska, 2002; Madigan and York, 1997; Madigan et al., 1995; Regal
and Hook, 1984), and to make corrections to the census, (Brown et al., 1999). In all
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of these contexts, the underlying population is hidden, but researchers use existing
lists to estimate the full population size. For human rights violations, for instance, re-
searchers use lists of victims compiled by various governmental and non-governmental
organizations. (Lum et al., 2013). For the census, the “capture” is the census itself,
whereas the “recapture” is a post-enumeration survey. (Brown et al., 1999).
The case publication bias problem is similar in structure. Although lawyers often
think of the “case law” in monolithic terms, the observed case law is actually the
aggregate of many legal research databases. Some databases, like Westlaw and Lexis,
are more comprehensive than others and thus have higher capture probabilities. Some
cases — whether due to the court, subject matter, or other factors — are more
likely to be observed than others. Any workable model must thus account for these
variations. In any event, the various databases overlap imperfectly, and these overlaps
and discrepancies are what will permit us to draw inferences about the cases that are
otherwise unobserved.
The existing MSE literature offers a variety of statistical approaches for estimating
population size. (Bishop et al., 1975; Madigan and York, 1997; Fienberg et al., 1999;
King et al., 2008). The publication bias problem, however, is not a population size
problem and therefore requires an extension of the MSE approaches. Below, I extend
the Rasch approach from Fienberg et al. (1999) for use as a method of detecting
publication bias. (See also Pelle et al., 2016; Bartolucci and Forcina, 2001) I will
also show how the model estimates can be used to correct for the detected bias so




We start with lists of relevant cases from the available legal research databases. Sup-
pose we have K unique cases and L lists or databases. Our dataset then consists
of a K × L matrix in which the entries (Ykl) represent whether case k was observed
(or “published”) in a list l, as seen in Figure 1.1. We also collect information on
the ruling in case k, i.e., whether the trial court admitted or excluded the evidence,
which we label Ak.
List1 List2 List3 List4 . . . ListL
Case1 1 0 0 0 . . . 1
Case2 1 0 1 1 . . . 1







CaseK 0 1 1 0 . . . 0
Table 1.1: Case-List Data for Model (1 = case observed on list, 0 = case not
observed on list )
Given this data, we can construct a probability model for when case k is ob-
served in list l. For this first model, we assume that the various case databases are
independent. The probability of observing case k in list l then depends on a variety
of unknown (latent) attributes. As previously mentioned, certain cases will attract
greater attention, either because the opinion is better written, the facts are more
interesting, or the case has a higher profile. Similarly, some lists will be more com-
prehensive than others – major legal search databases such as Westlaw and Lexis will
have a greater probability of observing a given case than smaller databases. With
this backdrop, we propose the following regression model:
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Ykl ∼ Bernoulli(φkl)
logit(φkl) = βAk + θk + γl (1.1)
In this model, φkl is the (latent) probability that case k will be observed in list l.
We do not observe φkl, but instead only see the observation outcome, which is Ykl.
β is the parameter of interest, for it captures how much more likely an evidentiary
admission is to be observed (on any list) than an evidentiary exclusion. Under our
working theory of publication bias in the criminal context, we would expect β to be
negative since Ak is the indicator variable for admission. The other parameters are
random effects that control for the latent attributes previously discussed: θk accounts
for case variations, and γl controls for list variations. We can reasonably model the
noteworthiness of cases as being normally distributed, so that the θk arise from a
common normal distribution.10 We do not do so for the lists, however, because we
anticipate them to be bimodal. Relatively speaking, the major databases (Westlaw
and Lexis) are extremely comprehensive, while minor lists (like a BNA reporter or
a website) may be more hit-or-miss. We therefore give γl and the other parameters
flat normal priors, except for the hyperparameters for variance, which are given weak
Cauchy priors as suggested by Gelman (2006).
The parameters in Eq. 1.1 can then be estimated using standard Markov Chain
Monte Carlo methods. With the resulting parameter estimates, we can not only
10This assumption is not necessary for the model and can be replaced with a different distribution
depending on context.
16
detect publication bias (through β), but we can also correct for the bias and estimate
the underlying (true) admissibility rate. Technical details of the derivation can be
found in Section 1.5.1.
1.2.4 Dependence Model
One of the key limitations of the independence model is that it assumes that a case’s
appearance on one list is conditionally independent of its appearance on another
list. Violations of this assumption can result in underestimation. (Lum et al., 2013;
Stanghellini and van der Heijden, 2004). For example, if one legal database copied
its entries from another, then the resulting databases would exhibit more overlap
than under true independence, biasing the model toward estimating fewer unobserved
cases. A standard response to this problem is to include a group of interaction terms
in the regression model, (Lum et al., 2013; Fienberg et al., 1999; Darroch et al.,
1993), but such interaction terms greatly increase the complexity of the model and
the difficulty of calculating the corrected admissibility rate.
Legal databases are arguably unlikely to suffer general interdependency. Legal
databases cannot simply copy each other – the legal research market is lucrative, and
providers rigorously police licensing agreements and intellectual property rights. This
situation is in contrast to other contexts in which sharing might be actively promoted.
Rather, most of the dependence among legal databases is likely to arise from joint
dependence on one specific list—the “official” publication list. Historically, courts
chose whether an opinion carried sufficient precedential importance to be printed in
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an official case reporter. Opinions not so selected were classified as “unpublished”
and typically disappeared from public view since there was no easy access for future
litigants. The advent of electronic databases has changed this dynamic, since elec-
tronic services include both officially “published” opinions as well as “unpublished”
ones. Nonetheless, the published-unpublished distinction still carries legal heft. Offi-
cially published opinions generally carry greater precedential weight and are viewed
as more important by legal actors.
The dependence seen in legal databases is thus of a specific, limited kind. Inclusion
in an official reporter occurs independently, because the judicial decision to publish
occurs ex ante. We will label publication of case k in an official reporter as YkP
to match the previous notation of Ykl for observing case k in list l. For notational
simplicity, we will denote its complement as ZkP , where ZkP = 1−YkP . Observation of
case k in any of the remaining databases (Ol, l = 1, . . . , L) is dependent on publication
in the official reporter (OP ), but conditionally independent otherwise.
With these assumptions in place, we can model the probability that case k will
be observed in list l with a slight modification to the regression model in (1.1):
logit(φkl) = βAk + θk + γl + ρlZkP (1.2)
where l = 1, 2, . . . , L, P . The dependence of list l on the official publication list P
is captured by the new parameter ρl, and to avoid circularity issues, ρP is set to
zero. We assume that the ρl arise from a common normal distribution, but all other
elements and their priors are as before in Equation (1.1).
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Once again, β is the parameter of interest, because it captures the effect of a
case’s outcome (admissibility) on its observation by a list. βˆ thus enables us to
detect whether case publication bias is a problem.
Using Bayes Rule with this regression model, we can also estimate a corrected
















where ̂P (O∗|A) is the real root x ∈ (0, 1) of
(1− x)(1−RP |Ax)L−1 −
L∏
l=1
[1− (RP |A +Rl|A −RP |ARl|A)x] = 0,
and ̂P (O∗|A¯) is the real root x ∈ (0, 1) of
(1− x)(1−RP |A¯x)L−1 −
L∏
l=1
[1− (RP |A¯ +Rl|A¯ −RP |A¯Rl|A¯)x] = 0.
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One final complication to the model involves case “types.” As described in Sec-
tion 1.1, we can observe trial court decisions either directly through the trial court’s
own opinion, or indirectly through subsequent appellate decisions. As one might ex-
pect, some court levels are more likely to be observed in legal databases than others.
Supreme Court opinions are closely followed; trial court opinions are not; appellate
court opinions are somewhere in between. We can revise the regression model further
to account for the type of opinion (i.e., trial, appellate, etc.):
Yklt ∼ Bernoulli(φklt)
logit(φklt) = βAk + θk + γl + τt + ρlZkP (1.3)
where τt captures the effect that the court’s level t has on the probability that its
opinion in case k is observed in list l. Roughly in line with legal experience, the model
assumes that observing a case at one level of the court hierarchy is independent of
observing it at another level. The parameter β in the model serves the same purpose
of bias detection as in the earlier models. Calculating the corrected admissibility
rate requires that we account for τt, the details of which are shown in Section 1.5.3.





To validate the full dependence model (with case types) discussed in Section 1.2.4,
I constructed a series of simulated case publication datasets. Each simulation began
with a population of 250 cases. In each case, the proffered evidence had a 33%
chance of admission, which was the “true” admissibility rate. Six different publication
databases were available to observe the cases at either the trial or appellate level.
One list was designated the official publication list (P). Two of the remaining lists
(L and W) were a combination of independent observations and copies from the
official publication list,11 and the final three lists (A, B, and C) consisted simply of
independent observations. Aside from the defined dependence between L, W and P,
all of the lists had conditionally independent draws. Table 1.2 reports the probabilities
at which a given list l observed an admissibility or exclusion ruling at either the trial
or appellate level.
Probability of Observation
List Trial Opinion Trial Opinion App Opinion App Opinion
Admission Exclusion Admission Exclusion
P 2ptr,ad 2ptr,ex 2pap,ad 2pap,ex
A ptr,ad ptr,ex pap,ad pap,ex
B 2ptr,ad 2ptr,ex 2pap,ad 2pap,ex
C 4ptr,ad 4ptr,ex 4pap,ad 4pap,ex
L (L=L’+P) 2ptr,ad 2ptr,ex 2pap,ad 2pap,ex
W (W=W’+P) 4ptr,ad 4ptr,ex 4pap,ad 4pap,ex
Table 1.2: Simulated Lists and Their Observation Probabilities
11Lists L and W simulate the two major legal databases, Lexis and Westlaw, which comprehen-
sively include the officially published cases.
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The baseline probabilities of observing cases (i.e., ptr,ad, ptr,ex, pap,ad, and pap,ex),
represent respectively the probability for trial cases with admission, trial cases with
exclusion, appellate cases with admission, and appellate cases with exclusion. These
baselines were varied over several runs to simulate no publication bias, moderate pub-
lication bias, strong publication bias, as well as publication bias only at the trial level
or only at the appellate level. Keeping with actual practice, the probability of obser-
vation was always significantly higher at the appellate level than at the trial level. As
seen in Table 1.3, despite the true admissibility rate being 33%, the observed admis-
sibility rate departs increasingly downward from the true rate as one increases the
publication bias. In addition, most of the observed rate is driven by appellate opinion
observations, since relatively few trial court opinions are ever directly observed at all.
Simulated Set ptr,ad ptr,ex pap,ad pap,ex Observed Admis Rate
No Bias 0.0025 0.0025 0.05 0.05 0.319
Moderate Bias 0.002 0.004 0.04 0.08 0.244
Strong Bias 0.001 0.005 0.02 0.10 0.137
Appellate Bias Only 0.003 0.003 0.04 0.08 0.247
Trial Bias Only 0.001 0.005 0.06 0.06 0.313
Table 1.3: Simulated Datasets Used
Using these simulated datasets, we estimated the model in Equation 1.3 via
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to arrive at estimates for β and the
corrected admissibility rate. The results are shown in Table 1.4. For point estimates,
we used the mean of the posterior distribution for both β and the estimated corrected
admissibility rate (pcor). (pcor was calculated for each draw of the MCMC sampler.)
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Simulated Set β (95% CI) Observed Admis Corrected Admis
No Bias 0.0 (-0.4, 0.3) 0.319 0.334
Moderate Bias -0.4 (-0.7, -0.1) 0.244 0.311
Strong Bias -1.0 (-1.5, -0.6) 0.137 0.346
Appellate Bias Only -0.4 (-0.7, 0.0) 0.247 0.306
Trial Bias Only 0.0 (-0.3, 0.3) 0.314 0.315
Table 1.4: Simulation Results (True Admissibility Rate = 0.333)
1.3.2 False Confession Expert Testimony
False confession expert testimony (FCET) is an important context for applying the
bias-correction model. Confessions are, of course, one of the most devastating poten-
tial pieces of evidence against a criminal defendant. In recent years, however, wrongful
conviction exonerations have shown surprisingly that defendants will at times confess
to crimes that they did not commit. Social scientists have studied risk factors leading
to false confessions, including defendant disposition, environment, and interrogator
behavior, and some defendants have sought to introduce this type of testimony to
lend credibility to their claim that they confessed falsely. (Kassin and Kiechel, 1996;
Chojnacki et al., 2008; Ofshe and Leo, 1997).
As previously noted, FCET is a context in which one might be especially con-
cerned about publication bias and its resulting distortions. FCET is relatively new,
controversial, and involves psychological expertise, (Kaye et al., 2016, §§2.7.4 and
8.9.6), making judges likely to look to other sources, such as the case law, for guid-
ance on its evidentiary reliability. The ability to conduct unbiased surveys of the
case law is therefore critical. At the same time, because FCET involves confessions
and takes place in the criminal context, it is especially at risk of the biasing mecha-
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nisms discussed in Section 1.1. At the trial level, excluding FCET severely hampers
the defense, placing added pressure on trial judges to offer a written explanation
when excluding the evidence. In addition, to the extent FCET is effective defense
evidence, its admission will result in more acquittals, which cannot be appealed. Ap-
pellate opinions discussing FCET will therefore more likely arise out of trial court
exclusions.
To study publication bias in the FCET context, cases dealing with FCET were
gathered from readily available legal search databases: Westlaw, Lexis, Google Legal,
BNA, FastCase, and Daubert Tracker.12 Some of these databases are likely well-
known to readers, others less so; some are fee-based subscription services, while others
are freely available to the public. From these lists, one can easily extract the “official
publication list,” meaning cases appearing in traditional case reporters. Predictably,
both the Westlaw and Lexis lists included all officially published cases. However, they
also included scattered “unpublished” opinions that were not coincident with each
other.
In total, the false confession dataset consisted of 136 case opinions, of which
13 were trial opinions, 95 were decisions from a direct appeal, and 28 were from
further appellate processes (subsequent appeals, collateral review, etc.). These 136
case opinions derived from 110 underlying cases. The observed rate at which trial
12My research assistant, Maria Ramrath, a 2015 J.D./M.B.A. graduate of Vanderbilt University,
primarily handled this “case survey,” replicating what a junior associate might do in an actual
litigation context. Cases were found using conventional methods in legal research: search terms (e.g.,
“‘false confession’ /s ‘expert testimony’”), cross-checks between databases, and pursuing citations
found in the search results and citation history. Cases were then read to determine if they were
“relevant,” meaning that they either discussed the admissibility of false confession expert testimony
directly, or discussed an earlier trial court’s opinion on admissibility.
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courts admitted FCET was 0.16.
Confirming the suggestion in Section 1.1 that appellate courts tend to affirm trial
evidentiary decisions, appellate deference in the FCET dataset was very high. Among
the 114 appellate opinions that reached the issue of admissibility, 89% affirmed the
trial court’s determination.13 This affirmance rate was high irrespective of whether
the underlying trial court ruling was admission (82.3%) or exclusion (90.7%).
We estimated the publication bias correction model in Section 1.2.4 for the FCET
dataset. MCMC estimates were made using the Stan statistical computing platform,
and visual checks were made of the trace plots to ensure proper mixing. The results
are found in Table 1.5. The results suggest that the published case law on FCET
may exhibit a bias against admitted cases. The coefficient β, which is the indicator
of bias, is indeed negative, although less dramatic than in the simulated datasets. In
addition, the 95% credibility interval14 includes zero. Given the small sample size and
the noisier real-world data, the higher degree of uncertainty is unsurprising. Rather
revealing, however, is the model’s estimate for the actual (corrected) admissibility
rate, which is 0.281, rather than the observed rate of 0.163. This result suggests that
the case law could potentially be misleading legal actors into thinking that FCET is
far less accepted in trial court rulings than in reality.
13This rate is for all appellate opinions. The rate for affirmance on the first direct appeal was a
similar 90%.
14Because estimation of the parameters was through Bayesian techniques, the conventional mea-
sure of uncertainty is through a so-called “credibility” interval, as opposed to the confidence interval
in classical statistics.
25
β Observed Admis Corrected Admis
(95% CI) (95% CI)
False Confessions Set -0.211 0.163 0.281
(-0.702, 0.165) (0.100, 0.794)
Table 1.5: Results from False Confession Expert Testimony Dataset
1.4 Discussion
1.4.1 Model Limitations and Assumptions
As with all statistical models, the case publication bias correction model presented
here relies on a variety of assumptions to do its work. The discussion below outlines
some of those assumptions and their accompanying limitations.
1.4.1.1 Sampling Independence and Coverage
One of the key requirements for the MSE technique is that the various lists be condi-
tionally independent and that they have access to the entire underlying population.
For instance, in the fish example, if certain fish dislike the bait used and can never be
caught, then the procedure will systematically underestimate the population. (The
proposed model addressed a related concern by accounting for official publication
status, since cases that are officially published are more likely to be “caught” than
those that are not.)
At first, oral admissibility decisions may seem to create a problem along these
lines. Legal research databases do not typically include trial transcripts, so oral
decisions would seem to be a permanently hidden population. Fortunately for our
purposes, however, subsequent appeals generate opinions, and these opinions can
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shed light on the otherwise hidden world. Further, at least in the case of FCET
testimony, the bias created by these hidden oral admissibility decisions arguably cut
in a “conservative” direction. As Section 1.1 suggests, judges may be more likely
to resort to oral decisions when admitting, rather than excluding FCET evidence,
at least as an initial matter.15 A failure of the lists to capture oral decisions would
thus result in the model underestimating the population of admissions and hence
“undercorrect” the admissibility rate. So perhaps the admissibility rate estimated by
the model is in actuality a floor, but in any event is still better than the uncorrected
admissibility rate.
1.4.1.2 List Similarity
The proposed model requires that all of the publication lists suffer from the same
biasing mechanism(s). This requirement comes from the model’s roots in multiple
systems estimation, which uses overlaps and gaps in the publication lists to infer
the existence of unobserved cases. (The proposed model links two conventional MSE
models together — an MSE model for excluded cases and an MSE model for admitted
cases.) This limitation means that one cannot mix legal research database lists with,
for example, partisan lists compiled by attorneys or experts.
To illustrate, suppose one added a partisan list that included only admissions.
This list would then sharply increase the estimated number of admission cases, since
many of the partisan list’s cases would not be found in the other lists, implying a
15As discussed below, as the body of case law matures however, the direction of the bias may
shift, because novelty may motivate the publication of written opinions.
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significant hidden population. At the same time, however, the estimated number
of excluded cases would change less dramatically, since the supplemental dataset
contributes little new information on exclusions. Thus, by manipulating the size of
this added partisan list, one could arbitrary manipulate the level of publication bias
observed.16 Fortunately, there is no reason to believe that the biasing mechanism
among the various legal research database varies, and certainly no reason to believe
they are purposely biased in partisan ways. The assumption required by MSE is thus
reasonable.
1.4.1.3 Focus on Trial Court Admissibility
The proposed model focuses on trial court admissibility determinations, which can be
observed either through the original trial court’s opinion or indirectly through subse-
quent appellate opinions. This focus on trial decisions may seem initially odd, since
a subsequent appellate ruling could reverse and supersede the trial court. Appel-
late opinions also typically have broader precedential weight within their jurisdiction.
However, given the abuse-of-discretion standard that governs evidentiary rulings, ap-
pellate opinions have a more limited role in evidence than in other areas of law. If
an appellate court affirms, the appellate decision has only modest precedential ef-
fect, since the appellate court has only stated deferentially that a trial court may in
its discretion admit/exclude in that context.17 Appellate reversals are more weighty
16Additional simulation studies done on the bias correction model confirm these arguments,
although for brevity, we will not discuss them further here.
17While an appellate court could decide to adopt a per se rule, these are typically rare events.
One traditional area in which courts have imposed per se inadmissibility is polygraphs, (Ligons,
2000), but the modern trend is not toward such rules.
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precedent, but as a practical matter they are quite rare. As reported above, for the
FCET dataset, trial court rulings had a ∼ 90% affirmance rate. Furthermore, our
objective in this study is not to determine binding law. Rather, its more limited goal
is to discover whether the standard processes of publication and appeal contribute to
a skewing of the rulings that are observed. We are concerned with the psychological
effect the skewed pool might have on legal actors.
1.4.1.4 Biasing Mechanism
The current model collapses the different biasing mechanisms that might be at play
into a single parameter, β. So for example in the FCET context, it does not separate
the bias created by a trial judge’s felt-obligation to explain pro-prosecution rulings
from the bias caused by double jeopardy rules. Conceptually, one can construct
a model that treats each hierarchical level (trial, appellate, etc.) separately. For
example:
Y Tkl ∼ Bernoulli(φTkl)
logit(φTkl) = β
TAk + θk + γl
Y Akl ∼ Bernoulli(φAkl)
logit(φAkl) = β
AAk + θk + γl
where the T and A superscripts denote data or parameters specifically dealing with
observations at the trial or appellate level. This expanded model can grow to accom-
modate additional levels of appellate process, and differs from Equation 1.3, where
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we had a single bias parameter (β) and then other parameters controlling for type
(τ). Given the small numbers of trial court opinions in our FCET dataset, we did
not pursue this model further.
1.4.1.5 Case Temporal Independence
The proposed model accounts for some list interdependence (more specifically, their
dependence on official publication), but it assumes that the cases are temporally
independent, meaning that their probability of observation does not depend on when
they occur. This assumption is arguably violated in practice.18 For example, early
cases or cases of first impression in a jurisdiction are more likely to generate legal
community interest, making inclusion in a database more likely. Worse yet, the
biasing effect of admissibility may change over time depending on state of the corpus
of published cases. A judge may be more likely to write and publish a decision when
it goes “against the grain.” Presumably, covariates could account for these nuances
(albeit crudely), but modeling is practically difficult because of the small sample
sizes, large number of jurisdictions, the hierarchical nature of the judiciary, and the
complex rules about precedent. The model’s use of case-specific random effect terms
alleviates some of these concerns — while it does not model temporality directly, the
model does account for case-by-case variation in observability.
Accounting for temporal independence could be a useful area for future research.
A big concern with legal publication is its potential to create cascade effects. If later
legal decisions are more likely to conform with earlier ones, and the observation of
18My thanks to Paul Edelman for raising this point in detail.
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earlier decisions is biased, then the effect can snowball. For example, suppose at
time 1, decisions are half admissions and half exclusions. Because of publication bias,
however, at time 2, an observer sees primarily exclusions and is therefore more likely
to exclude. Then, at time 3, due to both publication bias and the growing cascade
effect, an observer will start to see more and more “consensus” toward exclusion, even
though the consensus is an artifact of publication bias.
1.4.2 Policy Implications
The policy implications for the ideas explored in this paper are wide-ranging. To the
extent that academics, practitioners, and courts conduct informal case reviews, they
must proceed cautiously, cognizant of the possibility that observed cases may not
be representative of the underlying population. Perhaps more importantly, for more
sophisticated actors aware of case publication bias but still desiring to use published
databases, this Chapter has offered an approach and a useful model. It provides
a method for detecting and then subsequently correcting publication bias, provided
that multiple legal research databases are available.
More specifically, the application of the model to the false confession expert testi-
mony context yields concerning results that deserve further investigation. The model
suggests that the observable case law gives a distorted view of the frequency with
which courts admit FCET. An attorney or judge naively looking at available legal
databases would conclude that FCET has been poorly received (16%), whereas the
model suggests greater ambivalence among trial courts (28%). Indeed, if FCET ad-
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missibility rulings have experienced a negative cascade effect (as described above),
the underlying “true” admissibility rate might be even higher.
Finally, while the proposed bias-correction model may be an exciting and powerful
tool for addressing case publication bias, legal actors should ideally only look at it
as a temporary solution. Complicated statistical models are often necessary only
because the available data is deeply flawed, and their results, while helpful, come
at the expense of many assumptions and uncertainty. Far better would be to have
datasets without such flaws, obviating the need for the models entirely. One hope
is that greater awareness of case publication bias will lead to more comprehensive
availability of legal decisions. For example, trial judges might try to write and release
opinions regardless of outcome. State court systems could make trial transcripts
more widely available, and legal research databases could try to obtain case materials
in more systematic ways. For example, Lex Machina, the legal analytics company
spawned from Stanford’s law school and computer science department, has attempted
to independently collect its own exhaustive dataset on intellectual property cases. If
these kinds of databases were more pervasively used, the bias-correction model might
be unnecessary, and that would be a good thing.19
19A more “legal” solution would be to encourage greater uniformity of evidentiary determinations
through appellate practice reforms. For example, removing the abuse-of-discretion standard would
move the battleground of evidence law to the appellate level, where opinions are more readily
accessible. More radically, one can envision allowing the government to appeal acquittals on an




Table 1.6 provides a reference key for all the notation used in this Section 1.5.1.
Variable Definition
k Index for cases (1, . . . , K)
l Index for lists (1, . . . , L)
Ykl Observation of case k in list l
Ak Expert admitted in case k
φkl Probability that case k observed in list l
β Effect of Ak on observation
θk Random-effect term for case k
γl Random-effect term for list l
Ol Observation in list l
O∗ Observation in any list
wk Normalization term
Table 1.6: Reference Key for Independence Model
Recall that for the Independence Model, we model the observation of case k in
list l through the following regression model:
Ykl ∼ Bernoulli(φkl)
logit(φkl) = βAk + θk + γl (1.1)
θk ∼ N (0, σ2θ)
To find the corrected admissibility rate, we set up the problem using Bayes Rule,
where Ol represents observation in list l, O
∗ represents observation in any available
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Immediately we can identify several terms. The prior odds (P (A)/P (A¯)) are the
unknown quantity of interest, because P (A) is the corrected admissibility rate un-
encumbered by publication bias. The posterior odds (P (A|O∗)/P (A¯|O∗)) are easily
estimated by using the observed (uncorrected) admissibility rate. Legal observers
only see cases that are reported in some list and calculate the admissibility rate from
that potentially skewed perspective. The likelihood ratio (P (O∗|A)/P (O∗|A¯)) can
ultimately be inferred from the estimated regression coefficients in the model, but
doing so requires further elaboration.
Without loss of generality, we work with the numerator, P (O∗|A). Owing to the
fact that O∗ =
⋃
lOl, and the model assumption that the various lists are indepen-
dent:
P (O∗|A) = 1−
∏
l
(1− P (Ol|A)) (1.4)
Next, by the definition of conditional probability,
P (O∗|AOl)P (Ol|A) = P (Ol|AO∗)P (O∗|A),





P (Ol|A) = P (Ol|AO∗)P (O∗|A). (1.5)
34
Substituting (1.5) into (1.4),
P (O∗|A) = 1−
∏
l
(1− P (Ol|AO∗)P (O∗|A)).
This last relationship is key because the regression coefficients from the model are
estimates of P (Ol|AO∗), not P (Ol|A). The model estimates the probability of ob-
serving a case in list l given that the case is observed in some list (O∗). We now have
an estimator for P (O∗|A), which is implicitly expressed in the equation:
̂P (O∗|A) = 1−
∏
l
(1− logit−1(β + θk + γl) ̂P (O∗|A)))




(1− logit−1(β + θk + γl)x)) = 0
This polynomial has a trivial root at zero, as well as a real root on (0,1) whenever∑
l
̂P (Ol|AO∗) ≥ 1, a condition that will be satisfied whenever we have reasonable
estimates for ̂P (Ol|AO∗). Since the individual lists are independent, and the case
must appear on some list, then the sum of the list probabilities should be at least
one. Higher order polynomials will have additional real or complex roots, but those
appear to all have real part greater than 1, so we will ignore them.
One last complication is that the regression contains a nuisance parameter θk, the
case random effect term. Since θk parameters are normally distributed around zero,
we can arguably treat it as zero for purposes of estimation, which worked well in
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P (Ol|kAO∗)P (k|AO∗) (1.6)
The first term in (1.6) can be estimated with the regression model:
̂P (Ol|kAO∗) = logit−1(β + θk + γl), l = 1, . . . , L
The second term in (1.6), P (k|AO∗), can be estimated directly from the dataset. This
probability is uniform over all cases with admissible outcomes, and zero for all cases











, if Ak = 1
0, otherwise
.
So the revised estimator for P (O∗|A) becomes implicitly expressed in the equation:







−1(β + θk + γl) ̂P (O∗|A)))
1.5.2 Dependence Model
Table 1.7 provides a reference key for all of the notation used in Section 1.5.2.
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Variable Definition
k Index for cases (1, . . . , K)
l Index for lists (1, . . . , L, P)
Ykl Observation of case k in list l
Ak Expert admitted in case k
ZkP Whether case k is (officially) unpublished
φkl Probability that case k observed in list l
β Effect of Ak on observation
θk Random-effect term for case k
γl Random-effect term for list l
ρl Effect of being (officially) unpublished on observation in list l
Ol Observation in list l
OP Observation in official publication list (P)
O∗ Observation in any list
wk Normalization term
Rl|A Probability of being observed in list l given expert is admitted
x Root of Equation 1.10
Table 1.7: Reference Key for Dependence Model
As discussed in Section 1.2.4, we assume for this model that publication in an
official reporter is an independent determination. Observation in any other database
is influenced by (i.e., dependent on) official publication, but conditionally indepen-
dent otherwise. Using this structure, we can obtain an estimate for the corrected
admissibility rate.








As with the independence model, the prior odds are unknown, but are the quantity
of interest. The posterior odds are easily estimated by using the observed (uncor-
rected) admissibility rate. The key to estimating the corrected admissibility rate is
the likelihood ratio (P (O∗|A)/P (O∗|A¯)). Without loss of generality, we again focus
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on the numerator P (O∗|A).
Owing to the fact that O∗ =
⋃
lOl and that the lists are conditionally independent
given OP , we can use deMorgan’s Law and the product rule:
P (O¯∗|A) = P (O¯1 ∩ O¯2 ∩ . . . O¯L ∩ O¯P |A)
= P (O¯1 ∩ O¯2 ∩ . . . O¯L|O¯P , A)P (O¯P |A)
= P (O¯1|O¯P , A)P (O¯2|O¯P , A) . . . P (O¯L|O¯P , A)P (O¯P |A).
To get an estimate for P (O¯l|O¯P , A), l = 1, 2, . . . L, we note that
P (Ol, O
∗|O¯P , A) = P (Ol|O∗, O¯P , A)P (O∗|O¯P , A)
but because Ol ⊆ O∗,
P (Ol|O¯P , A) = P (Ol|O∗, O¯P , A)P (O∗|O¯P , A) (1.8)
We can estimate P (Ol|O∗, O¯P , A) by using the modified regression model in Equation
(1.2):
logit(φkl) = βAk + θk + γl + ρlZkP (1.2)
where l = 1, 2, . . . , L, P . Recall that here, ZkP = 1 − YkP , that is, ZkP is the com-
plement of YkP , which is whether case k is observed on the official publication list
P . The dependence of list l on the official publication list P is captured by the new
parameter ρl, and to avoid circularity issues, ρP is set to zero. All other elements are
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as before in Equation (1.1).
Estimates for P (Ol|O∗, O¯P , A) flow directly from the new model. To simplify the
notation, we will label these estimates Rl|A:
Rl|A = ̂P (Ol|O∗, O¯P , A) = logit−1(β + γl + ρl)
where again the nuisance parameter, θk, can be treated as zero or integrated out
formally. Note that because the probability is conditioned on A, Ak = 1, and because
it is conditioned on O¯P , ZkP = 1.
Finally, we analyze the remaining term in (1.8), which is P (O∗|O¯P , A).
P (O∗|O¯P , A) = 1− P (O¯∗|O¯P , A)
= 1− P (O¯
∗O¯P |A)
P (O¯P |A)
= 1− P (O¯
∗|A)
P (O¯P |A) , since O¯
∗ ⊆ O¯P
=
P (O¯P |A)− P (O¯∗|A)
P (O¯P |A)
=
P (O∗|A)− P (OP |A)
1− P (OP |A) . (1.9)
Since OP ⊆ O∗,
P (OP |A) = P (OPO∗|A)
= P (OP |O∗, A)P (O∗|A).
P (OP |O∗, A) can be similarly estimated using the regression model in (1.2) with
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l = P . For notational simplicity, we will label that RP |A.
RP |A = ̂P (OP |O∗, A) = logit−1(β + γP ),
where ρ has been dropped because ρP = 0. Substituting these results back into (1.9):
̂P (O∗|O¯P , A) = P (O
∗|A)−RP |AP (O∗|A)
1−RP |AP (O∗|A)
= P (O∗|A) 1−RP |A
1−RP |AP (O∗|A) .
Substituting back into (1.8):




We then substitute these results back into (1.7) to arrive at:
P (O¯∗|A) = P (O¯P |A)
L∏
l=1
P (O¯l|O¯P , A)
P (O∗|A) = 1− P (O¯P |A)
L∏
l=1
(1− P (Ol|O¯P , A))















Our estimator ̂P (O∗|A) is thus the real root x on the interval (0,1) of the polynomial:









(1− x)(1−RP |Ax)L−1 −
L∏
l=1
[1− (RP |A +Rl|A −RP |ARl|A)x] = 0. (1.10)
1.5.3 Dependence Model with Types
Section 1.5.3 uses the notation in Table 1.7 as well as Table 1.8 brlow.
Variable Definition
t Index for case types (trial or appellate)
τt Random-effect term for case type t
Tt Type t court generated an opinion in the case
Olt Observation of type t court opinion in case
Table 1.8: Additional Reference Key for Dependence Model with Types
Recall that in Equation 1.3, we revised the regression model further to account
for the type of opinion (i.e., trial, appellate, etc.):
Yklt ∼ Bernoulli(φklt)
logit(φklt) = βAk + θk + γl + τt + ρlZkP (1.3)
where τt captures the effect that the court’s level t has on the probability that its
opinion in case k is observed in list l.
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To calculate the corrected admissibility rate, we need to account for τt. In the
following analysis, all probabilities are dependent on admissibility (A) and observation
in the dataset (O∗), but we will drop the dependence notation for simplicity. Let
P (Olt) be the probability that a type t court’s opinion in case k is observed on list l,
and P (Ol) be the probability the case k is observed on list l at any court level. Then,


















P (OltOls|TtTs)P (TtTs) + . . . (1.11)
where Tt denotes the event that a type t court generated an opinion in the case.
We can readily estimate all of the values in (1.11). For the first-order summation,
P (Olt|Tt) comes directly from the regression model, since
̂P (Olt|Tt) = logit−1(β + γl + τt)
where again we have assumed either that θk ≈ 0 or we can integrate it out. We
can estimate P (Tt) directly from the dataset matrix by using the frequency at which
observed admissible cases are from level t (as opposed to other court levels).
For the higher-order summations, we note that under the model assumptions,
what happens to a case at the t level is independent of what happens to it at other
levels, so
Olt ⊥⊥ Ts, t 6= s
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Olt ⊥⊥ Ols, t 6= s
and so we can simplify the joint probabilities using the product rule. For example,










P (Olt|Tt)P (Ols|Ts)P (TtTs).
P (Olt|Tt) and P (Ols|Ts) can once again be estimated using the regression model,
whereas P (TtTs) can be estimated from the dataset matrix by looking at frequencies.
Having thus found a way to estimate P (Ol|O∗, A), the rest of the method for
correcting the observed admissibility rate in the dependence-type model proceeds as
in Section 1.5.2.
43
2 Fair Division of Attorneys’ Fees1
At the end of every class action or consolidated multidistrict settlement, a court
must decide how much to pay the group of lawyers who the court appointed to
prosecute the case on behalf of the plaintiffs. Because aggregate litigation lawyers
are appointed by courts and not selected by clients in a free market like other lawyers,
there is no possibility of paying the lawyers using voluntarily (ex ante) contractual
arrangements; the court must figure out how to do it ex post. As such, a great deal
of legal scholarship has been published to help courts decide how much to pay these
groups in total. (Fitzpatrick, 2010c,a; Eisenberg and Miller, 2010; Rubenstein, 2009).
But there is almost no scholarship on the question that inevitably follows: how should
the money be divided amongst the group?
Most of the time, this task falls to the lawyer who was appointed by the court to
be the leader of the group of lawyers, but sometimes the court tries to do it itself —
and if a dispute arises when the lead lawyer does it, then the court will have to do it
itself.2 Without guidance from scholars, lead lawyers and courts rely upon a familiar
technique: the lodestar method. That is, almost all fee allocations start with how
many hours each lawyer says he or she worked on the case multiplied by that lawyer’s
normal hourly rate. Lead lawyers and courts usually do not stop there — they usually
attempt to adjust those hours with “multipliers” that pay “more important” hours
1This chapter is joint work with Paul Edelman and Brian Fitzpatrick.
2For examples in which courts did the allocation themselves, see Allapattah Services, Inc. v.
Exxon Corp. (2006) and In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation (2013). For instances in
which the lead lawyer did the allocation with review on objection by the court for abuse of discretion,
see Victor v. Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. (2010), In re Initial Public Offering
Securities Litigation (2011), and In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation (2005).
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more handsomely than “less important” ones — but the lodestar is almost always the
foundation of every allocation. For example, in the recent NFL concussion litigation,
the lead class action lawyer proposed dividing over $100 million in fees among a dozen
or so law firms using this adjusted lodestar method, with multipliers ranging from
0.75 times the lowest firm’s lodestar to 3.885 times the highest firm’s lodestar (the
lead lawyer’s firm).
The problem with the lodestar method is that no one likes it. The vices of the
lodestar method are well known in law and economics: if lawyers are paid for the
hours they work, they will work more hours than necessary or they will pad their
time by saying they worked more hours than they did. (Fitzpatrick, 2010a, 2051-52).
They will also be insensitive to how much they recover for their clients because, so
long as they recover something, they get paid the same. (Fitzpatrick, 2010a, 2051-
52). These vices may not be very acute when a sophisticated client is around to
supervise the lawyers, but that is not the case with class action and consolidated
multidistrict litigation: the lawyers there are hired by courts, not clients, and courts
have too many things to do and are institutionally ill-suited to watch over lawyers
like a sophisticated client would. Our courts are good at adjudicating adversarial
disputes that come to them, not reaching out and finding problems to solve on their
own.
For these very reasons, courts today almost never use the lodestar method to
determine the total attorneys’ fee awarded. Fitzpatrick (2010c), for example, found
that the lodestar method was used in only 12% of class action settlements. This has
not always been the case. Before the law and economics scholarship critical of the
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lodestar method was published, most courts used the lodestar method to award fees
after successful class action settlements. The famous 1985 Third Circuit Task Force
Report authored by Arthur Miller brought much of this scholarship to the judiciary
and was instrumental in the change in favor of the so-called “percentage method.”
(Fitzpatrick, 2010a, 2051-2052). Today, under the percentage method, courts pay
the lawyers (as a group) a percentage of what they recover — typically 25% in class
actions (Fitzpatrick, 2010c, 836) and 4% in multidistrict litigation (where the lawyers
also collect a percentage from their individual clients) (Rubenstein, 2009, 88). This
arrangement eliminates any incentive to drag cases along to generate unnecessary
hours, and it makes the lawyers very sensitive to how much they recover for their
clients.
But the percentage method is hard to implement when it comes to the division of
fees. How do you decide which lawyer should get what portion of the common pool?
If you give every lawyer the same percentage, what incentive would any of them have
to do any work? If you try to award percentages based on how much you think each
lawyer contributed to the outcome of the case, how do you figure out how much each
lawyer contributed? The lawyers themselves — including the lead lawyers — have
biased perspectives on how much they contributed, and as we noted, courts typically
do not have very good information on their own regarding which lawyer did what.
Thus, almost everyone falls back on the lodestar method for dividing the pool despite
its obvious vices. (Baker et al., 2016).
The only better proposal (at least of which we are aware) is Silver and Miller (2010)
in the context of consolidated multidistrict litigation. Their solution is basically to
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manufacture a sophisticated client: they propose tasking the lawyer with the greatest
number of clients in the litigation with hiring the lawyers who will do all the work
on behalf of the plaintiffs and figuring out how much to pay them; the catch is that
the lawyer with the greatest number of clients cannot hire his or her own firm to do
this work. They argue that the lawyer with the greatest number clients will have the
incentive to hire the best people at the lowest price because that lawyer: 1) benefits
more than any other from good work (he or she has the most individual clients,
all paying him or her 33–40% in contingency fees), and 2) pays more for that work
(because he or she is likewise paying more of the 4% common-benefit fees).
It is an ingenious solution, but it only works in contexts where you can manufac-
ture a sophisticated client like this. In many consolidated multidistrict litigations, no
single law firm has that many clients, and in class action litigation very few people
have lawyers at all. Moreover, allocating fees among lawyers in aggregate litigation is
not the only place the law confronts the problem of allocating money among a group
of claimants ex post when there is no objective measure of proper distribution, but
very strong subjective (and conflicting) beliefs. The same task confronts law firms
when the partners allocate profits at the end of each year, when business associations
unwind, and when inventors and artists jointly create great works. In these contexts,
too, there is no easy way to manufacture a sophisticated client to make the division
ex post. Sometimes ex ante contracts govern these divisions, but often they do not.
How do we do it ex post?
In this Chapter, we tackle this question of proper distribution. Specifically, given a
group of firms involved in a litigation, we propose asking each firm to rate the relative
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contribution made by the other firms with which they worked, and then using this
information to reconstruct what is effectively a “consensus” division. Obviously, this
consensus division will deviate some from each individual rater’s preferences. In
addition, not all firms will be familiar with the work of all other firms, and two firms
may attempt to collude to inflate each other’s share. These are some of the issues
that we attempt to address below.
2.1 Background
The problem of how a group of claimants can equitably allocate a good among them-
selves is a fundamental one in any society. One classic technique, the “I cut, you
choose” rule dates back at least 2800 years to Hesiod’s Theogeny. (Brams and Tay-
lor, 1996, 10). It is then no surprise that the literature, both academic and popular,
is voluminous. (Brams and Taylor, 1996; Robertson and Webb, 1998; Moulin, 1991).
With very few exceptions, however, the studies have focused on the situation in which
each claimant’s right is taken as a given. That is, all the parties agree to the value of
the percentage claim of the other parties. The fundamental problem is how to design
division rules that ensure that every party feels as if they were allocated their agreed
upon share. For example, in the cake cutting problem, both parties agree that each
deserves half the cake; the problem is only how to cut it in “half.”
Our context, fee-splitting in class actions or multidistrict litigation, differs from
other fair division questions on exactly this point. Because of the difficulties outlined
in the Introduction, there is precisely no agreement on how much of the pot each
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firm merits. Thus, any mechanism to allocate the fees among the firms must decide,
explicitly or tacitly, how much each is owed. Surprisingly, until recently, there has
been little work in fair division on how to assess these values.
The first paper to consider this problem is de Clippel et al. (2008).3 Their division
rule is based on individual reports by each firm of the relative shares that each of
the other firms deserve. They then propose three requirements that a division rule
should satisfy:
1. (Strategy-proofness) The share of any firm is determined exclusively by the
reports of the other firms — its own report has no influence on its own share.
2. (Objectivity) No firm’s share is dependent on what a particular firm reports
about its own share.4
3. (Consensuality) If there is a division that is consistent with all of the reports of
all of the firms then that should be the final allocation.5
The principal result of de Clippel et al. (2008) is that there is a unique division rule
for three firms that satisfies these three requirements. In particular, if si represents
the share allocated to firm i, and rkij is Firm k’s report of the ratio of what Firm i
and Firm j should receive, then
s1 =
1














3For a more expository presentation of the same results, see Tideman and Plassmann (2008).
4B’s share is not dependent on any report that A makes about A’s value relative to anyone else.
5This terminology is taken from Tideman and Plassmann (2008).
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(de Clippel et al., 2008, Prop.1).
An example of the de Clippel rule is helpful. Suppose that there are three firms,
A, B, and C. Firm A reports that B’s work was worth twice C’s. Firm B reports
that A was worth 3 times C, and C reports that A was worth 3/2’s B. Given this
information, how should we divide up the pot? In this instance, there is a division
that is consistent with all three of the reports: A gets 1/2, B gets 1/3, and C gets
1/6.6 Thus, the property of consensuality would require exactly that allocation.
Suppose instead that Firm A reports that B’s work was worth twice C’s, Firm B
reports that A was worth 3 times C, and C reports that A was worth the same as B.
Now, there is no division that is consistent with these three reports.7 In this case, the
de Clippel rule produces the allocation of A=3/7, B=2/5, and C=1/6. (de Clippel
et al., 2008, Prop.1)
The astute observer will note that the sum of the shares of the firms do not add
to 1.8 That is, the de Clippel rule is not efficient in the sense that it forces some
of the good to go unallocated. This would seem to be problematic. One could of
course normalize the allocations, but the normalized allocation would no longer be
guaranteed to satisfy the axioms. As it turns out, however, if there are four or more
firms, a generalization of the de Clippel rule will in fact allocate all of the good.9
61/2 = 3× 1/6 = 3/2× 1/3 and 1/3 = 2× 1/6.
7To see this note that by C’s report ShareA/ShareB = 1, and by A’s report the ShareB/ShareC =
2. But then it follows that ShareA/ShareC = ShareA/ShareB × ShareB/ShareC = 1× 2 = 2 which
is inconsistent with B’s report.
83/7 + 2/5 + 1/6 ≈ 0.995
9Unfortunately, if there are more than four firms then the rule is no longer unique, i.e., there are
many rules, all satisfying the three given conditions, and all of which will be efficient. (de Clippel
et al., 2008, Thm.2).
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We could, given the results of de Clippel, et al., advocate for the use of the de
Clippel rule in the context of fee-splitting in class actions. However, as beautiful
as their work is, we find that it has some significant drawbacks in the fee-splitting
context. The first problem is that it is rather difficult to motivate and explain the
division rule. While one can appeal to the axioms and the theorems, the intuition
behind the construction is somewhat obscure. To be practical, one has to be able
to persuade the firms that the division rule is an improvement over the status quo,
and the difficulty in doing so is a major impediment to its practical usefulness. We
would expect that firms examining the difference between their desired portions and
the final assignment will want some explanation for why the outcomes are different
from what they recommended, and the de Clippel rule does not provide such an
explanation.
Second, the mathematical elegance of the de Clippel rule — that there is a unique
division rule that satisfies the three axioms — often breaks down in practice. In the
fee division context, incomplete data is common. Firms A and B may work with Firm
C, but not with each other, a situation that is particularly frequent when the number
of firms involved grows large. To use the de Clippel rule, one must have at least one
report for every pair of firms, a condition that is more readily violated than may seem
at first glance (for example, see Table 2.1 infra). (Tideman and Plassmann, 2008)
If one wants to use the version of the de Clippel rule that avoids unallocated funds,
one must have at least two reports for every pair of firms. Thus, for example, in a
division problem with Firms A, B, C, and D, to guarantee all three axioms, at least
two firms must rate AB, AC, AD, BC, BD, and CD; in other words, no missing data
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is allowed.10
Finally, the opacity of the de Clippel rule leads to one further disadvantage. If
collusion is a concern, it would be useful to see how each firm’s reports contribute to
the outcome. If one firm’s reports are vast outliers, or if a pair of firms seem to be too
cozy, it would be useful to see it overtly in the distribution rule. Such transparency
may forestall such behavior. And if firms collude anyway, perhaps it can be detected
and the firms suitably penalized.11
Our approach to the fee-splitting attempts to deal with these disadvantages by
approaching the division rule as an optimization problem. Starting with the same in-
formation as de Clippel, et al., we select the allocation that minimizes the discrepancy
between it and the firm’s reports. We do this in two ways: as a pure optimization
problem and then as a statistical model seeking best estimates. By framing the prob-
lem in this way, our methods become far more tolerant of incomplete information.
We can also be very clear about the connection between our solution and the reports
provided by the firms. We can see how the firms interact in their assessments of each
other quite explicitly. We think these explicit connections will help convince firms to
employ our techniques.
What do we lose in treating our division problem as an optimization or statistical
problem? One way to examine this is to consider which of de Clippel, et al.’s axioms
10Consider the pair AB. Neither A’s nor B’s ratings will contain the pair AB, because they are
not allowed to self-report. Therefore C’s and D’s ratings must include A and B to satisfy the two
rater requirement.
11We should note that there are technical choices in the de Clippel rule that allow one to minimize
the impact of collusion. (See Tideman and Plassmann, 2008, p.31). Such choices are buried enough
that it would be hard to make transparent which firms are contributing to the problem.
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our method satisfies. As will become clear in subsequent sections our methods sat-
isfy both the Objectivity and Consensualness axioms. Our methods are also always
efficient in that all of the good is allocated.
The one axiom that fails for our method is Strategy-Proofness. A firm’s allocation
may depend on its reports about other firms. However, as will become evident in the
next section, the connection between the allocation and the reports is attenuated,
and nearly impossible to predict a priori. Thus, we believe that it is impractical if
not literally impossible for any firm to benefit itself unilaterally by misreporting. Fur-
thermore, both the optimization and statistical approaches turn out to be inherently
collusion resistant, because the dense “web” of relative assessments prevent any one
or two sets of scores from affecting the outcome by much. We also propose additional
methods designed to resist collusion.
2.2 Problem Specification
Suppose that N firms, labeled 1, 2, . . . , N , have worked together on a litigation
matter. A court has issued a collective award of attorneys fees, and the objective is
to distribute the sum according to “desert” as defined by the firms. To begin, we ask
each firm to rate the relative contribution made by each of the other firms. We label
these observed ratings as Sij, 0 < Sij < 1 where i is the rater, and j is the rated firm.
To prevent self-dealing, a firm may not rate itself. In addition, because some firms
may not have sufficient contact with some of the other firms to make an educated
rating, some of the Sij may be missing. So for example, we might have a score matrix
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that looks like Table 2.1.
Rating for
Rater Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Firm 1 NA 0.50 0.40 0.10
Firm 2 0.70 NA 0.30 NA
Firm 3 0.85 NA NA 0.15
Firm 4 NA 0.50 0.50 NA
Table 2.1: Example Score Matrix
Note that under this construction, the row sums (
∑
j Sij) necessarily equal 1,
since each rating firm makes relative assessments among the firms for which it has
information. Missing values are NA, as distinct from a zero contribution, which are
not permitted in most of the models that follow. Given this dataset, the goal of the
approaches below is to arrive at a justified estimate for the contribution made by
each firm to the litigation as a whole. We will denote by αj the final recommended
allocation for firm j.12
2.3 Optimization
Our first approach to the fee allocation problem is optimization. We will choose
allocations {αj} so as to minimize the error between our allocations and the reports
provided by the firms themselves. We will analyze two different measures. The first is
based on pair-wise error and the second is based on the individual error of the firms.
12Further note that even a simple example like Table 2.1 already violates the de Clippel infor-
mational requirements. For example, Firms 1 and 2 are never rated together.
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2.3.1 Pairwise Error
Suppose that firm i reports on the relative contributions Sij and Sik of the two firms






A natural measure of the error produced by our allocation relative to firm i’s assess-






but this has a rather severe drawback — it is not symmetric in the firm labels j and
k. Alternatively we could choose the symmetric measure
(αk Sij − αj Sik)2 .
This formulation has two advantages. It is symmetric in the labels and it leads to a
well-behaved quadratic optimization function. Algebraically we have








So this latter measure amounts to a weighted version of our non-symmetric measure.
This weighting will magnify the error when both the report Sik and the allocated
amount αk is large. The former may happen because the reporting firm only has
information on a few other firms, thus the relative values will tend to be larger, or
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because this particular firm merited a large allocation. In either case, we think large
reports should be held to stricter requirements forcing the error they produce to be
less.













αi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
2.3.2 Individual Error
Another approach would be to focus on the individual assessments of the firms. Sup-










Unlike the earlier measure, this one exhibits no particular asymmetry. It is, however,
rather ill-behaved for optimization purposes. It also has the property of weighting all
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errors equally, even if the actual allocations involved are rather small. We can create








2 (Sij − αj∑
{k|Sik 6=0} αk
)2
as our quantification of the error in the allocation for firm i’s estimate for the relative
share for firm j. Note that now we are weighting the error by the amount of the allo-
















αi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}
2.4 Bayesian Model
An alternative approach to the problem is to use a statistical model in which each
firm’s “true” contribution to the litigation is modelled as a latent vairable, αj. Con-
tributions are measured on a relative basis, so the vector α is a unit simplex, that
is αj > 0, and
∑
j αj = 1. The αj’s are latent and therefore not directly observed.
Instead, we observe the relative ratings given by other firms, which provide informa-
tion about the αj’s indirectly and with error. In what follows, we develop Bayesian
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models of increasing sophistication to estimate αj.
2.4.1 Linear Approach
One straightforward approach is to view the observed scores (Sij) as consisting of the
“true” contribution of firm j relative to all of the other firms rated by rater i plus
some Gaussian error. So, for example, if we let i be the rating firm, j be the rated
firm, and Xik be an indicator variable for when firm i has sufficient contact with firm
k to evaluate its contribution, then the observed score can be modelled as:




, and ij ∼ N(0, σ2j ). Here we give the αj’s a flat Dirichlet
prior, since they constitute a simplex, and σj’s receive uninformative inverse-gamma
priors. (Gelman, 2006).
The model in Equation 2.1 can be extended to account for idiosyncratic raters.
For example, to the extent that certain raters produce “noisier” signals than others,
we can take a random effect approach, where the variance of the error term depends
on the rater, i.e., σi. Using a random effect may also have the benefit of making the
model resistant to strategic behavior, since the model will characterize a rater whose
ratings significantly deviate from the norm as “noisy,” and thus an aberrant rater’s




A significant limitation to the linear approach is that it fails to account for correlation
among the observation errors. Because α is a simplex, error in measuring one firm’s
contribution should negatively correlate with the error in measuring other firms’
contributions. For example, suppose Firm A rates the relative contributions of Firms
B & C. If A underestimates B’s contribution, then it must necessarily overestimate
C’s contribution, since the total relative contributions of B & C must sum to 1.
The log-ratio approach to compositional data proposed in Aitchison (1986) helps
model this correlated error. Let’s assume that we have N firms involved in the
division, and that the true (latent) contribution for each firm is represented by αj,
where j = 1, . . . N. Because the vector α is a simplex, it is completely defined by its
first n = N−1 elements.13 So instead of focusing on the individual αj’s, we can focus






, j = 1, . . . , n.
We can then view the observed log-ratios to be the true log-ratios plus some error
term. Let sij be the observed contribution of firm j as judged by firm i, and the
vector si contain all of the contributions observed by firm i except the last term
(siN), namely (sij, j = 1, . . . , n). Then, we can model those contributions as:
13αN = 1− α1 − α2 . . .− αn. As Aitchison (1986) shows, the results are invariant to which αj is







= µ+ i, (2.2)
where i ∼ N n(0,Σ),and i indexes the firm doing the judging. Here, αj, j = 1, . . . , n,
can have uniform priors on [0,1], or perhaps a weakly informative normal prior (with
appropriate constraints) since we know that the relative contributions will tend to be
in the lower part of that interval.
For ease of notation, we can borrow the notation from Aitchison (1986) and express
the model as si ∼ Ln(µ,Σ). The covariance matrix (Σ) captures interdependencies
among the firm contributions. For example, if Firm A and Firm B worked on the
same aspect of a case, then we should expect negative covariance between the error
associated with A’s contribution and B’s contribution.
One final complication to the log-ratio approach is the issue of missing data.
Recall that to prevent self-dealing, Section 2.2 specified that firms may not rate
themselves. In addition, some firms may not have sufficient information to rate all
of the other firms involved in the litigation. The estimated contributions provided
by the raters are therefore only the relative contributions of the firms for which the
rater has enough information. The approach presented thus far, however, requires
complete information.
Fortunately, because the logratio approach is based on a multivariate normal
model, it can handle relative contributions (known as subcompositions) with ease
through a linear transformation. (Aitchison, 1986). If si ∼ Ln(µ,Σ) is a complete
composition as seen in Equation 2.2, then subcomposition s˜i has the following dis-
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tribution:
s˜i ∼ Ln(µ˜, Σ˜)
µ˜ = Qµ
Σ˜ = QΣQT ,
where we construct matrix Q based on which indicies are chosen for the subcom-
position. In particular, let M be the number of firms in the subcomposition with






where Fk is the identity matrix Ik with an appended last column of -1’s (i.e., [Ik−1 :
−jk]), Z is the M × N selection matrix that creates the subcomposition, and H is
defined as H = I + J , where I is the identity matrix and J is a matrix of ones.
(Aitchison, 1986).
We apply this property frequently throughout the remainder of the chapter to do
estimates using the compositional model. For brevity, we will assume the use of this




A limitation of the basic compositional model is that it treats the rater firms as
interchangeable scientific instruments, so that each set of observed ratings is like any
other. However, certain judging firms may be more knowledgable or competent, and
thus they may have lower error in estimating contributions. Of even greater concern,
two firms may attempt to collude with each other — for example, they may agree to
rate each other at levels far in excess of their desert.
One way to address these concerns is to introduce a random effect into the compo-
sitional model to account for rater variability. To do this, we can use a decomposition
of the covariance matrix:
Σ = ΩDΩT ,
where D is a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues, σj, corresponding to the “scale” of the
covariance. We then assume that D has takes the form:
D = γiD˜,
where D˜ is a diagonal matrix with elements σ˜j, 0 ≤ σ˜j ≤ 1, and γi is the random effect
measuring the variability (or reliability) of the rating firm i. We assume that the γi
arise from a common normal distribution with zero mean and common variance.
The random-effects model directly addresses accuracy differences among different
firms. It also helps resist collusion. Consider this example: suppose that there are 10
firms in the pool, and Firm 4 and Firm 5 collude to give higher ratings to each other.
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Since Firm 4’s estimate of Firm 5’s contribution will deviate from the assessments
made by the other eight firms, the model will estimate γ4 to be quite high, effectively
downweighting Firm 4’s observations. A similar downweighting will occur due to
Firm 5’s estimate of Firm 4’s contributions. Such collusion protection is less effective
when the number of firms is small, because detecting “outlier” ratings will be difficult
if not impossible. But the random effect model provides some incentive and assurance
against collusive behavior when there is a substantial number of firms.
2.5 Examples of Implementation
Simulation 1. The first simulation uses the example data introduced in Section
2.2 and reproduced in Table 2.2. The authors constructed the dataset by taking the
ground truth (obviously not observed by the model) and then playing the role of each
of the rating firms and doing rough estimates of the other firms. So, for example,
Firm 2 only rates Firm 1 and Firm 3, whose contributions in truth should be in
a 5:2 ratio, but which we made roughly 70/30. As seen in Table 2.2, the models
do a reasonable job estimating the “true” contribution values.14 The compositional
model is notably less accurate, and we suspect this is because of the limited data
available (and relatively large number of parameters) in a four firm problem. The
posterior distributions of the estimates for the compositional model exhibit a lot of
variance, probably due to overfitting. For example, as seen in Table 2.3, the credibility
14The Bayesian models were estimated using MCMC methods using the Stan statistical modeling
platform. Visual checks of the trace plots suggest that the linear model has difficulty mixing, likely
because of the (unmodeled) correlated errors. The compositional model exhibits no such issues.
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intervals for the compositional model’s estimates are much wider that those for the
linear model. These issues (and the relative success of the other methods) suggest
that future work might consider some kind of regularization for the compositional
model when dealing with small numbers of firms.
Rating for
Rater Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Firm 1 NA 0.50 0.40 0.10
Firm 2 0.70 NA 0.30 NA
Firm 3 0.85 NA NA 0.15
Firm 4 NA 0.5 0.5 NA
Truth 0.50 0.25 0.20 0.05
Opt Pair 0.48 0.24 0.21 0.07
Opt Indiv 0.48 0.24 0.21 0.07
Bayes Linear 0.49 0.21 0.21 0.09
Bayes Comp 0.41 0.28 0.24 0.06
Table 2.2: Data and Results for Simulation 1
Credibility Interval for
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4
Linear (50% CI) (0.49, 0.49) (0.21, 0.21) (0.21, 0.21) (0.09, 0.09)
Linear (95% CI) (0.41, 0.50) (0.20, 0.26) (0.20, 0.26) (0.07, 0.09)
Comp (50% CI) (0.22, 0.52) (0.15, 0.42) (0.14, 0.31) (0.04, 0.08)
Comp (95% CI) (0.01, 0,89) (0.01, 0.85) (0.01, 0.66) (0.01, 0.17)
Table 2.3: Credibility Intervals for Bayesian Estimates in Simulation 1
Simulation 2. The second simulation uses the data in Table 2.4. The dataset
was constructed similarly to Simulation 1, except that it involves a larger group
of firms and therefore more ratings. We also informally increased the amount of
measurement error and introduced more missing data values. With six firms, all
of the models perform well at recovering the “truth.” Once again, the credibility
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intervals for the Bayesian compositional model’s estimates are much wider that those
for the Bayesian linear model, as seen in Table 2.5,15 and visual checks of the trace
plots yielded results similar to Simulation 1.
Rating for
Rater Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6
Firm 1 NA 0.60 0.30 NA 0.10 NA
Firm 2 0.50 NA 0.20 0.30 NA NA
Firm 3 NA NA NA 0.50 0.25 0.25
Firm 4 NA 0.45 0.30 NA 0.15 0.10
Firm 5 0.50 0.50 NA NA NA NA
Firm 6 0.60 NA NA 0.35 0.05 NA
Truth 0.30 0.30 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.05
Opt Pair 0.29 0.27 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.07
Opt Indiv 0.29 0.27 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.07
Bayes Linear 0.28 0.28 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.08
Bayes Comp 0.32 0.28 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.05
Table 2.4: Data and Results for Simulation 2
Credibility Interval for
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 4 Firm 5 Firm 6
Linear (50% CI) (0.28, 0.30) (0.28, 0.30) (0.11, 0.15) (0.15, 0.17) (0.05, 0.08) (0.06, 0.08)
Linear (95% CI) (0.24, 0.32) (0.25, 0.35) (0.11, 0.18) (0.10, 0.19) (0.02, 0.08) (0.05, 0.14)
Comp (50% CI) (0.22, 0.41) (0.18, 0.32) (0.10, 0.18) (0.10, 0.19) (0.04, 0.07) (0.04, 0.06)
Comp (95% CI) (0.04, 0.71) (0.05, 0.58) (0.10, 0.40) (0.10, 0.40) (0.01, 0.12) (0.01, 0.10)
Table 2.5: Credibility Intervals for Bayesian Estimates in Simulation 2
Simulation 3. The problem with manual encoding is that measurement errors
are introduced in a haphazard and uncontrolled way. Thus, the “truth” is no longer
really the truth, since our manual coding may inadvertently bias things in some
direction. For the third simulation, we adopted a more systematic approach: We
began with the “true” distribution among 10 firms. Then for each rater, we added
15Hereafter, we will forego reporting credibility intervals in the interests of brevity.
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independent normal error to each component, where the standard deviation of the
error was set at 20% of the true value (to model the fact that people are perhaps
less precise when observing larger quantities). We then randomly dropped some of
these components, although to make things more realistic, more “involved” firms
(those entitled to a greater share) were more likely to observe a greater number of
their peers. Finally, we renormalized the observations so that the relative shares all
added to one. The resulting set of observations was labelled the ”Baseline” set for
the simulation.
To simulate collusive behavior, we then assumed that Firms 4 and 5 agreed to
inflate each other’s scores. Table 2.6 shows an example of the baseline (no collusion)
set of observations for Firms 4 and 5, and then the affected (collusion) set for the
same two firms. Note that as a result of the collusion, Firm 4’s rating for Firm 5 is
about twice as large, whereas Firm 5, who would have not rated Firm 4 at all, instead
rates Firm 4 greater than Firm 1, the greatest contributor in the set. Those inflated
scores then have concomitant downstream effects on the other firms rated.
Rating for Firm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Baseline 4 0.42 NA 0.28 NA 0.19 NA 0.11 NA NA NA
Baseline 5 0.36 0.26 0.21 NA NA 0.17 NA NA 0.079 0.083
Collusion 4 0.32 NA 0.21 NA 0.39 NA 0.08 NA NA NA
Collusion 5 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.39 NA 0.10 NA NA NA NA
Table 2.6: Baseline and Collusion Data for Simulation 3
Table 2.7 displays the true contribution for each of the ten firms in Simulation 3,
and the results of the various models on the Baseline and Collusion datasets. Three
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results are especially worthy of note. First, the outputs of the four models are again
quite similar. Second, the models seem to have some natural resistance to collusion,
probably because they rely on the observations of so many other firms. Despite Firm
4 and Firm 5’s significant attempts to inflate their scores, they are at best only able
to modestly affect outcomes by a few percentage points, which is often within the
general noise we see in the table. Third, the Bayesian collusion resistant model seems
able (at least in this example) to negate the distortion created by Firm 5’s collusive
efforts.
Allocation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Truth 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.025 0.025
Baseline Set
Opt Pair 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.032 0.026
Opt Indiv 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.029 0.024
Bayes No Resist 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.028 0.028
Bayes Resist 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.032 0.029
Collusion Set
Opt Pair 0.20 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.08 0.058 0.043
Opt Individual 0.20 0.15 0.11 0.16 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.045 0.036
Bayes No Resist 0.24 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.028 0.028
Bayes Resist 0.25 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.027 0.027
Table 2.7: Results for Simulation 3
One should bear in mind that all of these results are subject to random variation.
We construct the baseline dataset through random processes, and the process of
constructing the collusion set (which attempts to distort the baseline set) also has
random aspects. Further, the estimation procedure for the Bayesian model, which
uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, also has random aspects. To
get a better sense of average model performance for the Bayesian models, we ran a
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procedure similar to Simulation 3 (dataset generation as well as model estimation)
twenty times, measuring the performance of the models by calculating the sum of





The results of this exercise are seen in Table 2.8. It shows that the non-collusion-
resistant model predictably performs less well on the collusion dataset than on the
baseline dataset. This result is of course expected, since the colluders are distorting
the observations. The collusion-resistant model, however, seems able to counteract
some of the collusion, getting on average closer to the “truth” than the non-resistant
model.
Dataset / Bayesian Model
Baseline / No Resist Collusion / No Resist Collusion / Resist
Mean Performance 1.49E-3 2.65E-3 1.98E-3
Table 2.8: Average Mean Squared Error from 20 Runs of Simulation 3
2.6 Discussion
Both the optimization and statistical methods offer more viable and flexible methods
for solving the fee division problem. They are more easily understood and interpreted:
The optimization method seeks a compromise that minimizes the error between it
and the firm reports. The statistical method determines the most likely underlying
“true” allocation assuming that the firm reports are noisy estimates of this truth.
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The proposed methods are also capable to handling incomplete data and are robust
to collusion, with the collusion resistant Bayesian model being particularly so. In
addition, in simulations, the methods consistently yield allocations that accord with
each other and that are close to the ground truth. The close agreement between
the optimization and statistical models may seem remarkable at first, but further
consideration may suggest that it should be unsurprising. As we know from the
Gauss-Markov Theorem in the linear regression context, the least squares estimator
(optimization approach) is the best linear unbiased estimator (statistical approach).
Perhaps what we see here is a compositional data variant of the Gauss-Markov The-
orem, although further research would be needed to ascertain which precise methods
are linked and under what conditions.
2.6.1 Self-Reporting
One potentially significant limitation of our proposal is its prohibition on self-reports
— firms rating themselves. This limitation raises two concerns. First, firms may
object to these procedures because they cannot provide any direct input on the share
they receive. Part of this objection may rest on some kind of participation value,
but it may be also related to information costs. Arguably, the firm with the best
(although not unbiased) information on what Firm A did during a litigation is Firm A
itself. By not allowing self-reporting, we may be throwing away valuable information.
Second, if firms are unable to self-report, what incentive do they have to make careful
assessments about other firms? When a firm is self-reporting, it is highly motivated
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to get other firm contributions right, because its own contribution will be assessed
relative to those other contributions. When a firm cannot self-report, the relationship
between its assessment of other firms and what the rater firm ultimately receives may
appear much more tenuous.
The good news is that our methods are actually capable of handling self-reporting.16
Just as the methods exhibit natural resistance to collusion, they also resist distortions
caused by overly generous self-reports. Much of this resistance likely comes from the
dense, interlocking web of relative ratings that effectively prevents any one set of rat-
ings from distorting the outcomes. In the case of the collusion resistance model, there
are further helpful incentives at play. Due to the presence of the random effect term, a
self-report that significantly departs from the underlying consensus effectively causes
the model to “discount” that rater firm’s report. Thus, if a firm wishes its report to
be taken seriously, it would be wise to rate itself and the other firms carefully and
accurately.
To test how our methods handled self-reports, we extended the simulation in Table
2.7 to have self-reports. We estimated the allocations for four sets of data, all based
on the original baseline set from Simulation 3: i) the baseline set as before; ii) the
baseline set plus unbiased self-reports; iii) the baseline set with self-reports where
Firm 3 doubled its own rating; iv) the baseline set with self-reports where Firm 9
quadrupled its own rating. As seen in Table 2.9, the models appear unfazed by the
addition of self-reports, whether unbiased or distortive.
16Our thanks to Ben Alarie for pointing out this possibility.
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Rating for Firm
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Truth 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.025 0.025
Opt Pair
No Self-Report 0.24 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.032 0.026
Unbiased Self-Report 0.23 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.024 0.025
Firm 3 Inflated Self 0.23 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.026 0.027
Firm 9 Inflated Self 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.060 0.024
Opt Indiv
No Self-Report 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.029 0.024
Unbiased Self-Report 0.23 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.025 0.025
Firm 3 Inflated Self 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.028 0.029
Firm 9 Inflated Self 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.053 0.023
Bayes No Resist
No Self-Report 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.028 0.028
Unbiased Self-Report 0.24 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.027 0.027
Firm 3 Inflated Self 0.23 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.027 0.027
Firm 9 Inflated Self 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.030 0.028
Bayes Resist
No Self-Report 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.032 0.029
Unbiased Self-Report 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.025 0.025
Firm 3 Inflated Self 0.26 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.025 0.025
Firm 9 Inflated Self 0.22 0.16 0.13 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.032 0.028
Table 2.9: Results for Self-Report Simulation
2.6.2 Data Concerns
Our proposal has significantly more relaxed data requirements than the de Clippel
rule, since it merely requires that every firm be rated by some other firm, not that
every pair of firms be rated by some other firm. However, for the methods to be
effective, not only do the firms have to be rated, but there must be some degree of
interconnection between the various ratings. It is unlikely that any firm will have no
ratings, but small-share firms may have only one point of connection to the broader
group. For example, A, B, and C all work together, but D only interacts with C. Such
small-share firms are somewhat vulnerable to the whims of their connection point.
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Another structure that could be troubling is a dumbbell-shaped social network where
one firm is the link between two groups of firms (ie., a low-degree vertex with high
betweenness). In this situation, the relative weights within the groups may be well
estimated, but the weight between the two groups will depend entirely on the link
firm. Whether this dumbbell shape creates problems in practice though is unclear.
After all, one suspects that how satisfied a firm is with its allocation depends on how
its portion compares to firms with which it is familiar, not portions received in the
foreign half of the dumbbell.
Another potential concern is that ratings will be correlated with share size. This
bias can occur in two ways. One possibility is that prominence can psychologically
affect the perception of a firm’s contribution. The other is that people may not
assess small differences in proportions very well – for example, the difference between
33% and 50% is better understood than the difference between 3.3% and 5%. The
extent that these biases are true is an empirical question and will require additional
investigation. For now, we only argue that the direction of the bias is completely
unclear ex ante. A rater may perceive a large-share firm as being overly important
because of its prominence, or a rater may perceive a small-share firm as being overly
important because of a bias toward awarding equal shares to each entity. Similarly,
any round-off error associated with small values presumably cuts in both directions.
And round-off error can be reduced in litigations featuring a large number of firms
by simply reducing the maximum number of firms than any rater can assess (which
will have the effect of increasing the relative proportions involved).
A system based on peer ratings may also be susceptible to preening as well as
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racial or gender bias concerns. Since allocations are based on peer perception, firms
may waste resources trying to look good. Similarly, peer ratings may incorporate
unstated biases against women or minority attorneys. We concede that these are po-
tential problems with any system reliant on peer ratings, but nothing in our proposal
exacerbates them. The analog to preening in the lodestar context is running up bil-
lable hours, a far more effective and predictable way of increasing one’s share of the
fees than preening. As for discrimination, the weights used in the lodestar method is
also a way in which bias can creep into its “objective” calculus. And at least for our
statistical method, in cases with a large number of firms, it may be possible to use
covariates to check for possible race effects both for raters and ratees.
Finally, we note that nothing in our proposal requires that the raters in our
scheme be identical to the rated firms. So a court could easily add to the dataset its
own assessment of the firms (or the assessments of consultants or special masters) to
address any of the above concerns. For reasons stated in the Introduction, we doubt
that courts or special masters will often have such superior information so as to justify
this strategy. Also, a single set of ratings is unlikely to influence the outcome, for
the same reasons that make our methods collusion resistant. Nonetheless, courts can
use this option as a safety valve, especially if they weight the “neutral” ratings more
heavily in the model.
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3 Latent Space Models for Legal Doctrine
Legal researchers frequently use a case’s doctrinal area or subject matter as a stan-
dard covariate or predictor. For example, the well-known Supreme Court Database
divides the United States Supreme Court’s cases into fourteen major subject areas,
such as First Amendment, Criminal Procedure, and Judicial Power. The database
then breaks down these major areas into smaller issue areas based on the legal issues
presented. (Spaeth et al., 2013). Subject matter can be useful to researchers because
of its correlation with judicial attitudes, precedential weight, case complexity, and a
whole host of other attributes that may be relevant to a given study. Convention-
ally, however, a case’s subject matter has been manually coded, leading to concerns
about subjectivity, arbitrariness, and confirmation bias in the coding. (Harvey and
Woodruff, 2011, 423)
To address these concerns, this Chapter proposes using case citations to estimate
the “location” of cases in a latent subject matter space as an alternative to manual
coding. Then, using a dataset of First Amendment cases, we show that the citation-
derived latent space model produces a usable map of First Amendment doctrine. The
map correlates well with what legal actors might expect, captures crossovers between
doctrinal areas, and avoids the subjectivity of manual coding.
3.1 Motivation and Literature Review
As Harvey and Woodruff (2011) and Sherry (2004) note, the manual classification of
legal cases into discrete doctrinal categories can be an artificial and fraught exercise.
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(Harvey and Woodruff, 2011; Sherry, 2004). Because manual classification is subjec-
tive, resesarchers will often disagree about the proper category. In addition, because
cases cut across traditional doctrinal categories, selecting a single classification can
arbitrary, oversimplistic, and possibly distorting. Take, for example, City of Erie vs.
Pap’s A.M., a Supreme Court case involving a local public indecency ordinance and
an adult entertainment club. Within First Amendment doctrine, does one classify
City of Erie as an obscenity case or one about commercial speech? To the extent
that the city was concerned about “secondary effects” — crimes associated with the
presence of adult establishments — should City of Erie be classified as a “forum
doctrine” case as well?
Worse yet, Harvey and Woodruff (2011) has suggested that the manual coding of
issue areas in the widely used Supreme Court Database, (Spaeth et al., 2013), may be
afflicted by confirmation bias. Specifically, Harvey and Woodruff (2011) found that
for cases that implicated several plausible issue areas, “the assignment of issue codes
. . . [was] conditional on both case disposition and the known preferences of the
deciding court.” Understandably, how we subjectively classify a case may depend on
its outcome, but that kind of confirmation bias makes existing datasets problematic
for models attempting to predict or explain legal outcomes.
To address these coding issues, we propose using citation networks as the means
for characterizing cases. Citations, a familiar mainstay of traditional legal argument,
have drawn recent interest among researchers interested in social network theory.
For example, Fowler et al. (2007) and Fowler and Jeon (2008) collect all citations
among United States Supreme Court cases through 2005 and construct a network to
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identify the most important precedents over time. Lupu and Fowler (2013) use the
Supreme Court case citation network to ascertain whether Supreme Court justices
cite precedent strategically. Other scholars have investigated ways for representing
the Supreme Court’s citation network. (Bommarito II et al., 2009). For example,
Rabina and Sula (2015) produces data visualizations of the First Amendment cita-
tion network. These prior citation network studies, however, study the networks as
networks, and do not involve the use of probability models to measure distance or to
classify cases. Dunn and Ruiz (2015) discusses an algorithm for determining whether
a case is a “patent case” using the unknown case’s citations, but it is restricted to
this classification problem and relies on manually tagged opinions.
Perhaps the closest prior work to the models proposed below is Clark and Laud-
erdale (2010), which uses a latent space model to locate Supreme Court justices and
their opinions in a common ideological space. Their efforts, however, treat case ci-
tations as a measure of ideological endorsement, and focus on testing theories about
Supreme Court bargaining.
3.2 Methods
We build on the latent space approach to social networks first proposed by Hoff et al.
(2002). We model all of the cases as existing in an unobserved latent space, which we
assume to be two-dimensional here for demonstration purposes. The likelihood of case
k citing case l depends on the Euclidean distance between them, and is conditionally
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independent of all other citations given the cases’ positions. Specifically, we assume
logit(qkl) = α− ||xk − xl||2 (3.1)
Ckl ∼ Bern(qkl)
where qkl is the probability that case k cites case l, Ckl is a binary observation rep-
resenting whether k actually cites l, α is a scaling parameter, and xk is the latent
(two-dimensional) position of case k. Unlike more conventional social networks, case
citation networks are unidirectional, because earlier cases cannot cite later ones. Un-
der the proposed model, we treat such “prospective” citations (citations to future
cases) as missing values rather than as zero or “non-citation.” This coding is impor-
tant because we are using citations as evidence of subject matter affinity between
cases. The failure of an earlier case to cite a later one is not due to lack of affinity but
rather lack of opportunity. An alternative coding would be to impose symmetry, so
that a citation from a newer case A to an older case B implies a prospective citation
from B to A.
Latent space models notoriously have rotational indeterminacy problems, because
the likelihood is invariant to a rotation of the entire latent space. This indeterminacy
is closely analogous to the “label switching” problem in mixture models, in which the
labels for the various elements of the mixtures can be arbitrarily permuted. (Jasra
et al., 2005). The latent space estimated here is no different, since the locations of
xk can be rotated with impunity. The sampling estimates must therefore be suitably
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transformed to yield meaningful results, for which a generalized Procrustes analysis
is the conventional approach. (Hoff et al., 2001; Martin and Quinn, 2002; Dryden
and Mardia, 1998).
A natural extension of the model is to include random effect terms to capture
case-specific attributes and to prevent them from contaminating the latent position
estimates. For a variety of reasons, certain cases may be more generous in their
citation to other cases, Lupu and Fowler (2013), and that greater propensity to cite
should not be conflated with topic affinity. On the flip side, some cases are more
likely to be cited for reasons unrelated to their topic affinity – for example, because
they are more famous or broader in scope. Adding two sets of random effects controls
for these effects:
logit(qkl) = α + γk + δl − ||xk − xl||2, (3.2)
where γk is the random effect for the citing case, and δl for the cited case.
We can generalize this model beyond a binary regression to consider the strength
of the citation link. For example, since “closeness” is likely related to the citation
intensity (the proportion of citations that a case occupies), a beta regression might
be an option, or one can use a Poisson regression to capture the number of citations
to a case. For purposes of this Chapter, however, we will focus on binary regression.
3.2.1 Controlling for Strategic Citation
One important concern for the latent space model is strategic citation, specifically
citation based on ideology. Citing past precedent is a form of persuasion, and thus
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one would expect opinion writers to be more likely to cite cases in support of their
outcome. Credibility of course demands that any judicial opinion cite all directly
relevant precedent, but at the margin, whether a case is cited or omitted may be
closely correlated with outcome. To the extent that we would like the latent citation
space to reflect subject matter only, the model needs to control for strategic citation
to avoid clusters based on outcome.
A straightforward way to control for strategic citation is to code cases for ideo-
logical outcome and use that information as a covariate. For example,
logit(qkl) = α + γk + δl − ||xk − xl||2 + βZkl (3.3)
where Zkl is a binary variable representing whether case k and case l have the same
ideological outcome (liberal or conservative). The problem with this approach, how-
ever, is that it again involves manual coding and the subjectivity and arbitrariness
that entails. Whether an outcome is liberal or conservative is frequently unclear —
for example, an opinion promoting the free exercise of religion may be “conservative”
because it furthers current Republican political platforms, or it may be “liberal” be-
cause it strengthens civil rights. Cases can also have some conservative outcomes and
some liberal ones.
To control for strategic citation without manual coding, we propose using justice
agreement as a measure of outcome similarity. Justices choose to either join, concur,
or dissent with a majority opinion, a relatively more objective observation. (Because
recent Supreme Court justices have a tendency to fracture their votes, agreeing to
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some parts and disagreeing with others, even coding “join” votes involves some sub-
jectivity. Such fracturing is notably less frequent at lower appellate levels, and so this
subjectivity will be considerably reduced outside the Supreme Court context.) If a
justice joins both case k and case l, that gives an indication that the two cases have
similar ideological outcomes. If a justice joins one but dissents on the other, then
those cases are likely different, at least in that justice’s perspective. By tallying the
number of justices who vote similarly versus dissimilarly on two cases, we can get a
sense of how close the cases are ideologically.





where j indexes the J justices who participated in both case k and l, and Zjkl captures
whether justice j voted in the same way in cases k and l. Using this similarity
measure avoids the hazards of ideological coding, and allows the justices, and not
some researcher-defined distinction between liberal and conservative, to tell us which
outcomes go together. A justice voting the same way in two cases provides evidence
that those two cases cohere under some perspective, whether political, philosophical,
legal, or otherwise, and to the extent the two cases cohere, they are more likely to
cite each other.
A potential problem with the above agreement metric is missing data. Model 3.4
requires the existence of “bridge justices” who participate in both case k and case
l. Because Supreme Court justices tend to have long tenures, some case pairs will
have such bridge justices, but for cases substantially separated in time, the number
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of bridge justices will be few if not zero. We can address this problem by modelling
the agreement metric through a (one-dimensional) latent space, this time for case
ideology, and then using those results as a covariate in the citation space model.
Zkl ∼ Bern(θkl)
θkl = αa − ||yk − yl||2 (5a)
where for any pair of cases k and l, the probability of having a justice vote the same
way on both cases is θkl, our measure of ideological similarity. Observed agreements
or disagreements (of which there may be up to nine), Zkl, are treated as independent
Bernoulli draws with that latent probability. αa is a scaling parameter, and yk is case
k’s position in a latent ideological space. αa has a flat normal prior. The yk’s have
normal priors with some common variance, σy, which itself has a flat or weak Cauchy
prior. (Gelman, 2006). A Euclidean latent ideological space offers a good conceptual
fit because it preserves the transitive properties of a similarity metric. If case k is
ideologically similar to case l, and case l is similar to case m, we would expect k to be
similar to m. The latent space allows us to borrow strength across cases and impute
the agreement metric for time-separated cases.
We can then use the estimates for θ from Equation 5a as covariates in a citation
model similar to Model 3.4.
Ckl ∼ Bern(qkl)
logit(qkl) = αc + γk + δl − ||xk − xl||2 + βθˆkl (5b)
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where αc and β have flat normal priors, the γk’s have normal priors with mean zero
and some common variance σγ, and the δl’s have normal priors with mean zero and
some common variance σδ. As we are assuming a two-dimensional latent space for
this study, the xk have multivariate normal priors with mean at the origin and a
common covariance matrix.
3.2.2 Predicting Future Votes and Cases
In theory, one can also make predictions of future Supreme Court votes by adapting
Equations 5a and 5b. Such a model, however, implicitly assumes that justices only
vote on the basis of ideology, rather than on “legal” factors such as precedent. In
addition, Model 5b is designed to estimate doctrinal space, using judge agreement as
a rough measure of ideological similarly, and thus it may be a rather blunt instrument
for prediction purposes. Regardless, the predictive power of such an ideology-based
model is arguably worth investigating, and the model has the important advantage
of making predictions without any need for (or risk of) manual coding.
To predict a case, which we label as k˜, we focus on the lower court opinion, since
by definition pending cases have no associated Supreme Court ruling. In keeping with
the model’s emphasis on “agreement,” we estimate the probability that a given justice
will “agree” with the lower court opinion, which directly translates into a predicted
vote to affirm. The given justice can also “disagree,” which naturally translates into
a predicted vote to reverse.
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The prediction procedure proceeds as follows:
Step 1: Estimate Latent Spaces with Training Set. We estimate Models
5a and 5b using a training dataset of existing Supreme Court opinions, obtaining
parameter estimates for αa, αc, and β, as well as the latent space locations (xk, yk)
and random effect terms (γk, δk) for each case k in the training set.
Step 2: Estimate Location of Test Cases. We then fit the following model
using the test data:
Ck˜l ∼ Bern(qk˜l)
logit(qk˜l) = α̂c + γk˜ + δ̂l − ||xk˜ − x̂l||2 + βˆ logit−1(α̂a − ||yk˜ − ŷl||2) (6)
where k˜ = K + 1, . . . , K + K˜ are the testing set cases with lower court opinions, and
l = 1, . . . , K are the training set of Supreme Court opinions. Ck˜l are the citations
observed in the lower court opinion of case k˜.
The only parameters to be estimated in Model 6 are the random effect terms γk˜,
and the latent space positions, xk˜ and yk˜. The model treats all remaining would-be
parameters as fixed, as emphasized by the hats (e.g., x̂k). These fixed parameters
were estimated in Step 1 using the training set of Supreme Court opinions. Fixing
them here is conceptually justified because the underlying latent spaces are defined
by the training set. All we are doing at the prediction stage is locating the test case k˜
in those latent spaces. Thus, the unknown parameters γk˜, xk˜, and yk˜ are all assumed
to arise from the same hyperdistributions previously estimated.
Step 3: Calculate Predicted Votes. Given the estimates found in Step 2, we
can calculate the probability that a given justice will vote to affirm the lower court
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opinion in case k˜. From Equation 5a, we estimate θk˜l, the probability that a justice
will vote the same way (i.e., agree or disagree with both) in the prediction case k˜ and
training case l.
logit(θ̂k˜l) = α̂a − ||ŷk˜ − ŷl||2
Next, we use θ̂k˜l along with the justice’s known voting record, which we will
label Vjl, l = 1, . . . K. For ease of notation, we code Vjl as 1 when the justice joins
the majority opinion, -1 when the justice dissents, and 0 when the justice did not
participate.
Assume (without loss of generality) that the justice’s vote in k˜ will be to affirm
(i.e, Vjk˜ = 1). Then, the agreement vector, z
A, which describes whether a justice
voted the same way in case k˜ and case l contains elements:
zAjl = Vjl,
where zA is coded 1 for same, -1 for different, and 0 for unknown. We can generate
an analogous vector, zR, under the opposite assumption that the justice’s vote in k˜
will be to reverse (i.e., Vjk˜ = −1). In this latter case,
zRjl = −Vjl.
Finally, because the justice’s voting record Vjl is fixed, the only random variable
is the vote in k˜, and the only two possible values for the agreement vector z are zA
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and zR. Accordingly,














































Note that given the 1 and -1 coding, the equations above are those typical of a series
of independent Bernoulli random variables. Missing values for Vjl, which are coded
0, would appear to create spurious product terms but because those spurious terms
arise in both pA and pR whenever Vjl is missing, they cancel out.
Predictions follow directly by using a threshold such as 0.5, but more importantly,
this equation generates a probability for an affirm vote, which gives us a measure of
confidence for our prediction. Combining the predicted votes for all nine sitting
justices generates a prediction for the outcome in case k˜.
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3.3 Application and Discussion
The United States Supreme Court provides a natural starting point for any study
of legal doctrine. Supreme Court cases have been intensively studied by legal and
political scholars alike, and they form something of a baseline in the literature on
judicial decision making. As an application of the above latent space models, we
thus chose First Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court between 1946 and
2002. The choice of the First Amendment is largely arbitrary, though it is attractive
as a well-defined area in which the Supreme Court regularly hears important cases.
We chose to limit the time frame to 1946– 2001 for training purposes and 2002 for
test purposes largely for convenience and comparison reasons. The 2002 Term was
the year used for the most well-known attempt at Supreme Court prediction. (Ruger
et al., 2004).
The data used primarily came from well-known and well-used sources. Citation
network data came from the Supreme Court Citation Network dataset developed by
Fowler and Jeon (2008). (See also Fowler et al., 2007). Fowler and Jeon (2008) pro-
vides a comprehensive list of case citations between Supreme Court majority opinions.
Other case specific information such as the justices’ votes and case dispositions came
from the Supreme Court Database from Spaeth et al. (2013). For prediction model-
ing, we manually coded the citations of the lower court opinions associated with the
2002 Term cases.
After suitably combining these data sources in R, Models 5a, 5b, and 6 were fit
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods using the STAN statistical computing
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platform. (Stan, 2015). Visual checks of the trace plots were performed to ensure
proper mixing. The R script and the STAN code are available in the Appendix.
Figure 3.1: Estimated Latent Space for First Amendment Cases
3.3.1 Doctrinal Space
Figure 3.1 displays the result of applying Models 5a and 5b to First Amendment cases
from 1946-2001. The colors in Figure 3.1 represent the First Amendment subissue
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involved in the case as manually coded in the Supreme Court Database. As noted
earlier, such manual classifications can raise concerns about oversimplication and
bias, but they nevertheless provide a convenient way of validating the model.
Models 5a and 5b are able to separate disparate areas of First Amendment law.
Conscientious objector cases occupy their own region in the upper left, whereas areas
such as libel, commercial speech, security, and obscenity occupy distinct regions of
the latent space. At the same time, the latent space is able to capture “crossover”
areas. Many religion cases involve both free exercise and establishment aspects, as
evinced by the overlap of the light and dark blue regions. The religion cases as a
whole, however, correctly separate from the rest of First Amendment doctrine, which
generally deal with speech, not religion. Forum doctrine cases often overlap with
other areas of First Amendment doctrine, and thus the forum cases are mixed in
with commercial speech, obscenity, and campaign finance.
City of Erie, the adult entertainment case discussed in Section 3.1, is labelled
with a star in Figure 3.1. It sits at the intersection of forum doctrine, commercial
speech, libel, and obscenity, but contrary to the obscenity classification given to it
by a manual coder, the latent space suggests that legally speaking, it is more of a
commercial speech case than anything else.
One final advantage seen in Figure 3.1 is found in the gray points, which corre-
spond to cases which manual coders labelled as miscellaneous, a classification with
little content. For these cases, the latent space model finds a position in doctrinal
space rather than leaving them unclassified.
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3.3.2 Prediction
Applying the procedure outlined in Section 3.2.2, we used the 1946-2001 dataset along
with citations from the lower court opinions in the 2002 cases to generate predictions
for the justices’ votes on First Amendment cases for the 2002 Term. The results were
a disappointing 30% accuracy rate, a marked contrast from the model’s mapping
of doctrinal space.1 The fault for the poor performance does not rest with the use
of lower court opinions (which may cite precedent differently from Supreme Court
opinions). Running the same procedure using the citations found in the ultimate
Supreme Court opinions fares no better.
One possible explanation for the poor predictive performance is that the key
parameter estimates may be too noisy for prediction. When mapping doctrinal space,
the model aggregates the justices votes to generate a rough estimate of ideological
similarity. This similarity measure may be useful for controlling for ideology (a fact
further supported by the fact that the estimate for β is relatively large and has
a narrow posterior distribution). However, the ideological similarity measure may
not contain enough information to help predict the justice’s votes. First, the point
estimates for the θkl’s are all quite close to 0.5 (typically ranging from 0.4 to 0.7).
Second, the predictions generated by the model frankly lack nuance. The model
predicted “affirm” for all of the justices in all cases except for Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Scalia and Thomas, for whom it uniformly predicted “reverse.”
1By contrast, Ruger et al. (2004) has a roughly 80% accuracy rate in predicting the justices’
votes in the 2002 First Amendment cases, whether one uses the outcomes as coded in Ruger et al.
(2004) or in Spaeth et al. (2013). To calculate the accuracy of Ruger et al. (2004), one has to exclude
Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, which was a case granted certiorari after the
commencement of the Ruger study.
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3.3.3 Future Directions
Although Figure 3.1 shows that citations can provide an effective means for locating
cases in a latent space, there are some extensions that future work might address.
One is to explore other methods for measuring the closeness of cases, such as latent
Dirichlet allocation, (Blei et al., 2003), or natural language processing methods, (e.g,
Merlo et al., 2013). Although citations provide important information on the rela-
tionship among cases, the text of case opinions surely can provide valuable additional
data.
Another extension is to improve the predictive performance of the latent space
model by drawing on the social recommender literature. (See, e.g., Liu et al., 2013;
Gartrell et al., 2012; Ma et al., 2011). Recommender systems have been an area
of special interest to online retailers hoping to introduce consumers to new products
based on their past purchases or ratings. (E.g., Condliff et al., 1999). With the advent
of social media, researchers have incorporated social network data into recommender
systems on the expectation that a person’s tastes are likely to be similar to his/her
friends. In addition to providing another data source, social network data addresses
the longstanding issue known as the “cold-start” problem, in which recommenders
have trouble with new customers with minimal past history.
Case prediction is deeply analogous to the recommender problem. Just as con-
sumers rate products, judges “rate” legal cases by voting to affirm, concur, or dissent,
and we can use the same techniques to help predict what new cases a judge may “like.”
The case citations are analogous to social network data, albeit as a mirror image. In a
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conventional social recommender system, the users are networked. In case prediction,
the cases (analogous to the consumer products) are networked. The inverted data
structure however does not change the model. If our interest is in prediction and not
understanding some causal relationship, we can easily pretend that the cases rate the
judges, rather than the other way around. Future work might therefore try to apply
social recommender models to the case prediction context.
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Other Related Work
Below are some shorter published works completed during my program that are not
formally part of this dissertation but offered for the Committee’s additional consid-
eration.
• Cheng, E.K. (2016) A Bayesian look at the Baby Annie case. Chance, 29,
27–31.
• Cheng, E.K. (2013) Is high-altitude mountaineering Russian roulette? Journal
of Quantitative Analysis of Sports, 9, 1–14.
• Cheng, E.K. and Farmer, S.J. (2013) A normalized scoring model for law school
competitions. Green Bag, 17, 377–393.
92
Bibliography
Aitchison, J. (1986) The statistical analysis of compositional data. Mono-
graphs on statistics and applied probability. Chapman and Hall.
URLhttps://books.google.com/books?id=RHKmAAAAIAAJ.
Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Corp. (2006) 454 F.Supp.2d 1185. S.D. Fla.
Amstrup, S., McDonald, T. and Manly, B. (2005) Handbook
of Capture-Recapture Analysis. Princeton University Press.
URLhttp://books.google.com/books?id=aK7V1qyDjygC.
Asher, J., Banks, D. L. and Scheuren, F. (2008) Statistical methods for human rights
/ Jana Asher, David Banks, Fritz J. Scheuren, editors. Springer New York.
Baker, C. L., Specter, S. and Kline, T. R. (2016) How not to manage a common
benefit fund: Allocating attorneys’ fees in vioxx litigation. Drexel Law Review, 9,
1.
Bar-Gill, O., Ben-Shahar, O. and Marotta-Wurgler, F. (2017) Searching for the com-
mon law: The quantitative approach of the restatement of consumer contracts.
University of Chicago Law Review, 84, 7–35.
Bartolucci, F. and Forcina, A. (2001) Analysis of capture-recapture
data with a Rasch-type model allowing for conditional de-
pendence and multidimensionality. Biometrics, 57, 714–719.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0006-341X.2001.00714.x.
Baude, W., Chilton, A. S. and Malani, A. (2017) Making doctrinal work more rig-
orous: Lessons from systematic reviews. University of Chicago Law Review, 84,
37–58.
Bishop, Y., Fienberg, S. and Holland, P. (1975) Discrete
Multivariate Analysis: Theory and Practice. MIT Press.
URLhttp://books.google.com/books?id=nPkjIEVY-CsC.
Blei, D. M., Ng, A. Y. and Jordan, M. I. (2003) Latent
dirichlet allocation. J. Mach. Learn. Res., 3, 993–1022.
URLhttp://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=944919.944937.
Bommarito II, M. J., Katz, D. and Zelner, J. (2009) Law as a seamless web?: compar-
ison of various network representations of the united states supreme court corpus
(1791-2005). In Proceedings of the 12th international conference on artificial intel-
ligence and law, 234–235. ACM.
Brams, S. and Taylor, A. (1996) Fair Division: From Cake-
Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge University Press.
URLhttps://books.google.com/books?id=cLUA-sRhJ5QC.
93
Brooks v. State (1999) 748 So.2d 736. Miss.
Brown, L. D., Eaton, M. L., Freedman, D. A., Klein, S. P., Olshen, R. A., Wachter,
K. W., Wells, M. T. and Ylvisaker, D. (1999) Statistical controversies in census
2000. Jurimetrics, 39, 347–375. URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/29762618.
Chojnacki, D. E., Cicchini, M. D. and White, L. T. (2008) Empirical basis for the
admission of expert testimony on false confessions, an. Ariz. St. LJ, 40, 1.
Clark, T. S. and Lauderdale, B. (2010) Locating supreme court opinions
in doctrine space. American Journal of Political Science, 54, 871–890.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00470.x.
de Clippel, G., Moulin, H. and Tideman, T. (2008) Impartial division of a dollar.
Journal of Economic Theory, 139, 176–191.
Condliff, M. K., Lewis, D. D., Madigan, D. and Posse, C. (1999) Bayesian Mixed-
Effects Models for Recommender Systems. ACM SIGIR ’99 Workshop on Recom-
mender Systems: Algorithms and Evaluation.
Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36.
Darroch, J. N., Fienberg, S. E., Glonek, G. F. V. and Junker, B. W. (1993) A
three-sample multiple-recapture approach to census population estimation with
heterogeneous catchability. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88,
pp. 1137–1148. URLhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2290811.
Delgado, R. and Stefancic, J. (1989) Why do we tell the same stories?: Law reform,
critical librarianship, and the triple helix dilemma. Stanford Law Review, 42, 207.
Dryden, I. and Mardia, K. (1998) Statistical Shape Analysis. Wiley.
Dunn, E. and Ruiz, M. (2015) Can case citations tell us what a legal opinion is about?
if so, why not use them to sort legal information?
Duval, S. and Tweedie, R. (2000) Trim and fill: A simple funnel-plot–based method
of testing and adjusting for publication bias in meta-analysis. Biometrics, 56,
455–463. URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0006-341X.2000.00455.x.
Easterbrook, P., Gopalan, R., Berlin, J. and Matthews, D. (1991)
Publication bias in clinical research. The Lancet, 337, 867 – 872.
URLhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/014067369190201Y.
Originally published as Volume 1, Issue 8746.
Eisenberg, T. and Miller, G. P. (2010) Attorneys’ fees and expenses in class action
settlements: 1993-2008. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7, 248–281.
Fabricant, M. C. and Carrington, T. (2016) The shifted paradigm: Forensic science’s
overdue evolution from magic to law. Virgnia Journal of Criminal Law, 4, 1.
94
Fienberg, S. E., Johnson, M. S. and Junker, B. W. (1999) Classical multilevel and
Bayesian approaches to population size estimation using multiple lists. Journal
of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society), 162, 383–405.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-985X.00143.
Fienberg, S. E. and Manrique-Vallier, D. (2009) Integrated methodol-
ogy for multiple systems estimation and record linkage using a miss-
ing data formulation. AStA Advances in Statistical Analysis, 93, 49–60.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10182-008-0084-z.
Fitzpatrick, B. T. (2010a) Do class action lawyers make too little. University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, 158, 2043–2083.
— (2010b) An empirical study of class action settlements and their fee awards. Jour-
nal of Empirical Legal Studies, 7, 811–846.
— (2010c) An empirical study of class action settlements and their fee awards. Journal
of Empirical Legal Studies, 7, 811–846.
Fowler, J., Johnson, T., Spriggs, J., Jeon, S. and Wahlbeck, P. (2007) Network anal-
ysis and the law: Measuring the legal importance of supreme court precedents.
Political Analysis, 15, 324–346.
Fowler, J. H. and Jeon, S. (2008) The authority of supreme court precedent. Social
networks, 30, 16–30.
Gartrell, M., Paquet, U. and Herbrich, R. (2012) A bayesian treatment of social
links in recommender systems. Tech. Rep. CU-CS-1092-12, University of Colorado
Department of Computer Science.
Gelman, A. (2006) Prior distributions for variance parameters in hierarchical mod-
els (comment on article by browne and draper). Bayesian Anal., 1, 515–534.
URLhttps://doi.org/10.1214/06-BA117A.
Givens, G. H., Smith, D. D. and Tweedie, R. L. (1997) Publication bias
in meta-analysis: a bayesian data-augmentation approach to account for is-
sues exemplified in the passive smoking debate. Statist. Sci., 12, 221–250.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1214/ss/1030037958.
Harvey, A. and Woodruff, M. J. (2011) Confirmation bias in the united states supreme
court judicial database. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 29, 414–
460.
Hoff, P. D., Raftery, A. E. and Handcock, M. S. (2001) Latent space approaches
to social network analysis. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 97,
1090–1098.
— (2002) Latent space approaches to social network analysis.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 97, 1090–1098.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1198/016214502388618906.
95
Holmes, O. W. (1897) The path of the law. Harvard Law Review, 10, 457.
Hubbard, W. H. J. (2013) Testing for change in procedural standards, with ap-
plication to bell atlantic v. twombly. The Journal of Legal Studies, 42, 35–68.
URLhttps://doi.org/10.1086/668506.
— (2017) The effects of Twombly and Iqbal. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 14,
474–526. URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jels.12153.
In re Initial Public Offering Securities Litigation (2011) 2011 WL 2732563. S.D.N.Y.
In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation (2013) 2013 WL 1365900. N.D.
Cal.
In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation (2005) 398 F.Supp.2d 209. D.D.C.
Jasra, A., Holmes, C. C. and Stephens, D. A. (2005) Markov chain monte carlo
methods and the label switching problem in bayesian mixture modeling. Statistical
Science, 20, 50–67. URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1214/088342305000000016.
Kassin, S. M. and Kiechel, K. L. (1996) The social psychology of false confessions:
Compliance, internalization, and confabulation. Psychological Science, 7, 125–128.
Kaye, D. H., Bernstein, D. E. and Mnookin, J. L. (2016)
The New Wigmore on Evidence: Expert Evidence. Aspen.
URLhttp://books.google.com/books?id=aK7V1qyDjygC.
King, R., Brooks, S. P., Mazzetta, C., Freeman, S. N. and Morgan, B. J. T. (2008)
Identifying and diagnosing population declines: a bayesian assessment of lapwings
in the uk. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series C (Applied Statistics),
57, 609–632. URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9876.2008.00633.x.
Laska, E. M. (2002) The use of capture-recapture methods in pub-
lic health. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 80, 845–845.
URLhttp://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2567685/.
Ligons, M. J. (2000) Polygraph evidence: Where are we now? Missouri Law Review,
65, 209–227.
Liu, J., Wu, C. and Liu, W. (2013) Bayesian probabilistic matrix factorization with
social relations and item contents for recommendation. Decision Support Systems,
55, 838–850.
Lizotte, B. N. (2007) Publish or perish: The electronic availability of summary judg-
ments by eight district courts. Wisconsin Law Review, 2007, 107–149.
Lum, K., Price, M. E. and Banks, D. (2013) Applications of multiple systems
estimation in human rights research. The American Statistician, 67, 191–200.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2013.821093.
96
Lunbery v. Hornbreak (2010) 605 F.3d 754. 9th Cir.
Lupu, Y. and Fowler, J. H. (2013) Strategic citations to precedent on the us supreme
court. Journal of Legal Studies, 21, 151–186.
Ma, H., Zhou, T. C., Lyu, M. R. and King, I. (2011) Improving recommender systems
by incorporating social contextual information. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst., 29, 9:1–
9:23. URLhttp://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1961209.1961212.
Madigan, D., York, J. and Allard, D. (1995) Bayesian graphical models for discrete
data. International Statistical Review/Revue Internationale de Statistique, 215–
232.
Madigan, D. and York, J. C. (1997) Bayesian methods for estima-
tion of the size of a closed population. Biometrika, 84, 19–31.
URLhttp://biomet.oxfordjournals.org/content/84/1/19.abstract.
Martin, A. D. and Quinn, K. M. (2002) Dynamic ideal point estimation via markov
chain monte carlo for the us supreme court, 1953–1999. Political Analysis, 10,
134–153.
Merlo, P., Henderson, J., Schneider, G. and Wehrli, E. (2013) Learning doc-
ument similarity using natural language processing. Linguistik Online, 17.
URLhttps://bop.unibe.ch/linguistik-online/article/view/788.
Merritt, D. J. and Brudney, J. J. (2001) Stalking secret law: What predicts publica-
tion in the united states courts of appeals. Vanderbilt Law Review, 54, 71–121.
Moulin, H. (1991) Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making.
Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge University Press.
URLhttps://books.google.com/books?id=mK6nEvHnqQIC.
Nolan, J. M., Schultz, P. W., Cialdini, R. B., Goldstein, N. J.
and Griskevicius, V. (2008) Normative social influence is underde-
tected. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34, 913–923.
URLhttp://psp.sagepub.com/content/34/7/913.abstract.
Ofshe, Richard, J. and Leo, R. A. (1997) The decision to confess falsely: Rational
choice and irrational action. Denver University Law Review, 74, 979–1122.
Pelle, E., Hessen, D. J. and van der Heijden, P. G. M. (2016) A log-linear multidi-
mensional Rasch model for capture–recapture. Statistics in Medicine, 35, 622–634.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1002/sim.6741. Sim.6741.
Rabina, D. L. and Sula, C. (2015) Visual first amendment: Using empirical legal
methods and visualization techniques to enhance understanding of supreme court
rulings. iConference 2015 Proceedings.
Regal, R. R. and Hook, E. B. (1984) Goodness-of-fit based confidence intervals for
estimates of the size of a closed population. Stat Med, 3, 287–291.
97
Risinger, D. M. (2007) Goodbye to all that, or a fool’s errand, by one of the fools:
How i stopped worrying about court responses to handwriting identification (and
”forensic science” in general) and learned to love misinterpretations of kumho.
Tulsa Law Review, 43, 447–475.
Roberts, C. and Stanley, T. (2006) Meta-Regression Analysis: Issues of Publi-
cation Bias in Economics. Surveys of Recent Research in Economics. Wiley.
URLhttp://books.google.com/books?id= oMTN0U9usAC.
Robertson, J. and Webb, W. (1998) Cake-Cutting Algorithms:
Be Fair if You Can. Ak Peters Series. Taylor & Francis.
URLhttps://books.google.com/books?id=XBCOmGFmpBMC.
Rosenthal, R. (1979) The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 86, 638–641.
Rubenstein, W. B. (2009) On what a common benefit is, is not, and should be. Class
Action Attorney Fee Digest, 3, 87–94.
Ruger, T. W., Kim, P. T., Martin, A. D. and Quinn, K. M. (2004) The supreme court
forecasting project: Legal and political science approaches to predicting supreme
court decisionmaking. Columbia Law Review, 1150–1210.
Seybolt, T., Aronson, J. and Fischhoff, B. (2013) Counting Civilian Ca-
sualties: An Introduction to Recording and Estimating Nonmilitary
Deaths in Conflict. Studies in Strategic Peacebuilding. OUP USA.
URLhttps://books.google.com/books?id=9WJKkgEACAAJ.
Sherry, S. (2004) What’s law got to do with it? Perspectives on Politics, 2, 769–775.
Siegelman, P. and Donohue, J. J. (1990) Studying the iceberg from its tip: A com-
parison of published and unpublished employment discrimination cases. Law and
Society Review, 1133–1170.
Silver, C. and Miller, G. P. (2010) The quasi-class action method of managing multi-
district litigations: Problems and a proposal. Vanderbilt Law Review, 63, 107.
Simonsohn, U., Nelson, L. D. and Simmons, J. P. (2014) p-Curve
and effect size. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 9, 666–681.
URLhttps://doi.org/10.1177/1745691614553988.
Spaeth, H., Epstein, L., Ruger, T., Whittington, K., Segal, J. and Martin, A. D.
(2013) Supreme court database.
Stan (2015) Stan: A c++ library for probability and sampling, version 2.7.0.
URLhttp://mc-stan.org/.
98
Stanghellini, E. and van der Heijden, P. G. M. (2004) A multiple-
record systems estimation method that takes observed and un-
observed heterogeneity into account. Biometrics, 60, 510–516.
URLhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0006-341X.2004.00197.x.
State v. Buechler (1998) 572 N.W.2d 65. Neb.
Stith, K. (1990) The risk of legal error in criminal cases: Some consequences of the
asymmetry in the right to appeal. University of Chicago Law Review, 57, 1–61.
Tideman, T. N. and Plassmann, F. (2008) Paying the partners. Public Choice, 136,
19–37. URLhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9276-z.
United States v. Brito (2005) 427 F.3d 53. 1st Cir.
United States v. Hadley (2005) 431 F.3d 484. 6th Cir.
Vent v. State (2003) 67 P.3d 661. Alaska Ct. App.
Victor v. Argent Classic Convertible Arbitrage Fund L.P. (2010) 623 F.3d 82. 2d Cir.
Wininger, P. J. and Cecil, J. S. (2015) Finding motions: Comparison of samples of
12(b)(6) orders from westlaw, dockets, and cm/ecf codes.
99
Appendix
Code for Chapter 1 (Publication Bias)
R Code
Simulation
1 # S c r i p t F i l e
# Simulated Pub l i ca t i on Bias
3 # Edward K. Cheng
5 # I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
rm( l i s t = l s ( ) ) # c l e a r a l l
7 name <− ” papersim1a ”
9 # HPC S p e c i f i c Commands
. l i bPaths ( ”/vega/ s t a t s / u s e r s / ekc2109 / rpackages /” ) # Use f o r c l u s t e r
11 l i b r a r y ( r s tan )
s e t cppo ( ” f a s t ” )
13
# Local S p e c i f i c Commands
15 # setwd (” / Users / ekcheng /Documents/PubBias/HPC/Sim7a ”)
l i b r a r y ( r s tan )
17 s e t cppo ( ’ debug ’ ) # to make debugging e a s i e r
l i b r a r y ( s t a t s )
19 l i b r a r y ( f o r e i g n )
l i b r a r y (MASS)
21 l i b r a r y ( reshape )
23 # FUNCTION
# Takes a vec to r o f b inary va lue s
25 # Generates B e r n o u l l i v a r i a b l e X c o n d i t i o n a l on data vec to r dta )
# p 0 = P(X=1 | dta=0)
27 # p 1 = P(X=1 | dta=1)
29 genCondBern <− f unc t i on ( dta , p 0 , p 1) {
N dta <− l ength ( dta )
31 N 0 <− sum( dta==0)
N 1 <− sum( dta==1)
33
newset <− rep (NA, N dta )
35
newset 0 <− rbinom (N 0 , 1 , p 0)
37 newset [ dta==0] <− newset 0
39 newset 1 <− rbinom (N 1 , 1 , p 1)
newset [ dta==1] <− newset 1
41
re turn ( newset )
43 }
45 # 2 . SIMULATION PARAMETERS
s e t . seed (2813)
47 N case <− 250
p admit <− 0 .33 # True p r o b a b i l i t y o f admiss ion
49
p obs admit a <− 0 .02
51 p obs e x c l a <− 0 .1
53 p obs admit t <− 0 .001
p obs e x c l t <− 0 .005
55
# 2 .1 Construct outcomes
57 rawset <− data . frame ( case=paste ( ”Case” , c ( 1 :N case ) , sep=”” ) )
100
rawset $admis <− rbinom (N case , 1 , p admit )
59
# 2 .2 Observation Data ( Independent )
61 Publ ished1 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 2∗p obs e x c l t , 2∗p obs admit t )
rawset $ ListA1 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , p obs e x c l t , p obs admit t )
63 rawset $ ListB1 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 2 ∗ p obs e x c l t , 2 ∗ p obs admit t )
rawset $ ListC1<− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 4 ∗ p obs e x c l t , 4 ∗ p obs admit t )
65 rawset $SimLex1 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 2 ∗ p obs e x c l t , 2 ∗ p obs admit t ) |
Publ ished1
rawset $SimWest1 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 4 ∗ p obs e x c l t , 4 ∗ p obs admit t ) |
Publ ished1
67 rawset $ Publ ished1 <− Publ ished1
69 Publ ished2 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 2∗p obs e x c l a , 2∗p obs admit a )
rawset $ ListA2 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , p obs e x c l a , p obs admit a )
71 rawset $ ListB2 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 2 ∗ p obs e x c l a , 2 ∗ p obs admit a )
rawset $ ListC2<− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 4 ∗ p obs e x c l a , 4 ∗ p obs admit a )
73 rawset $SimLex2 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 2 ∗ p obs e x c l a , 2 ∗ p obs admit a ) |
Publ ished2
rawset $SimWest2 <− genCondBern ( rawset $admis , 4 ∗ p obs e x c l a , 4 ∗ p obs admit a ) |
Publ ished2
75 rawset $ Publ ished2 <− Publ ished2
77 rawset $agg <− rowSums( rawset [ ,− c ( 1 : 2 ) ] ) > 0
79 c u l l e d s e t <− rawset [ rawset $agg == TRUE, ]
c u l l e d s e t $agg <− NULL
81
nrow ( c u l l e d s e t )
83 mean( rawset $admis ) # Actual a d m i s s i b i l i t y ra t e
mean( c u l l e d s e t $admis ) # Observed a d m i s s i b i l i t y ra t e
85
# 2 .3 Create s e t f o r MCMC
87 combinedset <− c u l l e d s e t
89 me l t s e t <− melt ( combinedset , id=c ( ” case ” , ”admis” ) , v a r i a b l e name=” l i s t t y p e ” )
colnames ( me l t s e t ) [ 4 ] <− ”obs”
91
me l t s e t $ l i s t <− sub ( ” [0−9] ” , ”” , as . cha rac t e r ( me l t s e t $ l i s t t y p e ) ) # Create
L i s t and Type columns in datase t
93 me l t s e t $ type <− sub ( ” [A−Za−z ] ∗” , ”” , p e r l=TRUE, as . cha rac t e r ( me l t s e t $ l i s t t y p e ) )
95 f c s e t <− mel t s e t
f c s e t $ case <− f a c t o r ( f c s e t $ case )
97 f c s e t $ l i s t <− f a c t o r ( f c s e t $ l i s t , l e v e l s=c ( ” ListA ” , ” ListB ” , ” ListC ” , ”SimLex” , ”
SimWest” , ” Publ ished ” ) )
f c s e t $ l i s t t y p e <− f a c t o r ( f c s e t $ l i s t t y p e )
99 f c s e t $ type <− as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ type ) # Keep as number f o r easy index ing
101 l e v e l s ( f c s e t $ l i s t )
103 # Create Z array
# I t i s the i n v e r s e o f the Publ ished l i s t vec to r as r equ i r ed by the model
105 Z <− rbind (
1−combinedset $” Publ ished1 ” ,
107 1−combinedset $” Publ ished2 ” )
109 # 2 .4 Create ” datase t ”
# Case , type −− then 0/1 f o r the l i s t s
111 datase t <− f c s e t
datase t $ l i s t t y p e <− NULL
113
datase t <− reshape ( dataset , t imevar=” l i s t ” , idvar=c ( ” case ” , ”admis” , ” type ” ) ,
d i r e c t i o n=”wide” )
115 colnames ( datase t ) <− sub ( ”obs . ” , ”” , p e r l=TRUE, as . cha rac t e r ( colnames ( datase t ) ) )
117 datase t <− unique ( datase t )
datase t obs <− rowSums( datase t [ , 4 : 9 ] )
101
119 datase t <− datase t [ datase t obs > 0 , ]
121 datase t [ with ( dataset , order ( datase t $ case , datase t $ type ) ) , ]
123 # 3 . MULTIPLE SYSTEMS ESTIMATION
f c dat <− l i s t (
125 K = length ( l e v e l s ( f c s e t $ case ) ) ,
L = length ( l e v e l s ( f c s e t $ l i s t ) ) ,
127 T = max( f c s e t $ type ) ,
129 N = nrow ( f c s e t ) ,
P = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $obs ) ,
131 casename = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ case ) ,
type = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ type ) ,
133 l i s t = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ l i s t ) ,
l i s t t y p e = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ l i s t t y p e ) ,
135 admis = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $admis ) ,
137 Z = Z
139 )
ptm <− proc . time ( )
141 mse f i t <− stan ( f i l e = paste (name , ” . stan ” , sep=”” ) , data = f c dat ,
i t e r = 5000 , warmup=1000 , cha ins = 1)
143 proc . time ( ) − ptm
145 # 4 . POST−PROCESSING MATERIALS
datase t $ type <− f a c t o r ( datase t $ type ) # Factor them so that t a b l e s below w i l l
have the zero e n t r i e s
147 datase t $ case <− f a c t o r ( datase t $ case )
149 p obs <− mean( combinedset $admis )
tau wt <− t ab l e ( datase t $ type ) /nrow ( datase t )
151 gamma wt <− t ab l e ( datase t $ case ) /nrow ( datase t )
tautheta wt <− t ab l e ( datase t $ type , datase t $ case ) / nrow ( datase t )
153
datase t a <− datase t [ datase t $admis == 1 , ]
155 datase t abar <− datase t [ datase t $admis == 0 , ]
157 tautheta wt a <− t ab l e ( datase t a$ type , datase t a$ case ) / nrow ( datase t a )
tautheta wt abar <− t ab l e ( datase t abar $ type , datase t abar $ case ) / nrow ( datase t abar )
159
# 4 .1 GET TYPE COMBINATION FREQUENCIES
161 l i b r a r y ( s e t s )
l i b r a r y ( p ly r )
163
# Get Count Matrix
165 typedata <− datase t [ , c ( 1 , 3 ) ]
typedata $ value <− 1
167 typegr id <− ca s t ( typedata , case ˜ type , f i l l =0)
typegr id $numobs <− rowSums( typegr id [ , −1 ] ) # Max number o f shared = 3
169




# S i n g l e s
175 s i n g l e s <− data . frame ( 1 :T)
s i n g l e s $ f r e q <− NULL
177 f o r ( i in 1 : nrow ( s i n g l e s ) ) {
counts <− typecounts [ ( typecounts [ , s i n g l e s [ i , 1 ] ] == 1) , ]
179 s i n g l e s $ f r e q [ i ] <− sum( counts $ f r e q )
}
181 s i n g l e s $ f r e q <− s i n g l e s $ f r e q / nrow ( typegr id )
183 #type f req1b <− colSums ( typegr id [ , −1 ] ) /nrow ( typegr id ) # Matches
185 # Pai r s
102
p a i r s <− s e t combn( s e t ( 1 , 2 ) , 2)
187 p a i r s <− as . data . frame ( t ( matrix ( u n l i s t ( p a i r s ) , nrow=2) ) ) # Coerces the p a i r s i n to
data frame
p a i r s $ f r e q <− NULL
189
f o r ( i in 1 : nrow ( p a i r s ) ) {
191 counts <− typecounts [ ( typecounts [ , p a i r s [ i , 1 ] ] == 1) & ( typecounts [ , p a i r s [ i , 2 ] ] ==
1) , ]
# pr in t ( c ( p a i r s [ i , 1 ] , p a i r s [ i , 2 ] ) )
193 # pr in t ( counts )
p a i r s $ f r e q [ i ] <− sum( counts $ f r e q )
195 }
p a i r s $ f r e q <− p a i r s $ f r e q / nrow ( typegr id )
197
199 # True a d m i s s i b i l i t y ra t e
p ac tua l <− mean( rawset $admis )
201
203 # 5 . SAVE AND REPORT
205 mse f i t
save (mse f i t , p actua l , p obs , tau wt , gamma wt , tautheta wt , tautheta wt a ,
tautheta wt abar , s i n g l e s , pa i r s , f i l e=paste (name , ” . Rdata” , sep=”” ) )
Simulation Analysis
# S c r i p t F i l e
2 # Simulated Pub l i ca t i on Bias Dataset
# Edward K. Cheng
4
# I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
6 rm( l i s t = l s ( ) ) # c l e a r a l l
8 name <−” papersim1 ”
10 setwd ( paste ( ”/ Users / ekcheng /Documents/PubBias/HPC/” , name , sep=”” ) )
12 l i b r a r y ( r s tan )
s e t cppo ( ’ debug ’ ) # to make debugging e a s i e r
14
l i b r a r y ( s t a t s )
16 l i b r a r y ( f o r e i g n )
l i b r a r y (MASS)
18 l i b r a r y ( reshape )
l i b r a r y ( coda )
20 l i b r a r y ( boot )
l i b r a r y ( polynom )
22 l i b r a r y ( r s tan )
24 ### FUNCTIONS
# Conversion func t i on ( thanks to Ben Goodrich )
26 stan2coda <− f unc t i on ( f i t ) {
mcmc. l i s t ( l app ly ( 1 : nco l ( f i t ) , f unc t i on ( x ) mcmc( as . array ( f i t ) [ , x , ] ) ) )
28 }
30 loadbeta <− f unc t i on (name) {
load ( paste (name , ” . Rdata” , sep=”” ) )
32 e x t r a c t (mse f i t , ” beta ” ) $ beta
}
34
p lotdens <− f unc t i on ( dataset , co lo r , width=1) {
36 dens . pts <− dens i ty ( dataset , k e rne l=” gauss ian ” )
l i n e s ( dens . pts , c o l=co lo r , lwd=width )
38 }
40 # RECOVERY OF ADMISSIBILITY PROBABILITY
103
42 # EXPLORE ROOTS
44 load ( paste (name , ”a . Rdata” , sep=”” ) )
# Loads mse f i t , taugamma wt [T,K] , p obs , tau wt [T]
46
draws <− e x t r a c t (mse f i t )
48 N <− l ength ( draws$ beta )
50 p co r r <− rep (NA, N)
l i k num <− rep (NA, N)
52 l i k denom <− rep (NA, N)
54 L <− 5
56 r e s u l t s denom <− matrix ( nrow=N, nco l =(6 + 1 + 5) ) # nco l = # of l i s t s + zero +
# of roo t s
r e s u l t s num <− matrix ( nrow=N, nco l =(6 + 1 + 5) )
58
f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
60 beta <− draws$ beta [ i ]
gamma <− draws$gamma l i s t [ i , ]
62 theta <− draws$ theta case [ i , ]
rho <− draws$ rho [ i , ]
64 tau <− draws$ tau type [ i , ] # ONLY WORKS FOR DIRECT APPEAL CASES
P <− l ength (gamma)
66 L <− P−1
K <− l ength ( theta )
68 T <− l ength ( tau )
70
# INCORPORATES THETA
72 # R A ( Denominator )
74 R A <− rep (NA, P)
76 f o r ( l in 1 :P) {
R A t <− rep (NA, T)
78
# I n t e g r a t e over k
80 f o r ( t in 1 :T) {
R A t [ t ] <− sum( inv . l o g i t ( beta + gamma[ l ] + theta + tau [ t ] + rho [ l ] ) ) / K
82 }
84 R A s i n g l e s <− s i n g l e s
R A s i n g l e s $O l <− R A t [R A s i n g l e s [ , 1 ] ]
86 R A s i n g l e s $prod <− R A s i n g l e s $O l ∗ R A s i n g l e s $ f r e q
88 R A p a i r s <− p a i r s
R A p a i r s $O l <− R A t [R A p a i r s [ , 1 ] ] ∗ R A t [R A p a i r s [ , 2 ] ]
90 R A p a i r s $prod <− R A p a i r s $O l ∗ R A p a i r s $ f r e q
92 R A[ l ] <− sum(R A s i n g l e s $prod ) − sum(R A p a i r s $prod )
94 }
96 r i g h t <− polynomial ( c o e f = 1)
98 f o r ( l in 1 :L) {
regterm <− polynomial ( c o e f = c (1 , −(R A[P] + R A[ l ] − R A[P] ∗R A[ l ] ) ) )
100 r i g h t <− r i g h t ∗ regterm
}
102
l e f t <− polynomial ( c o e f = c (1 , −1) ) ∗ ( ( polynomial ( c o e f = c (1 , −R A[P ] ) ) ) ˆ(L−1)
)
104
p <− l e f t − r i g h t
106
104
z e r o e s <− s o l v e (p)
108
zero <− NA
110 j <− 1
whi l e ( i s . na ( zero ) & ( j <= length ( z e r o e s ) ) ) {
112 z <− z e r o e s [ j ]
i f ( (Im( z ) == 0) & (Re( z ) > 0) & (Re( z ) < 1) ) { zero <− z }
114 j <− j+1
}
116
r e s u l t s denom [ i , ] <− c (R A, zero , z e r o e s )
118
l i k denom [ i ] <− Re( zero )
120
# R Abar ( Numerator )
122
R Abar <− rep (NA, P)
124
f o r ( l in 1 :P) {
126 R Abar t <− rep (NA, T)
128 # I n t e g r a t e over k
f o r ( t in 1 :T) {
130 R Abar t [ t ] <− sum( inv . l o g i t (gamma[ l ] + theta + tau [ t ] + rho [ l ] ) ) / K
}
132
R Abar s i n g l e s <− s i n g l e s
134 R Abar s i n g l e s $O l <− R Abar t [R Abar s i n g l e s [ , 1 ] ]
R Abar s i n g l e s $prod <− R Abar s i n g l e s $O l ∗ R Abar s i n g l e s $ f r e q
136
R Abar p a i r s <− p a i r s
138 R Abar p a i r s $O l <− R Abar t [R Abar p a i r s [ , 1 ] ] ∗ R Abar t [R Abar p a i r s [ , 2 ] ]
R Abar p a i r s $prod <− R Abar p a i r s $O l ∗ R Abar p a i r s $ f r e q
140




r i g h t <− polynomial ( c o e f = 1)
146
f o r ( l in 1 :L) {
148 regterm <− polynomial ( c o e f = c (1 , −(R Abar [P] + R Abar [ l ] − R Abar [P] ∗R Abar
[ l ] ) ) )
r i g h t <− r i g h t ∗ regterm
150 }
152 l e f t <− polynomial ( c o e f = c (1 , −1) ) ∗ ( ( polynomial ( c o e f = c (1 , −R Abar [P ] ) ) ) ˆ(L
−1) )
154 p <− l e f t − r i g h t
156 z e r o e s <− s o l v e (p)
158 zero <− NA
j <− 1
160 whi le ( i s . na ( zero ) & ( j <= length ( z e r o e s ) ) ) {
z <− z e r o e s [ j ]
162 i f ( (Im( z ) == 0) & (Re( z ) > 0) & (Re( z ) < 1) ) { zero <− z }
j <− j+1
164 }
166 r e s u l t s num[ i , ] <− c (R Abar , zero , z e r o e s )
168 l i k num[ i ] <− Re( zero )
170 # Correc t ion
odds co r r <− ( l i k num[ i ] / l i k denom [ i ] ) ∗ (p obs / (1−p obs ) )










r e s u l t s <− data . frame ( r e s u l t s num) # Choose which s e t to examine
184
colnames ( r e s u l t s ) <− c ( ”R 1” , ”R 2” , ”R 3” , ”R 4” , ”R 5” , ”R P” , ” zero ” , ” z1” , ” z2” ,
” z3” , ” z4” , ” z5” )
186 f o r ( i in 1 : 5 ) {
r e s u l t s [ , i ] <− Re( r e s u l t s [ , i ] )
188 }
r e s u l t s $probsum <− rowSums( r e s u l t s [ , 1 : 5 ] )
190 # Re( colMeans ( r e s u l t s [ , 1 : 7 ] ) )
192
data . frame ( r e s u l t s $ zero , r e s u l t s $probsum ) # Shows that l o s s o f root i s due to lack
o f coverage o f the p r o b a b i l i t y space (O∗ )
194
196 # CORRECTION
p cor r <− p co r r [ ! i s . na (p co r r ) ]
198 l i k num <− l i k num[ ! i s . na ( l i k num) ]
l i k denom <− l i k denom [ ! i s . na ( l i k denom) ]
200
data . frame (p obs=p obs , mean=mean(p co r r ) , med=median (p co r r ) , l i k num=mean( l i k
num) ,
202 l i k denom=mean( l i k denom) )
204 # EXPLORATION
206 colSums ( datase t [ , 4 : 1 0 ] ) / nrow ( datase t )
208 ## PLOTS
png ( paste ( ” Ana lys i s beta ” ,name , ” . png” , sep=”” ) , 500 ,500)
210 p l o t (1 , pch=19, cex =0.3 , xl im=c (−2 , 2) , yl im=c ( 0 , 1 . 5 ) ,
x lab=” beta ” , ylab=” Density ” , main=” Offdata13 ” )
212 p lotdens ( draws$beta , ” red ” )
dev . o f f ( )
214
png ( paste ( ” Ana lys i s pcorr ” ,name , ” . png” , sep=”” ) , 500 ,500)
216 p l o t (1 , pch=19, cex =0.3 , xl im=c (0 , 1) , yl im=c (0 , 3 ) ,
x lab=” pcorr ” , ylab=” Density ” , main=” Offdata13 ” )
218 p lotdens (p corr , ” red ” )
dev . o f f ( )
False Confession Expert Testimony
# S c r i p t F i l e
2 # Simulated Pub l i ca t i on Bias Dataset
# Edward K. Cheng
4
# I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
6 rm( l i s t = l s ( ) ) # c l e a r a l l
8 name <− ” o f fda ta13 ”
10 # HPC S p e c i f i c Commands
. l i bPaths ( ”/vega/ s t a t s / u s e r s / ekc2109 / rpackages /” ) # Use f o r c l u s t e r
12 l i b r a r y ( r s tan )
s e t cppo ( ” f a s t ” )
14 l i b r a r y ( s t a t s )
106
l i b r a r y ( f o r e i g n )
16 l i b r a r y (MASS)
l i b r a r y ( reshape )
18
s e t . seed (2813)
20
# FUNCTION
22 genCondBern <− f unc t i on ( dta , p 0 , p 1) {
N dta <− l ength ( dta )
24 N 0 <− sum( dta==0)
N 1 <− sum( dta==1)
26
newset <− rep (NA, N dta )
28
newset 0 <− rbinom (N 0 , 1 , p 0)
30 newset [ dta==0] <− newset 0
32 newset 1 <− rbinom (N 1 , 1 , p 1)
newset [ dta==1] <− newset 1
34
re turn ( newset )
36 }
38 # 1 . IMPORT DATASET
40 # 1.1 Importat ion
dataraw <− read . csv ( ” f cda ta s e tv3 . csv ” )
42
datase t <− dataraw [ , c (2 , 19 , 25 , 5 : 6 , 4 , 7 : 1 1 ) ] # Reorder and get r e l e v a n t
columns
44 colnames ( datase t ) [ 1 : 3 ] <− c ( ” case ” , ” type ” , ”admis” )
46 colnames ( datase t ) [ 7 ] <− ”Google”
colnames ( datase t ) [ 1 1 ] <− ” DaubertTracker ”
48
datase t $ case <− paste ( ”Case” , datase t $ case , sep=”” )
50
# 2 . PREP DATASET FOR USE
52
# Ensure unique
54 un iq s e t <− unique ( data . frame ( datase t $ case , admis=datase t $admis ) )
nrow ( un iq s e t ) # Number o f unique ca s e s : 110 ( l o s t nothing )
56 nrow ( datase t ) # Number o f observed ca s e s ( t r i a l and app counted
i n d i v i d u a l l y ) : 136
58 reducedset <− datase t [ datase t $ type==1, ]
60 # Observation Rate
p obs <− mean( reducedse t $admis )
62
# 2 .2 Reorder
64 # Remove Findlaw , Remove type
datase t <− datase t [ c ( ” case ” , ”admis” , ” type ” , ” DaubertTracker ” , ” Fastcase ” , ”BNA” , ”
Google” , ” Lex i s ” , ”Westlaw” , ” Publ ished ” ) ]
66
# 2 .3 I n f e r Gaps
68
# 2 . 3 . 1 Break−up datase t i n to d i f f e r e n t types
70 # Convert the numbering from 0 through 4 to 1 through 5 because then i t w i l l enable
easy index r e f e r e n c i n g
72 datase t $ type <− datase t $ type+1
74 data1 <− datase t [ datase t $ type ==1,]
colnames ( data1 ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] <− paste ( colnames ( datase t ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] , ”1” , sep=”” )
76 data1 <− data1 [ ,−3] # Removes type , which we now have coded in to column
data2 <− datase t [ datase t $ type ==2,]
78 colnames ( data2 ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] <− paste ( colnames ( datase t ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] , ”2” , sep=”” )
107
data2 <− data2 [ ,−3]
80 data3 <− datase t [ datase t $ type ==3,]
colnames ( data3 ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] <− paste ( colnames ( datase t ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] , ”3” , sep=”” )
82 data3 <− data3 [ ,−3]
data4 <− datase t [ datase t $ type ==4,]
84 colnames ( data4 ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] <− paste ( colnames ( datase t ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] , ”4” , sep=”” )
data4 <− data4 [ ,−3]
86 data5 <− datase t [ datase t $ type ==5,]
colnames ( data5 ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] <− paste ( colnames ( datase t ) [ 4 : 1 0 ] , ”5” , sep=”” )
88 data5 <− data5 [ ,−3]
90 # 2 . 3 . 2 Merge f u l l da ta s e t s based on number o f h i e r a r c h i c a l l e v e l s to search
merge12 <− merge ( data1 , data2 , by=c ( ” case ” , ”admis” ) , a l l=TRUE)
92 merge12 [ i s . na ( merge12 ) ] <− 0 # Replace NA with 0 ( because not seen )
merge12$ case <− f a c t o r ( merge12$ case ) # Reset the f a c t o r
94
merge123 <− merge ( merge12 , data3 , by=c ( ” case ” , ”admis” ) , a l l=TRUE)
96 merge123 [ i s . na ( merge123 ) ] <− 0
merge123$ case <− f a c t o r ( merge123$ case ) # Reset the f a c t o r
98
mergea l l <− merge ( merge123 , data4 , by=c ( ” case ” , ”admis” ) , a l l=TRUE)
100 mergea l l [ i s . na ( mergea l l ) ] <− 0
mergea l l <− merge ( mergeal l , data5 , by=c ( ” case ” , ”admis” ) , a l l=TRUE)
102 mergea l l [ i s . na ( mergea l l ) ] <− 0
mergea l l $ case <− f a c t o r ( mergea l l $ case ) # Reset the f a c t o r
104
# 2 .4 Melt
106
combinedset <− mergea l l # Take a l l l i s t s
108
me l t s e t <− melt ( combinedset , id=c ( ” case ” , ”admis” ) , v a r i a b l e name=” l i s t t y p e ” )
110 colnames ( me l t s e t ) [ 4 ] <− ”obs”
112 me l t s e t $ l i s t <− sub ( ” [0−9] ” , ”” , as . cha rac t e r ( me l t s e t $ l i s t t y p e ) ) # Create
L i s t and Type columns in datase t
me l t s e t $ type <− sub ( ” [A−Za−z ] ∗” , ”” , p e r l=TRUE, as . cha rac t e r ( me l t s e t $ l i s t t y p e ) )
114
f c s e t <− mel t s e t
116 f c s e t $ case <− f a c t o r ( f c s e t $ case )
f c s e t $ l i s t <− f a c t o r ( f c s e t $ l i s t , l e v e l s=c ( ”BNA” , ” DaubertTracker ” , ” Fastcase ” , ”
Google” , ” Lex i s ” , ”Westlaw” , ” Publ ished ” ) )
118 f c s e t $ l i s t t y p e <− f a c t o r ( f c s e t $ l i s t t y p e )
f c s e t $ type <− as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ type ) # Keep as number f o r easy index ing
120
l e v e l s ( f c s e t $ l i s t )
122
# 2 .5 Create Z array
124 # I t i s the i n v e r s e o f the Publ ished l i s t vec to r as r equ i r ed by the model
Z <− rbind (
126 1−mergea l l $” Publ ished1 ” ,
1−mergea l l $” Publ ished2 ” ,
128 1−mergea l l $” Publ ished3 ” ,
1−mergea l l $” Publ ished4 ” ,
130 1−mergea l l $” Publ ished5 ” )
132 # Check
# mergea l l $ case == l e v e l s ( f c s e t $ case )
134 # data . frame ( mergea l l $ case , l e v e l s ( f c s e t $ case ) )
136 # 3 . MULTIPLE SYSTEMS ESTIMATION
f c dat <− l i s t (
138 K = length ( l e v e l s ( f c s e t $ case ) ) ,
L = length ( l e v e l s ( f c s e t $ l i s t ) ) ,
140 T = max( f c s e t $ type ) ,
142 N = nrow ( f c s e t ) ,
P = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $obs ) ,
144 casename = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ case ) ,
108
type = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ type ) ,
146 l i s t = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ l i s t ) ,
l i s t t y p e = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $ l i s t t y p e ) ,
148 admis = as . i n t e g e r ( f c s e t $admis ) ,
150 Z = Z
152 )
ptm <− proc . time ( )
154 mse f i t <− stan ( f i l e = paste (name , ” . stan ” , sep=”” ) , data = f c dat ,
i t e r = 5000 , warmup=1000 , cha ins = 1)
156 proc . time ( ) − ptm
158
# 4 . POST−PROCESSING MATERIALS
160
datase t $ type <− f a c t o r ( datase t $ type ) # Factor them so that t a b l e s below w i l l
have the zero e n t r i e s
162 datase t $ case <− f a c t o r ( datase t $ case )
164 p obs <− mean( combinedset $admis )
tau wt <− t ab l e ( datase t $ type ) /nrow ( datase t )
166 gamma wt <− t ab l e ( datase t $ case ) /nrow ( datase t )
tautheta wt <− t ab l e ( datase t $ type , datase t $ case ) / nrow ( datase t )
168
170 datase t a <− datase t [ datase t $admis == 1 , ]
datase t abar <− datase t [ datase t $admis == 0 , ]
172
tautheta wt a <− t ab l e ( datase t a$ type , datase t a$ case ) / nrow ( datase t a )
174 tautheta wt abar <− t ab l e ( datase t abar $ type , datase t abar $ case ) / nrow ( datase t abar )
176 # 4 .1 GET TYPE COMBINATION FREQUENCIES
l i b r a r y ( s e t s )
178 l i b r a r y ( p ly r )
180 # Get Count Matrix
typedata <− datase t [ , c ( 1 , 3 ) ]
182 typedata $ value <− 1
typegr id <− ca s t ( typedata , case ˜ type , f i l l =0)
184 typegr id $numobs <− rowSums( typegr id [ , −1 ] ) # Max number o f shared = 3
186 typecounts <− count ( typegr id [ , −1 ] )
188 T <− 5
190 # S i n g l e s
s i n g l e s <− data . frame ( 1 :T)
192 s i n g l e s $ f r e q <− NULL
f o r ( i in 1 : nrow ( s i n g l e s ) ) {
194 counts <− typecounts [ ( typecounts [ , s i n g l e s [ i , 1 ] ] == 1) , ]
s i n g l e s $ f r e q [ i ] <− sum( counts $ f r e q )
196 }
s i n g l e s $ f r e q <− s i n g l e s $ f r e q / nrow ( typegr id )
198
#type f req1b <− colSums ( typegr id [ , −1 ] ) /nrow ( typegr id ) # Matches
200
# Pai r s
202 p a i r s <− s e t combn( s e t ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) , 2)
p a i r s <− as . data . frame ( t ( matrix ( u n l i s t ( p a i r s ) , nrow=2) ) ) # Coerces the p a i r s i n to
data frame
204 p a i r s $ f r e q <− NULL
206 f o r ( i in 1 : nrow ( p a i r s ) ) {
counts <− typecounts [ ( typecounts [ , p a i r s [ i , 1 ] ] == 1) & ( typecounts [ , p a i r s [ i , 2 ] ] ==
1) , ]
208 # pr in t ( c ( p a i r s [ i , 1 ] , p a i r s [ i , 2 ] ) )
# pr in t ( counts )
109
210 p a i r s $ f r e q [ i ] <− sum( counts $ f r e q )
}
212 p a i r s $ f r e q <− p a i r s $ f r e q / nrow ( typegr id )
214 # T r i p l e s
t r i p s <− s e t combn( s e t ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 ) , 3)
216 t r i p s <− as . data . frame ( t ( matrix ( u n l i s t ( t r i p s ) , nrow=3) ) ) # Coerces the p a i r s i n to
data frame
t r i p s $ f r e q <− NULL
218
f o r ( i in 1 : nrow ( p a i r s ) ) {
220 counts <− typecounts [ ( typecounts [ , t r i p s [ i , 1 ] ] == 1) & ( typecounts [ , t r i p s [ i , 2 ] ] ==
1) & ( typecounts [ , t r i p s [ i , 3 ] ] == 1) , ]
t r i p s $ f r e q [ i ] <− sum( counts $ f r e q )
222 }
t r i p s $ f r e q <− t r i p s $ f r e q / nrow ( typegr id )
224
226 # 5 . SAVE AND REPORT
228 mse f i t
save (mse f i t , p obs , tau wt , gamma wt , tautheta wt , tautheta wt a , tautheta wt abar ,
s i n g l e s , pa i r s , t r i p s , f i l e=paste (name , ” . Rdata” , sep=”” ) )
Stan Code
Simulation
1 # STAN model f i l e f o r Pub l i ca t i on Bias
# Corre la ted model
3
5 data {
int<lower=1> K; // number o f ca s e s
7 int<lower=1> L ; // number o f l i s t s
int<lower=1> N; // number o f vote ob s e rva t i on s
9 int<lower=1> T; // number o f types
int<lower =0, upper=1> P[N ] ; // observed votes
11 int<lower =1, upper=K> casename [N ] ; // case f o r obse rvat i on i
int<lower =1, upper=T> type [N ] ; // type o f case f o r obse rvat i on i
13 int<lower =1, upper=L> l i s t [N ] ; // l i s t f o r obse rvat i on i
int<lower =0, upper=1> admis [N ] ; // lower court a d m i s s i b i l i t y determinat ion f o r
obse rvat i on i
15 int<lower =0, upper=1> Z [T,K] ; // Inve r s e vec to r o f o f f i c i a l pub l i s t





r e a l beta ; // admis dependent i n t e r c e p t
23 r e a l theta case [K] ; // l a t e n t pub l i ca t i on−worth ines s o f case k
r e a l gamma l i s t [ L ] ; // l a t e n t comprehens iveness o f l i s t l
25 r e a l tau type [T ] ; // l a t e n t noteworth ines s o f type t
r ea l<lower=0> sigma case ; // hyperparameter f o r ca s e s
27 rea l<lower=0> sigma type ;
r e a l r [ L−1] ; // i n t e r a c t i o n
29 // f o r now assume l i s t s have s i n g l e rho
rea l<lower=0> sigma r ;
31 }
33 transformed parameters {
r e a l rho [ L ] ;
35
110
// Build rho vec to r
37 // Based on d i s c u s s i o n on stan−use r s group
// Assumes o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n l i s t i s the l a s t l i s t
39
f o r ( i in 1 : ( L−1) ) {
41 rho [ i ] <− r [ i ] ;
}
43





49 // hype rp r i o r s
sigma case ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ; // Half−cauchy p r i o r suggested by Gelman (5006)
51 sigma type ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ;
53 sigma r ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ;
55 // p r i o r s
theta case ˜ normal (0 , sigma case ) ;
57 tau type ˜ normal (0 , sigma type ) ; // Types are not l i nked
f o r ( l in 1 : ( L−1) ) {
59 gamma l i s t [ l ] ˜ normal (0 , 100) ;
}
61 gamma l i s t [ L ] ˜ normal (0 , 100) ; // Let pub l i shed l i s t have d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e
beta ˜ normal (0 ,100) ;
63 r ˜ normal (0 , sigma r ) ;
65 // r e g r e s s i o n s
f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
67 P[ i ] ˜ b e r n o u l l i l o g i t (
beta ∗ admis [ i ] + theta case [ casename [ i ] ] + tau type [ type [ i ] ] + gamma l i s t [
l i s t [ i ] ]




False Confession Expert Testimony
# STAN model f i l e f o r Pub l i ca t i on Bias
2
data {
4 int<lower=1> K; // number o f ca s e s
int<lower=1> L ; // number o f l i s t s
6 int<lower=1> N; // number o f vote ob s e rva t i on s
int<lower=1> T; // number o f types
8 int<lower =0, upper=1> P[N ] ; // observed votes
int<lower =1, upper=K> casename [N ] ; // case f o r obse rvat i on i
10 int<lower =1, upper=T> type [N ] ; // type o f case f o r obse rvat i on i
int<lower =1, upper=L> l i s t [N ] ; // l i s t f o r obse rvat i on i
12 int<lower =0, upper=1> admis [N ] ; // lower court a d m i s s i b i l i t y determinat ion f o r
obse rvat i on i
int<lower =0, upper=1> Z [T,K] ; // Inve r s e vec to r o f o f f i c i a l pub l i s t




18 r e a l beta ; // admis dependent i n t e r c e p t
r e a l theta case [K] ; // l a t e n t pub l i ca t i on−worth ines s o f case k
20 r e a l gamma l i s t [ L ] ; // l a t e n t comprehens iveness o f l i s t l
r e a l tau type [T ] ; // l a t e n t noteworth ines s o f type t
22 rea l<lower=0> sigma case ; // hyperparameter f o r ca s e s
r ea l<lower=0> sigma type ;
24 r e a l r [ L−1] ; // i n t e r a c t i o n
// f o r now assume l i s t s have s i n g l e rho
111
26 rea l<lower=0> sigma r ;
28 }
30 transformed parameters {
r e a l rho [ L ] ;
32
// Build rho vec to r
34 // Based on d i s c u s s i o n on stan−use r s group
// Assumes o f f i c i a l p u b l i c a t i o n l i s t i s the l a s t l i s t
36
f o r ( i in 1 : ( L−1) ) {
38 rho [ i ] <− r [ i ] ;
}
40





// hype rp r i o r s
48 sigma case ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ; // Half−cauchy p r i o r suggested by Gelman (5006)
sigma type ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ;
50 sigma r ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ;
52 // p r i o r s
theta case ˜ normal (0 , sigma case ) ;
54 tau type ˜ normal (0 , sigma type ) ; // Types are not l i nked
f o r ( l in 1 : ( L−1) ) {
56 gamma l i s t [ l ] ˜ normal (0 , 100) ;
}
58 gamma l i s t [ L ] ˜ normal (0 , 100) ; // Let pub l i shed l i s t have d i f f e r e n t a t t r i b u t e
beta ˜ normal (0 ,100) ;
60 r ˜ normal (0 , sigma r ) ;
62 // r e g r e s s i o n s
f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
64 P[ i ] ˜ b e r n o u l l i l o g i t (
beta ∗ admis [ i ] + theta case [ casename [ i ] ] + tau type [ type [ i ] ] + gamma l i s t [
l i s t [ i ] ]





Code for Chapter 2 (Attorneys’ Fees)
R Code
Simulations 1 and 2
1 # S c r i p t F i l e
# Fee D iv i s i on Simulat ion 1 & 2
3 # Edward K. Cheng
5 # I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
rm( l i s t = l s ( ) ) # c l e a r a l l
7
# Local S p e c i f i c Commands
9 setwd ( ”/ Users / ekcheng /Documents/ D i s s e r t a t i o n /Chapter2/Code” )
l i b r a r y ( r s tan )
11 opt ions (mc . co r e s = p a r a l l e l : : detectCores ( ) )
r s tan opt ions ( auto wr i t e = TRUE)
13 l i b r a r y ( s t a t s )
l i b r a r y ( f o r e i g n )
15 l i b r a r y (MASS)
l i b r a r y ( reshape )
17
19 # 1 . FUNCTIONS
# Both a l r and a l r . inv are checked
21
a l r <− f unc t i on ( x ) {
23 d <− dim ( x )
i f (d [ 1 ] != d [ 2 ] ) p r i n t ( ”WARNING ( a l r ) : Data matrix not square ” )
25 N <− d [ 1 ]
n <− N−1
27 x N <− x [ ,N]
29 r <− matrix (NA, N, n) # Creat ing normal ized r vec to r
f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
31 r [ i , 1 : n ] <− x [ i , 1 : n ] /x N[ i ]
}




a l r . inv <− f unc t i on ( l r ) {
39 d <− dim ( l r )
i f (d [ 1 ] != d [ 2 ] + 1) p r i n t ( ”WARNING ( a l r ) : Transformed matrix not N x n” )
41 N <− d [ 1 ]
n <− d [ 2 ]
43
r <− exp ( l r )
45 x <− matrix (NA, N, N)
x [ ,N] <− 1 / (1 + rowSums( r ) )
47 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {




53 a l r . s i n g l e <− f unc t i on ( x ) {
N <− l ength ( x )
55 n <− N−1
r <− x [ 1 : n ] /x [N]




61 a l r . inv . s i n g l e <− f unc t i on ( l r ) {
n <− l ength ( l r )
63 N <− n+1
65 r <− exp ( l r )
x <− rep (NA, N)
67 x [N] <− 1 / (1 + sum( r ) )




Fmatrix <− f unc t i on (d) {
73 cbind ( diag (d) , rep (−1 ,d) )
}
75
Hmatrix <− f unc t i on (d) {
77 diag (d) + matrix (1 , nrow=d , nco l=d)
}
79
Zmatrix <− f unc t i on ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) {
81 w <− ! i s . na ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) # vecto r o f non−miss ing va lue s
D <− l ength ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) # dimension o f f u l l s implex
83 I <− diag (D)
I [ (w==1) , ]
85 }
87 getC <− f unc t i on ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) {
C <− sum( ! i s . na ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) )
89 }
91 ## Q Matrix −− Aitch i son p .119
## Test by f e e d i n g i t a ba s i c vec to r o f s c o r e s and see i f i t g i v e s you the reduct i on
matrix
93 Qmatrix <− f unc t i on ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) {
w <− ! i s . na ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) # vecto r o f non−miss ing va lue s
95 D <− l ength ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) # dimension o f f u l l s implex
C <− sum(w) # dimension o f subcomposit ion s implex
97 Z <− Zmatrix ( s c o r e v e c t o r )
99 Fmatrix (C−1) %∗% Z %∗% t ( Fmatrix (D−1) ) %∗% s o l v e ( Hmatrix (D−1) ) # Resu l t s in
c o r r e c t r e s u l t on t e s t
}
101
# 3 STAN EXECUTION FUNCTION
103 stan s o l v e <− f unc t i on (S , stancode , i t e r a t i o n s ) {
# Create Q and Z m a t r i c i e s −− to handle miss ing data
105 F <− nrow (S)
N <− nco l (S)
107
Qindex <− rep (NA, F)
109 #Q l i s t <− NULL
Q <− NULL
111
Zindex <− rep (NA, F)
113 Z l i s t <− NULL
Z <− NULL
115
C <− rep (NA, F)
117
# Loop
119 f o r ( i in 1 :F) {
newQ <− Qmatrix (S [ i , ] ) # Round very smal l va lue s
121 newZ <− Zmatrix (S [ i , ] )
123 Q <− rbind (Q, newQ)
Z <− rbind (Z , newZ)
125 C[ i ] <− getC (S [ i , ] )
114
127 #Q l i s t [ [ i ] ] <− newQ # Test code
Z l i s t [ [ i ] ] <− newZ
129
i f ( i ==1) { # Sets the i=1
131 Qindex [ i ] <− 1
Zindex [ i ] <− 1
133 }
i f ( i < F) { # Sets the next index
135 Qindex [ i +1] <− Qindex [ i ] + C[ i ] − 1




S a l l <− S # Do t h i s to ease t r a n s f e r o f data to STAN
141 S a l l [ i s . na (S) ] <− −99 # Miss ing va lue s are tagged with −99 so we can de t e c t
e r r o r s in STAN
143 simul dat <− l i s t (
N = N,
145 F = F,
S a l l = S a l l ,
147 r a t e r = c ( 1 :F) ,
149 Q a l l = Q,
Qindex = Qindex ,
151 Qlength = nrow (Q) ,
153 Z a l l = Z ,
Zindex = Zindex ,
155 Zlength = nrow (Z) ,
157 C a l l = C
)
159
ptm <− proc . time ( )
161 stan f i t <− stan ( f i l e = stancode , data = simul dat ,
i t e r = i t e r a t i o n s , cha ins = 4)
163 proc . time ( ) − ptm
165 stan f i t
}
167
#4 . EXTRACTION FUNCTION
169 postmode <− f unc t i on ( draws ) {
N <− nco l ( draws )
171 estmode <− rep (NA, N)
f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
173 dens <− dens i ty ( draws [ , i ] )




179 # 4 . SIMULATION RUNS
181 # 4 .1 Simulat ion 1
obs data <− c ( NA, . 5 , . 4 , . 1 ,
183 . 7 , NA, . 3 , NA,
. 8 5 , NA, NA, . 1 5 ,
185 NA, 0 . 5 , 0 . 5 , NA)
obs <− t ( matrix ( obs data , 4 , 4) )
187
# 4 . 1 . 1 Sim1 Linear
189 s c o r e s <− melt ( t ( obs ) )
colnames ( s c o r e s ) <− c ( ” rated ” , ” r a t e r ” , ”S” )
191 s c o r e s <− s c o r e s [ ! i s . na ( s c o r e s $S) , ]
s c o r e s <− s c o r e s [ , c ( 2 , 1 , 3 ) ]
193 X <− t ( matrix ( as . i n t e g e r ( ! i s . na ( obs data ) ) , 4 , 4) ) # What obse rva t i on s
115
e x i s t
D <− 4
195 s imul dat <− l i s t (
N = length ( s c o r e s $S) ,
197 S = s c o r e s $S ,
r a t e r = s c o r e s $ rate r ,
199 rated = s c o r e s $ rated ,
D = D,
201 X = X,
ones <− rep (1 ,D)
203 )
205 s e t . seed (888)
sim1 l i n e a r <− stan ( f i l e = ” l inearmode l . stan ” , data = simul dat , i t e r = 5000 ,
cha ins = 4)
207 sim1 l i n e a r r e s u l t <− e x t r a c t ( sim1 l i n e a r , c ( ” alpha ” ) )
sim1 l i n e a r mode <− postmode ( sim1 l i n e a r r e s u l t $ alpha )
209 sim1 l i n e a r mode / sum( sim1 l i n e a r mode)
211 # 4 . 1 . 2 Sim1 Comp
s e t . seed (888)
213 sim1 comp <− stan s o l v e ( obs , ”compmodel . stan ” , 5000)
sim1 comp r e s u l t <− e x t r a c t ( sim1 comp , c ( ” x i ” ) )
215 sim1 comp mode <− postmode ( sim1 comp r e s u l t $ x i )
sim1 comp mode / sum( sim1 comp mode)
217
# 4 .2 Simulat ion 2
219 obs data <− c ( NA, . 6 , . 3 , NA, . 1 , NA,
. 5 , NA, . 2 , . 3 , NA, NA,
221 NA, NA, NA, . 5 , . 2 5 , . 2 5 ,
NA, . 4 5 , . 3 , NA, . 1 5 , . 1 0 ,
223 . 5 , . 5 , NA, NA, NA, NA,
. 6 , NA, NA, . 3 5 , . 0 5 , NA)
225 obs <− t ( matrix ( obs data , 6 , 6) )
227 # 4 . 2 . 1 sim2 Linear
s c o r e s <− melt ( t ( obs ) )
229 colnames ( s c o r e s ) <− c ( ” rated ” , ” r a t e r ” , ”S” )
s c o r e s <− s c o r e s [ ! i s . na ( s c o r e s $S) , ]
231 s c o r e s <− s c o r e s [ , c ( 2 , 1 , 3 ) ]
X <− t ( matrix ( as . i n t e g e r ( ! i s . na ( obs data ) ) , 6 ,6 ) ) # What obs e rva t i on s e x i s t
233 D <− 6
s imul dat <− l i s t (
235 N = length ( s c o r e s $S) ,
S = s c o r e s $S ,
237 r a t e r = s c o r e s $ rate r ,
rated = s c o r e s $ rated ,
239 D = D,
X = X,
241 ones <− rep (1 ,D)
)
243
s e t . seed (888)
245 sim2 l i n e a r <− stan ( f i l e = ” l inearmode l . stan ” , data = simul dat , i t e r = 5000 ,
cha ins = 4)
sim2 l i n e a r r e s u l t <− e x t r a c t ( sim2 l i n e a r , c ( ” alpha ” ) )
247 sim2 l i n e a r mode <− postmode ( sim2 l i n e a r r e s u l t $ alpha )
sim2 l i n e a r mode / sum( sim2 l i n e a r mode)
249
# 4 . 1 . 2 sim2 Comp
251 s e t . seed (888)
sim2 comp <− stan s o l v e ( obs , ”compmodel . stan ” , 5000)
253 sim2 comp r e s u l t <− e x t r a c t ( sim2 comp , c ( ” x i ” ) )
sim2 comp mode <− postmode ( sim2 comp r e s u l t $ x i )
255 sim2 comp mode / sum( sim2 comp mode)
257 save ( sim1 l i n e a r , sim1 comp , sim2 l i n e a r , sim2 comp , f i l e=” Sim12Results . Rdata” )
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Simulations 3 and 4
1 # S c r i p t F i l e
# Fee D iv i s i on Simulat ion 3 & 4
3 # Edward K. Cheng
5 # I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
rm( l i s t = l s ( ) ) # c l e a r a l l
7
# Local S p e c i f i c Commands
9 setwd ( ”/ Users / ekcheng /Documents/ D i s s e r t a t i o n /Chapter2/Code” )
l i b r a r y ( r s tan )
11 opt ions (mc . co r e s = p a r a l l e l : : detectCores ( ) )
r s tan opt ions ( auto wr i t e = TRUE)
13 l i b r a r y ( s t a t s )
l i b r a r y ( f o r e i g n )
15 l i b r a r y (MASS)
l i b r a r y ( reshape )
17
s e t . seed (3 . 1415 )
19
# 1 . FUNCTIONS
21 # Both a l r and a l r . inv are checked
23 a l r <− f unc t i on ( x ) {
d <− dim ( x )
25 i f (d [ 1 ] != d [ 2 ] ) p r i n t ( ”WARNING ( a l r ) : Data matrix not square ” )
N <− d [ 1 ]
27 n <− N−1
x N <− x [ ,N]
29
r <− matrix (NA, N, n) # Creat ing normal ized r vec to r
31 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
r [ i , 1 : n ] <− x [ i , 1 : n ] /x N[ i ]
33 }




39 a l r . inv <− f unc t i on ( l r ) {
d <− dim ( l r )
41 i f (d [ 1 ] != d [ 2 ] + 1) p r i n t ( ”WARNING ( a l r ) : Transformed matrix not N x n” )
N <− d [ 1 ]
43 n <− d [ 2 ]
45 r <− exp ( l r )
x <− matrix (NA, N, N)
47 x [ ,N] <− 1 / (1 + rowSums( r ) )
f o r ( i in 1 :N) {





a l r . s i n g l e <− f unc t i on ( x ) {
55 N <− l ength ( x )
n <− N−1
57 r <− x [ 1 : n ] /x [N]




a l r . inv . s i n g l e <− f unc t i on ( l r ) {
63 n <− l ength ( l r )
N <− n+1
65
r <− exp ( l r )
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67 x <− rep (NA, N)
x [N] <− 1 / (1 + sum( r ) )
69 x [ 1 : n ] <− r ∗ x [N]
x
71 }
73 Fmatrix <− f unc t i on (d) {
cbind ( diag (d) , rep (−1 ,d) )
75 }
77 Hmatrix <− f unc t i on (d) {
diag (d) + matrix (1 , nrow=d , nco l=d)
79 }
81 Zmatrix <− f unc t i on ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) {
w <− ! i s . na ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) # vecto r o f non−miss ing va lue s
83 D <− l ength ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) # dimension o f f u l l s implex
I <− diag (D)
85 I [ (w==1) , ]
}
87
getC <− f unc t i on ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) {
89 C <− sum( ! i s . na ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) )
}
91
## Q Matrix −− Aitch i son p .119
93 ## Test by f e e d i n g i t a ba s i c vec to r o f s c o r e s and see i f i t g i v e s you the reduct i on
matrix
Qmatrix <− f unc t i on ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) {
95 w <− ! i s . na ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) # vecto r o f non−miss ing va lue s
D <− l ength ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) # dimension o f f u l l s implex
97 C <− sum(w) # dimension o f subcomposit ion s implex
Z <− Zmatrix ( s c o r e v e c t o r )
99
Fmatrix (C−1) %∗% Z %∗% t ( Fmatrix (D−1) ) %∗% s o l v e ( Hmatrix (D−1) ) # Resu l t s in
c o r r e c t r e s u l t on t e s t
101 }
103 # Normal izat ion func t i on
normal ize <− f unc t i on ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) {
105 s c o r e v e c t o r / sum( s c o r e v e c t o r [ ! i s . na ( s c o r e v e c t o r ) ] )
}
107
# 2 . DATA GENERATION
109 s e t . seed (888)
111 s t rue <− c ( 0 . 2 5 , 0 . 15 , 0 . 15 , 0 . 1 , 0 . 1 , 0 . 1 , 0 . 05 , 0 . 05 , 0 . 025 , 0 . 025 )
N <− l ength ( s t rue )
113
# Creates N obse rva t i on s where each obse rvat i on has independent e r r o r ( not
normal ized )
115 # Bui lds by column , so you can ’ t combine with next f o r loop
s obs f u l l <− NULL
117 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
s obs f u l l <− cbind ( s obs f u l l , rnorm (N, mean=s true [ i ] , sd = 0 .2 ∗ s t rue [ i ] ) )
119 }
121 s t rue e r r <− diag ( s obs f u l l )
123 s base <− matrix (NA, N, N)
s s e l fA <− matrix (NA, N, N)
125 s s e l f B <− matrix (NA, N, N)
s s e l f C <− matrix (NA, N, N)
127 s s e l fD <− matrix (NA, N, N)
s col ludeA <− matrix (NA, N, N)
129
s co l ludeC <− matrix (NA, N, N)
131 s col ludeD <− matrix (NA, N, N)
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133 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
obs <− s t rue + rnorm (N, mean=rep (0 , N) , sd = 0 .2 ∗ s t rue ) # Observat ions
with e r r o r
135
maxobs <− c e i l i n g (N ∗ s t rue [ i ] /max( s t rue ) ) # Max number o f f i rms observed
i s the r e l a t i v e amount o f work t imes N
137 #minobs <− max( c (2 , maxobs/ 2) ) # Min number o f f i rms observed
i s the g r e a t e r o f 2 or max number d iv ided by 2
obs sample <− sample ( c ( 1 :N) [− i ] , max(2 , min ( maxobs ,N−1) ) , r e p l a c e=F, prob=s true
[− i ] ) # Creates random number o f ob s e rva t i on s ( r e l a t e d to s t rue ) , randomly
s e l e c t e d
139
# Don ’ t a l low s e l f −r epo r t ( handled l a t e r )
# Weighted so that l a r g e share s are more observed
141
s base [ i , obs sample ] <− obs [ obs sample ]
143 s base [ i , i ] <− NA # No s e l f −r e p o r t i n g a l lowed
s base [ i , ] <− normal ize ( s base [ i , ] )
145
# True s e l f −r epo r t
147 s s e l fA [ i , obs sample ] <− obs [ obs sample ]
s s e l fA [ i , i ] <− s t rue e r r [ i ] # Note −− w i l l be normal ized
149 s s e l fA [ i , ] <− normal ize ( s s e l fA [ i , ] )
151 # Everyone o v e r r a t e s themse lves
s s e l f B [ i , obs sample ] <− obs [ obs sample ]
153 s s e l f B [ i , i ] <− s t rue [ i ] ∗ 2 # Note −− w i l l be normal ized
s s e l f B [ i , ] <− normal ize ( s s e l f B [ i , ] )
155
# Only Firm 3 o v e r r a t e s i t s e l f
157 s s e l f C [ i , obs sample ] <− obs [ obs sample ]
s s e l f C [ i , i ] <− s t rue e r r [ i ] # Note −− w i l l be normal ized
159 i f ( i ==3) s s e l f C [ i , 3 ] <− s t rue [ 3 ] ∗ 2
s s e l f C [ i , ] <− normal ize ( s s e l f C [ i , ] )
161
# Only Firm 9 o v e r r a t e s i t s e l f
163 s s e l fD [ i , obs sample ] <− obs [ obs sample ]
s s e l fD [ i , i ] <− s t rue e r r [ i ] # Note −− w i l l be normal ized
165 i f ( i ==9) s s e l fD [ i , 9 ] <− s t rue [ 9 ] ∗ 4
s s e l fD [ i , ] <− normal ize ( s s e l fD [ i , ] )
167
169 # No s e l f −report , Firms 4 and 5 c o l l u d e
s col ludeA [ i , obs sample ] <− obs [ obs sample ]
171 s col ludeA [ i , i ] <− NA # Note −− w i l l be normal ized
i f ( i ==4) s col ludeA [ i , 5 ] <− s t rue [ 5 ] ∗ 3
173 i f ( i ==5) s col ludeA [ i , 4 ] <− s t rue [ 4 ] ∗ 4
s col ludeA [ i , ] <− normal ize ( s col ludeA [ i , ] )
175
# There i s NO col ludeB f o r now
177
# True s e l f −report , Firms 4 and 5 c o l l u d e
179 s co l ludeC [ i , obs sample ] <− obs [ obs sample ]
s co l ludeC [ i , i ] <− s t rue e r r [ i ] # Note −− w i l l be normal ized
181 i f ( i ==4) s co l ludeC [ i , 4 ] <− s t rue [ 4 ] ∗ 4
i f ( i ==5) s co l ludeC [ i , 5 ] <− s t rue [ 5 ] ∗ 3
183 i f ( i ==4) s co l ludeC [ i , 5 ] <− s t rue [ 5 ] ∗ 3
i f ( i ==5) s co l ludeC [ i , 4 ] <− s t rue [ 4 ] ∗ 4
185 s co l ludeC [ i , ] <− normal ize ( s co l ludeC [ i , ] )
187 # Firm 3 o v e r r a t e s and Firms 4 and 5 c o l l u d e
s col ludeD [ i , obs sample ] <− obs [ obs sample ]
189 s col ludeD [ i , i ] <− s t rue e r r [ i ] # Note −− w i l l be normal ized
i f ( i ==3) s col ludeD [ i , 3 ] <− s t rue [ 3 ] ∗ 2
191 i f ( i ==4) s col ludeD [ i , 4 ] <− s t rue [ 4 ] ∗ 3
i f ( i ==5) s col ludeD [ i , 5 ] <− s t rue [ 5 ] ∗ 2
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193 i f ( i ==4) s col ludeD [ i , 5 ] <− s t rue [ 5 ] ∗ 2
i f ( i ==5) s col ludeD [ i , 4 ] <− s t rue [ 4 ] ∗ 3
195 s col ludeD [ i , ] <− normal ize ( s col ludeD [ i , ] )
197 }
199 wr i t e . csv ( s base , ”Data7Base . csv ” )
wr i t e . csv ( s se l fA , ” Data7SelfA . csv ” )
201 wr i t e . csv ( s se l fB , ” Data7SelfB . csv ” )
wr i t e . csv ( s se l fC , ” Data7SelfC . csv ” )
203 wr i t e . csv ( s se l fD , ” Data7SelfD . csv ” )
wr i t e . csv ( s col ludeA , ” Data7colludeA . csv ” )
205 wr i t e . csv ( s col ludeC , ” Data7colludeC . csv ” )




# 3 .1 STAN EXECUTION FUNCTION
211
stan s o l v e <− f unc t i on (S , stancode ) {
213 # Create Q and Z m a t r i c i e s −− to handle miss ing data
F <− nrow (S)
215 N <− nco l (S)
217 Qindex <− rep (NA, F)
#Q l i s t <− NULL
219 Q <− NULL
221 Zindex <− rep (NA, F)
Z l i s t <− NULL
223 Z <− NULL
225 C <− rep (NA, F)
227 # Loop
f o r ( i in 1 :F) {
229 newQ <− Qmatrix (S [ i , ] ) # Round very smal l va lue s
newZ <− Zmatrix (S [ i , ] )
231
Q <− rbind (Q, newQ)
233 Z <− rbind (Z , newZ)
C[ i ] <− getC (S [ i , ] )
235
#Q l i s t [ [ i ] ] <− newQ # Test code
237 Z l i s t [ [ i ] ] <− newZ
239 i f ( i ==1) { # Sets the i=1
Qindex [ i ] <− 1
241 Zindex [ i ] <− 1
}
243 i f ( i < F) { # Sets the next index
Qindex [ i +1] <− Qindex [ i ] + C[ i ] − 1
245 Zindex [ i +1] <− Zindex [ i ] + C[ i ]
}
247 }
249 S a l l <− S # Do t h i s to ease t r a n s f e r o f data to STAN
S a l l [ i s . na (S) ] <− −99 # Miss ing va lue s are tagged with −99 so we can de t e c t
e r r o r s in STAN
251
simul dat <− l i s t (
253 N = N,
F = F,
255 S a l l = S a l l ,
r a t e r = c ( 1 :F) ,
257
Q a l l = Q,
259 Qindex = Qindex ,
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Qlength = nrow (Q) ,
261
Z a l l = Z ,
263 Zindex = Zindex ,
Zlength = nrow (Z) ,
265
C a l l = C
267 )
269 ptm <− proc . time ( )
stan f i t <− stan ( f i l e = stancode , data = simul dat ,
271 i t e r = 1000 , cha ins = 1)
proc . time ( ) − ptm
273
stan f i t
275 }
277 # 4 .2 Runs
f i t base no <− stan s o l v e ( s base , ”compmodel4 . stan ” )
279 f i t s e l fA no <− stan s o l v e ( s se l fA , ”compmodel4 . stan ” )
f i t s e l f B no <− stan s o l v e ( s se l fB , ”compmodel4 . stan ” )
281
f i t base r e s i s t <− stan s o l v e ( s base , ”compmodel5 . stan ” )
283 f i t s e l fA r e s i s t <− stan s o l v e ( s se l fA , ”compmodel5 . stan ” )
f i t s e l f B r e s i s t <− stan s o l v e ( s se l fB , ”compmodel5 . stan ” )
285
f i t s e l f C no <− stan s o l v e ( s se l fC , ”compmodel4 . stan ” )
287 f i t s e l fD no <− stan s o l v e ( s se l fD , ”compmodel4 . stan ” )
f i t s e l f C r e s i s t <− stan s o l v e ( s se l fC , ”compmodel5 . stan ” )
289 f i t s e l fD r e s i s t <− stan s o l v e ( s se l fD , ”compmodel5 . stan ” )
291 f i t co l ludeA no <− stan s o l v e ( s col ludeA , ”compmodel4 . stan ” )
f i t co l ludeC no <− stan s o l v e ( s col ludeC , ”compmodel4 . stan ” )
293 f i t col ludeD no <− stan s o l v e ( s col ludeD , ”compmodel4 . stan ” )
295 f i t co l ludeA r e s i s t <− stan s o l v e ( s col ludeA , ”compmodel5 . stan ” )
f i t co l ludeC r e s i s t <− stan s o l v e ( s col ludeC , ”compmodel5 . stan ” )
297 f i t col ludeD r e s i s t <− stan s o l v e ( s col ludeD , ”compmodel5 . stan ” )
299 save ( f i t base no , f i t s e l fA no , f i t s e l f B no , f i t s e l f C no , f i t s e l fD no , f i t
co l ludeA no , f i t co l ludeC no , f i t co l ludeD no ,
f i t base r e s i s t , f i t s e l fA r e s i s t , f i t s e l f B r e s i s t , f i t s e l f C r e s i s t , f i t
s e l fD r e s i s t , f i t co l ludeA r e s i s t , f i t co l ludeC r e s i s t , f i t co l ludeD r e s i s t ,
301 f i l e=” Resu l t s7 . Rdata” )
303 # 5 . ANALYSIS ( us ing draws to c a l c u l a t e p o s t e r i o r mean and mode)
load ( ” Resu l t s7 . Rdata” )
305
postmode <− f unc t i on ( draws ) {
307 N <− nco l ( draws )
estmode <− rep (NA, N)
309 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
dens <− dens i ty ( draws [ , i ] )





draws base no <− e x t r a c t ( f i t base no , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” ) )
317 postmode ( draws base no$ x i )
319 draws s e l fA no <− e x t r a c t ( f i t s e l fA no , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” ) )
postmode ( draws s e l fA no$ x i )
321
draws s e l f B no <− e x t r a c t ( f i t s e l f B no , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” ) )
323 postmode ( draws s e l f B no$ x i )
325 draws s e l f C no <− e x t r a c t ( f i t s e l f C no , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” ) )
121
postmode ( draws s e l f C no$ x i )
327
draws s e l fD no <− e x t r a c t ( f i t s e l fD no , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” ) )
329 postmode ( draws s e l fD no$ x i )
331 draws col ludeA no <− e x t r a c t ( f i t co l ludeA no , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” ) )
postmode ( draws col ludeA no$ x i )
333
draws col ludeC no <− e x t r a c t ( f i t co l ludeC no , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” ) )
335 postmode ( draws col ludeC no$ x i )
337 draws col ludeD no <− e x t r a c t ( f i t co l ludeD no , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” ) )
postmode ( draws col ludeD no$ x i )
339
draws base r e s i s t <− e x t r a c t ( f i t base r e s i s t , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” , ”gamma” ) )
341 postmode ( draws base r e s i s t $ x i )
343 draws s e l fA r e s i s t <− e x t r a c t ( f i t s e l fA r e s i s t , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” , ”gamma” ) )
postmode ( draws s e l fA r e s i s t $ x i )
345
draws s e l f B r e s i s t <− e x t r a c t ( f i t s e l f B r e s i s t , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” , ”gamma” ) )
347 postmode ( draws s e l f B r e s i s t $ x i )
349 draws s e l f C r e s i s t <− e x t r a c t ( f i t s e l f C r e s i s t , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” , ”gamma” ) )
postmode ( draws s e l f C r e s i s t $ x i )
351
draws s e l fD r e s i s t <− e x t r a c t ( f i t s e l fD r e s i s t , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” , ”gamma” ) )
353 postmode ( draws s e l fD r e s i s t $ x i )
355 draws col ludeA r e s i s t <− e x t r a c t ( f i t co l ludeA r e s i s t , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” , ”
gamma” ) )
postmode ( draws col ludeA r e s i s t $ x i )
357
draws col ludeC r e s i s t <− e x t r a c t ( f i t co l ludeC r e s i s t , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” , ”
gamma” ) )
359 postmode ( draws col ludeC r e s i s t $ x i )
361 draws col ludeD r e s i s t <− e x t r a c t ( f i t co l ludeD r e s i s t , c ( ” x i ” , ”Omega” , ” sigma” , ”
gamma” ) )
postmode ( draws col ludeD r e s i s t $ x i )
363
comp7resu l t s <− data . frame (
365 truth = s true ,
base no = postmode ( draws base no$ x i ) ,
367 s e l fA no = postmode ( draws s e l fA no$ x i ) ,
s e l f B no = postmode ( draws s e l f B no$ x i ) ,
369 s e l f C no = postmode ( draws s e l f C no$ x i ) ,
s e l fD no = postmode ( draws s e l fD no$ x i ) ,
371 col ludeA no = postmode ( draws col ludeC no$ x i ) ,
co l ludeC no = postmode ( draws col ludeC no$ x i ) ,
373 col ludeD no = postmode ( draws col ludeD no$ x i ) ,
base r e s i s t = postmode ( draws base r e s i s t $ x i ) ,
375 s e l fA r e s i s t = postmode ( draws s e l fA r e s i s t $ x i ) ,
s e l f B r e s i s t = postmode ( draws s e l f B r e s i s t $ x i ) ,
377 s e l f C r e s i s t = postmode ( draws s e l f C r e s i s t $ x i ) ,
s e l fD r e s i s t = postmode ( draws s e l fD r e s i s t $ x i ) ,
379 col ludeA r e s i s t = postmode ( draws col ludeC r e s i s t $ x i ) ,
co l ludeC r e s i s t = postmode ( draws col ludeC r e s i s t $ x i ) ,
381 col ludeD r e s i s t = postmode ( draws col ludeD r e s i s t $ x i ) )
383 comp7norm <− comp7resu l t s
f o r ( i in 1 : nco l ( comp7norm) ) {






int<lower=1> D; // number o f f i rms
3 int<lower=1> N; // number o f ob s e rva t i on s
r ea l<lower =0, upper=1> S [N ] ; // s c o r e s g iven by f i rm i to f i rm j
5 int<lower =1, upper=D> r a t e r [N ] ; // array o f r a t e r v a r i a b l e
int<lower =1, upper=D> rated [N ] ; // array o f t a r g e t v a r i a b l e
7 row vector<lower =0, upper=1>[D] X[D ] ; // presence o f s c o r e s from f i rm i to f i rm
j
vec to r [D] ones ; // vec to r o f ones
9 }
11 parameters {
s implex [D] alpha ; // v a r i a b l e o f i n t e r e s t −− value o f f i rm to
l i t i g a t i o n




17 // p r i o r s
alpha ˜ d i r i c h l e t ( ones ) ; // D i r i c h l e t (1 ) i s supposed to be uniform
d i s t r i b u t i o n
19
// draws
21 f o r ( i in 1 :D) {
sigma [ i ] ˜ inv gamma( 0 . 0 0 1 , 0 . 0 0 1 ) ;
23 }
25 f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
S [ i ] ˜ normal ( alpha [ rated [ i ] ] / dot product ( alpha , X[ r a t e r [ i ] ] ) , sigma [ r a t e r [ i





2 int<lower=1> N; // number o f rated f i rms
int<lower=1> F; // number o f r a t i n g f i rms
4 int<lower=1> Qlength ; // nrow o f Q
int<lower=1> Zlength ; // nrow o f Z
6 matrix [N,N] S a l l ; // Observed Raw Composit ions ( no log r a t i o yet )
int<lower=1> r a t e r [F ] ; // Rater number
8 int<lower =1, upper=Qlength> Qindex [F ] ; // Indexes f o r Q and Z
int<lower =1, upper=Zlength> Zindex [F ] ;
10 matrix<lower=−2, upper=2>[Qlength , N−1] Q a l l ; // Mashed Q matrix Should be
−1 to 1 // roundo f f
e r r o r
matrix<lower =0, upper=1>[Zlength , N] Z a l l ; // Mashed Z matrix
12 int<lower=1> C a l l [F ] ; // C vecto r −− conta in s l eng th s f o r each s e t o f








vec to r [ n ] alpha ; // v a r i a b l e o f i n t e r e s t −− t rue compos i t ion vec to r
22 cho le sky f a c t o r co r r [ n ] Omega ;




matrix [ n , n ] Sigma ;
28
Sigma = diag pre mult ip ly ( sigma , Omega) ;
30
to vec to r ( alpha ) ˜ normal (0 , 5) ;
32 Omega ˜ l k j co r r cho l e sky (4 ) ;
sigma ˜ cauchy (0 , 2 . 5 ) ;
34
36 // F i r s t i t e r a t i o n
f o r ( i in 1 :F) {
38 i n t C = C a l l [ i ] ;
i n t c = C−1;
40 vec to r [C] p s i ;
vec to r [ c ] a l rS ;
42 matrix [ c , n ] Q;
44 p s i = block (Z a l l , Zindex [ i ] , 1 , C, N) ∗ row (S a l l , i ) ’ ;
a l rS = log ( head ( ps i , c ) / p s i [C] ) ;
46
Q = block (Q a l l , Qindex [ i ] , 1 , c , n ) ;
48




generated q u a n t i t i e s {
54 rea l<lower =0,upper=1> x i [N ] ;
56 x i [N] = 1 / (1 + sum( exp ( alpha ) ) ) ;
f o r ( i in 1 : n ) {
58 x i [ i ] = exp ( alpha [ i ] ) ∗ x i [N ] ;
}
60 }
Compositional Model with Collusion Resistance
data {
2 int<lower=1> N; // number o f rated f i rms
int<lower=1> F; // number o f r a t i n g f i rms
4 int<lower=1> Qlength ; // nrow o f Q
int<lower=1> Zlength ; // nrow o f Z
6 matrix [N,N] S a l l ; // Observed Raw Composit ions ( no log r a t i o yet )
int<lower=1> r a t e r [F ] ; // Rater number
8 int<lower =1, upper=Qlength> Qindex [F ] ; // Indexes f o r Q and Z
int<lower =1, upper=Zlength> Zindex [F ] ;
10 matrix<lower=−2, upper=2>[Qlength , N−1] Q a l l ; // Mashed Q matrix Should be −1
to 1 , but the re was some
// roundo f f e r r o r
matrix<lower =0, upper=1>[Zlength , N] Z a l l ; // Mashed Z matrix
12 int<lower=1> C a l l [F ] ; // C vecto r −− conta in s l eng th s f o r each s e t o f








vec to r [ n ] alpha ; // v a r i a b l e o f i n t e r e s t −− t rue compos i t ion vec to r
22 cho le sky f a c t o r co r r [ n ] Omega ;
vector<lower =0, upper=1>[n ] sigma ;
24 rea l<lower=0> gamma[F ] ; // random e f f e c t s v a r i a b l e




matrix [ n , n ] Sigma ;
30
to vec to r ( alpha ) ˜ normal (0 , 5) ;
32 Omega ˜ l k j co r r cho l e sky (4 ) ;
sigma ˜ cauchy (0 , 2 . 5 ) ;
34 gamma ˜ normal (0 , s i g gamma) ;
36 // F i r s t i t e r a t i o n
f o r ( i in 1 :F) {
38 i n t C = C a l l [ i ] ;
i n t c = C−1;
40 vec to r [C] p s i ;
vec to r [ c ] a l rS ;
42 matrix [ c , n ] Q;
44 Sigma = diag pre mult ip ly ( sigma ∗ gamma[ i ] , Omega) ;
46 p s i = block (Z a l l , Zindex [ i ] , 1 , C, N) ∗ row (S a l l , i ) ’ ;
a l rS = log ( head ( ps i , c ) / p s i [C] ) ;
48
Q = block (Q a l l , Qindex [ i ] , 1 , c , n ) ;
50




generated q u a n t i t i e s {
56 rea l<lower =0,upper=1> x i [N ] ;
58 x i [N] = 1 / (1 + sum( exp ( alpha ) ) ) ;
f o r ( i in 1 : n ) {




Code for Chapter 3 (Latent Space)
R Code
Primary Script
# I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
2 rm( l i s t = l s ( ) ) # c l e a r a l l
f i l ename = ” la t ent7d ”
4 s e r i e s = ” l a t e n t 7 ”
6 # HPC S p e c i f i c Commands
. l i bPaths ( ”/vega/ s t a t s / u s e r s / ekc2109 / rpackages /” ) # Use f o r c l u s t e r
8
l i b r a r y ( r s tan )
10 s e t cppo ( ” f a s t ” )
l i b r a r y ( s t a t s )
12 l i b r a r y ( f o r e i g n )
l i b r a r y (MASS)
14 l i b r a r y ( g raph i c s )
l i b r a r y ( matr ixca l c )
16 l i b r a r y ( igraph )
l i b r a r y ( gdata )
18 l i b r a r y ( shapes )
l i b r a r y ( reshape )
20
# 1 . FUNCTIONS
22
24 # 2 . LOAD DATA AND PREP CITATIONS
26 # 2.01 J u s t i c e cente red votes
load ( ”SCJD. Rdata” )
28 SCJD <− SCDB 2013 01 j u s t i c e C e n t e r e d Ci ta t i on
SCJD <− SCJD[SCJD$term < 2003 , ] # El iminate ca s e s beyond 2002 f o r now
30
# 2.02 SCJD Case−Level Data
32 SCJDcases <− read . csv ( ”SCJDcasesEKC . csv ” ) # Load datase t with shor t names
f o r 1 s t Am
SCJDcases <− SCJDcases [ SCJDcases$term < 2003 , ] # El iminate ca s e s beyond 2002 f o r
now
34
# 2.03 C i ta t i on Network ( Fowler )
36 casenet <− read . csv ( ” SCc i ta t ion . csv ” )
38 # 2.04 C i t a t i o n s f o r 2002 t e s t s e t
# These are the c i t a t i o n s made by the lower court opinion , which i s a l l you w i l l
have in ac tua l p r e d i c t i o n
40 edge2002 <− read . csv ( ”2002 edges . csv ” , header=FALSE)
colnames ( edge2002 ) <− c ( ” c i t e r ” , ” c i t e d ” , ” weight ” )
42
# 2.05 J u s t i c e B iog raph i ca l Data
44 # Read in RData format because the e x c e l conver s i on takes too long
#j u s t i c e s b i o <− read . x l sx (” j u s t i c e s b i o . x l sx ” , 1) # Code f o r s e t t i n g up the R data
format
46 #save ( j u s t i c e s b i o , f i l e =”J u s t i c e s B i o . Rdata ”)
load ( ” J u s t i c e s B i o . Rdata” )
48
# 2 .1 Construct lookup t ab l e
50 case lookup <− data . frame ( usCite=SCJDcases$ usCite , l e x i s C i t e=SCJDcases$ l e x i s C i t e ,
name=SCJDcases$shortName )
case lookup <− case lookup [ ! i s . na ( case lookup $ l e x i s C i t e ) , ]
52 case lookup $ usCite <− gsub ( ” [\\ .\\ s ] ” , ”” , case lookup $ usCite , p e r l=TRUE) # Remove
pe r i od s and spac ing to match the c i t a t i o n par s e r
l e x i s s p l i t <− s t r s p l i t ( as . cha rac t e r ( case lookup $ l e x i s C i t e ) , ” U. S . LEXIS ” )
54
126
newlex i s <− cha rac t e r ( l ength ( case lookup $ l e x i s C i t e ) )
56 f o r ( i in 1 : l ength ( newlex i s ) ) {
year <− u n l i s t ( l e x i s s p l i t [ [ i ] ] ) [ 1 ]
58 num <− u n l i s t ( l e x i s s p l i t [ [ i ] ] ) [ 2 ]
num <− s p r i n t f ( ”%04d” , as . i n t e g e r (num) ) # Pad with z e r o e s
60 newlex i s [ i ] <− paste ( year , ”USLX” , num, sep=”” )
}
62
# t e s t <− data . frame ( case lookup $ l e x i s C i t e , newlex i s )
64 case lookup $ newlex i s <− newlex i s ;
66 # 2 .2 2002 Lookup Table f o r r e s ea r ch
#lookup2002 <− data . frame ( usCite=SCJDcases$ usCite , l e x i s C i t e=SCJDcases$ l e x i s C i t e ,
caseName=SCJDcases$caseName , term=SCJDcases$term )
68 #lookup2002 <− lookup2002 [ lookup2002 $term == 2002 , ]
# wr i t e . csv ( lookup2002 , ”2002 ca s e s . csv ”)
70
# 2 .3 Convert the 2002 c i t a t i o n s
72 # Produce l i s t with 2002 Supreme Court Lex i s Cite and the op in ions c i t e d by the
lower court
index <− match ( as . cha rac t e r ( edge2002 $ c i t e d ) , case lookup $ usCite )
74 edge2002 $ u s c i t e d <− edge2002 $ c i t e d
edge2002 $ c i t e d <− case lookup $ newlex i s [ index ]
76
lookup2002 <− read . csv ( ”2002 lookup . csv ” )
78 lookup2002 <− data . frame ( s u p c t l e x i s = lookup2002 $ s u p c t l e x i s , l owerc t=lookup2002 $
lowerc t )
80 edge2002 $ c i t e r s c <− numeric ( nrow ( edge2002 ) )
lookup2002 $ lowerc t <− as . cha rac t e r ( lookup2002 $ lowerc t )
82 edge2002 $ c i t e r <−as . cha rac t e r ( edge2002 $ c i t e r )
f o r ( i in 1 : nrow ( edge2002 ) ) {
84 i f ( edge2002 $ c i t e r [ i ] %in% lookup2002 $ lowerc t ) {
edge2002 $ c i t e r s c [ i ] <− as . cha rac t e r ( lookup2002 $ s u p c t l e x i s [ which ( lookup2002 $
lowerc t == edge2002 $ c i t e r [ i ] , a r r . in=TRUE) ] )
86 }
e l s e { edge2002 $ c i t e r s c [ i ] <− NA }
88 }
90 edge2002 <− edge2002 [ ! i s . na ( edge2002 $ c i t e d ) , ] # Just keep the ones with unique
Lex i s c i t e
92 # 2 .4 J u s t i c e lookup t a b l e
# Don ’ t use the SCJD lookup because that s t a r t s with an o f f s e t
94 # j u s t i c e l o o k u p <− data . frame (SCJDcode = SCJD$ j u s t i c e , name = SCJD$ just iceName )
# unique ( j u s t i c e l o o k u p )
96
# 2 .5 Convert and Reduce the Fowler Case Network
98 index c i t e r <− match ( as . cha rac t e r ( ca sene t $ c i t i n g case ) , case lookup $ l e x i s C i t e )
casenet $ c i t e r <− case lookup $ newlex i s [ index c i t e r ]
100
index c i t e d <− match ( as . cha rac t e r ( ca sene t $ c i t e d case ) , case lookup $ l e x i s C i t e )
102 casenet $ c i t e d <− case lookup $ newlex i s [ index c i t e d ]
104 # Note : Because you used a lookup ta b l e l i m i t e d by SCJD to cons t ruc t c i t e r and c i t ed
, you
# Can use the NA as the f i l t e r out ca s e s be f o r e the 1946 c u t o f f
106 # When you move to more expans ive networks , w i l l have to r e v i s i t
ca senet <− casenet [ ! i s . na ( casene t $ c i t e r ) , ]
108 casenet <− casenet [ ! i s . na ( casene t $ c i t e d ) , ]
ca senet <− casenet [ , 3 : 4 ]
110
# 2 .6 SCJD Conversion
112 index case <− match ( as . cha rac t e r (SCJD$ l e x i s C i t e ) , case lookup $ l e x i s C i t e )
SCJD$ newlex i sC i t e <− case lookup $ newlex i s [ index case ]
114 # data . frame (SCJD$ l e x i s C i t e , SCJD$ newlex i sC i t e )
116 index case <− match ( as . cha rac t e r ( SCJDcases$ l e x i s C i t e ) , case lookup $ l e x i s C i t e )
127
SCJDcases$ new l ex i sC i t e <− case lookup $ newlex i s [ index case ]
118
# 3 . Construct da ta s e t s f o r model
120 # Supreme Court Database i s 1946 forward .
# SCJD$ vote = concur / d i s s e n t
122 # 3 .1 Vote t a b l e
124 v o t e l i s t <− data . frame ( j u s t i c e=SCJD$ justiceName , c i t a t i o n=SCJD$ newlex i sCi te ,
i s sueArea=SCJD$ issueArea , term=SCJD$term ,
d i r e c t i o n=SCJD$ d i r e c t i o n , o r i g v o t e=SCJD$ vote , voteUnclear=SCJD$ voteUnclear ,
126 d i sp=SCJD$ ca s eD i spo s i t i on , petwin=SCJD$partyWinning , spaeth id=SCJD$ j u s t i c e ,
i s s u e=SCJD$ i s sue , l cDisagreement=SCJD$ lcDisagreement , l c D i s p o s i t i o n=SCJD$
l c D i s p o s i t i o n ,
128 l c D i s p o s i t i o n D i r e c t i o n=SCJD$ l c D i s p o s i t i o n D i r e c t i o n , lawSupp=SCJD$lawSupp )
130 # 3 . 1 . 1 Create Conso l idated D i s p o s i t i o n Var iab le
v o t e l i s t $ s imp led i sp <− rep (NA, nrow ( v o t e l i s t ) )
132 v o t e l i s t $ s imp led i sp [ v o t e l i s t $ d i sp == 2 ] <− 0 # Aff irm
v o t e l i s t $ s imp led i sp [ v o t e l i s t $ d i sp == 3 ] <− 1 # Reverse
134 v o t e l i s t $ s imp led i sp [ v o t e l i s t $ d i sp == 4 ] <− 1 # R&R
v o t e l i s t $ s imp led i sp [ v o t e l i s t $ d i sp == 5 ] <− 1 # Vacate and remand
136 v o t e l i s t $ s imp led i sp [ v o t e l i s t $ d i sp == 6 ] <− 1 # Reverse in part
v o t e l i s t $ s imp led i sp [ v o t e l i s t $ d i sp == 7 ] <− 1 # Reverse in part and remand
138 # NA f o r the remainder , i . e . , 1( p e t i t i o n granted ) , 8( vacated ) , 9( appeal d i smi s s ed ) ,
10( c e r t i f i c a t i o n ) , 11 ( no d i s p o s i t i o n )
140 # 3 . 1 . 2 Winning Var iab le
# For p r e l i m i n a r i e s , use Winning Party v a r i a b l e ra the r than 3 . 1 . 1 Conso l idated
D i s p o s i t i o n
142 # 0 = a f f i r m ( not f a v o r a b l e to p e t i t i o n e r ) , 1 = rever s e− l i k e ( f a v o r a b l e to
p e t i t i o n e r ) , 2 = unc l ea r
144 # 3 . 1 . 3 Create Join Var iab le
v o t e l i s t $ j o i n <− rep (NA, nrow ( v o t e l i s t ) )
146 v o t e l i s t $ j o i n [ v o t e l i s t $ o r i g v o t e ==1] <− 1 # Join major i ty
v o t e l i s t $ j o i n [ v o t e l i s t $ o r i g v o t e ==2] <− 0 # Dissent
148 v o t e l i s t $ j o i n [ v o t e l i s t $ o r i g v o t e ==3] <− 1 # Regular Concurrence ( s ee Codebook 57 :
This i s very c l o s e to j o i n )
v o t e l i s t $ j o i n [ v o t e l i s t $ o r i g v o t e ==4] <− 1 # S p e c i a l Concurrence ( s ee Codebook 57 :
This i s concurr ing in judgment )
150 v o t e l i s t $ j o i n <− as . l o g i c a l ( v o t e l i s t $ j o i n )
# NA f o r the remainder , i . e . , 5( judgment ) , 6( d i s s e n t from c e r t ) , 7( j u r i s d i s s e n t ) ,
8( equal d iv ided )
152
# 3 . 1 . 4 Create New Vote Var iab le
154 v o t e l i s t $ petwin [ v o t e l i s t $ petwin == 2 ] <− NA # Cases o f unc l ea r d i s p o s i t i o n
v o t e l i s t $ petwin <− as . l o g i c a l ( v o t e l i s t $ petwin )
156
v o t e l i s t $ vote <− ( v o t e l i s t $ petwin == v o t e l i s t $ j o i n ) # See Notes −− a truth t ab l e
bears t h i s out
158 v o t e l i s t $ vote [ i s . na ( v o t e l i s t $ petwin ) ] <− NA # Handle the NAs
v o t e l i s t $ vote [ i s . na ( v o t e l i s t $ j o i n ) ] <− NA
160
v o t e l i s t $ vote <− as . l o g i c a l ( v o t e l i s t [ , ’ vote ’ ] ) # Use o f ”$” r i s k s p a r t i a l match
162 v o t e l i s t $ vote <− ! v o t e l i s t $ vote # IMPORTANT: Fl ip so that 1=a f f i r m ( agree
) and 0=r e v e r s e ( d i s a g r e e )
# data . frame ( v o t e l i s t $petwin , v o t e l i s t $ jo in , v o t e l i s t $ vote )
164
# 3 . 1 . 5 Remove NA votes
166 v o t e l i s t <− v o t e l i s t [ ! i s . na ( v o t e l i s t $ vote ) , ]
168 # 3 . 1 . 6 Standard ize the ideo l ogy v a r i a b l e
# SCJD Di r e c t i on = Conservat ive (1 ) or L i b e r a l (2 ) or Unclear (3 )
170 # Make ideo l ogy = Conservat ive (0 ) or L i b e r a l (1 ) or Unclear (NA)
v o t e l i s t $ ideovote <− NA
172 v o t e l i s t $ ideovote [ v o t e l i s t $ d i r e c t i o n==”1” ] <− 0
v o t e l i s t $ ideovote [ v o t e l i s t $ d i r e c t i o n==”2” ] <− 1
174
128
# 3.2 J u s t i c e Dataset
176
# 3 . 2 . 1 Clean Data
178 # Var iab l e s o f i n t e r e s t
# name , spaeth id ( matches SCJD) , parnom ( p o l i t i c a l party o f nominee ) , p r e spar t (
party o f nominating Pres ident ) , ideo ( Sega l Cover s co r e o f nominee ideo l ogy )
180 # Note : Lots o f other id eo l ogy s c o r e s a v a i l a b l e in the j u s t i c e dataset , but r i g h t
now , we only want b a s e l i n e
182 j u s t i c e l i s t <− data . frame (name=j u s t i c e s b i o $name , spaeth id=j u s t i c e s b i o $ spaethid , ideo
=j u s t i c e s b i o $ ideo , parnom=j u s t i c e s b i o $parnom )
j u s t i c e l i s t <− unique ( j u s t i c e l i s t ) # Remove d u p l i c a t e rows ( a r t i f a c t o f datase t )
184
j u s t i c e l i s t <− j u s t i c e l i s t [ j u s t i c e l i s t $ ideo != 777 , ]
186 j u s t i c e l i s t <− j u s t i c e l i s t [ j u s t i c e l i s t $ spaeth id != ”no spaet ” , ]
j u s t i c e l i s t $ ideo [ j u s t i c e l i s t $ ideo == ” data unav” ] <− NA
188
j u s t i c e l i s t $ spaeth id <− as . numeric ( as . cha rac t e r ( j u s t i c e l i s t $ spaeth id ) )
190 j u s t i c e l i s t $ ideo <− as . numeric ( as . cha rac t e r ( j u s t i c e l i s t $ ideo ) )
j u s t i c e l i s t <− j u s t i c e l i s t [ ( j u s t i c e l i s t $ spaeth id !=74 | ! i s . na ( j u s t i c e l i s t $ ideo ) ) , ]
# Get r i d o f d u p l i c a t e f o r Stone , CJ (who was e l eva t ed )
192 j u s t i c e l i s t <− j u s t i c e l i s t [ ( j u s t i c e l i s t $ spaeth id !=97 | j u s t i c e l i s t $ ideo !=0.845 ) , ]
# Get r i d o f d u p l i c a t e f o r Fortas ’ s CJ nomination
194 j u s t i c e l i s t <− j u s t i c e l i s t [ o rder ( j u s t i c e l i s t $ spaeth id ) , ] # Put everyth ing in
order
rownames ( j u s t i c e l i s t ) <− seq ( l ength=nrow ( j u s t i c e l i s t ) ) # Reset rownames
196
# 3 . 2 . 2 Create party v a r i a b l e
198 # Does not capture F e d e r a l i s t s , Indep , or Whigs , but those are not important f o r
study
# Independents should be NA anyway
200 j u s t i c e l i s t $ party <− NA
j u s t i c e l i s t $ party [ j u s t i c e l i s t $parnom == ”democrat” ] <− 1
202 j u s t i c e l i s t $ party [ j u s t i c e l i s t $parnom == ” r e p u b l i c ” ] <− 0
204 # 3 .3 Add J u s t i c e Dataset to VoteList
v o t e l i s t $ party <− j u s t i c e l i s t $ party [ v o t e l i s t $ spaeth id ]
206 v o t e l i s t $ i d e o j u s t i c e <− j u s t i c e l i s t $ ideo [ v o t e l i s t $ spaeth id ]
208 # 4 . Dataset Manipulat ions
210 # 4 .1 R e s t r i c t Subject Matter
# R e s t r i c t i o n s on i s s u e
212 # 1 : Crim Pro (1515 ca s e s )
# 3 : F i r s t Amendment (579 ca s e s )
214 #
#
216 votedata <− v o t e l i s t [ ( v o t e l i s t $ i s sueArea == 3) , ] # F i r s t Amendment
218 votedata $ c i t a t i o n <− f a c t o r ( as . cha rac t e r ( votedata $ c i t a t i o n ) ) # Reset the ca s e s (
get r i d o f ca s e s not in s e t )
votedata $ j u s t i c e <− f a c t o r ( as . cha rac t e r ( votedata $ j u s t i c e ) ) # Reset the j u s t i c e s
( get r i d o f j u s t i c e s not in s e t )
220
# 4 .2 Recode I s s u e Codes
222 votedata $ s i m p l e i s s u e <− ( as . i n t e g e r ( votedata $ i s s u e ) − 30000) / 10 ; # Reduces
i s s u e codes to 1 ,2 ,3 index
votedata $ s i m p l e i s s u e <− f a c t o r ( as . cha rac t e r ( votedata $ s i m p l e i s s u e ) ) # Reset the
j u s t i c e s ( get r i d o f j u s t i c e s not in s e t )
224
# 4 .3 Lower Court Ideo logy
226 votedata $ lower ideo <− NA
votedata $ lower ideo [ votedata $ l c D i s p o s i t i o n D i r e c t i o n==”1” ] <− 0
228 votedata $ lower ideo [ votedata $ l c D i s p o s i t i o n D i r e c t i o n==”2” ] <− 1
230 # 4 .4 Remove NAs
votedata <− votedata [ ! i s . na ( votedata $ vote ) , ]
129
232
# 5 . Divide Train ing and Holdout Sets / Store the Fu l l Set
234 mask <− ( votedata $term > 2001) # Only 5 holdout ca s e s in 1 s t Amendment
votedata t r <− votedata [ ! mask , ]
236 votedata t r $ c i t a t i o n <− f a c t o r ( as . cha rac t e r ( votedata t r $ c i t a t i o n ) ) # Reset the
f a c t o r
238 votedata ho <− votedata [ mask , ] # Save the ac tua l Supreme Court votes
f o r l a t e r use
votedata ho$ c i t a t i o n <− f a c t o r ( votedata ho$ c i t a t i o n ) # Reset the f a c t o r
240
votedata f u l l <− votedata
242
# 6 . S o c i a l Network I s s u e s
244 # DIFFERENT FROM PREVIOUS
# Construct a combined c i t a t i o n set , with the t e s t year c o n s i s t i n g o f lower court
c i t a t i o n s
246 t r a i n c a s e s <− l e v e l s ( votedata t r $ c i t a t i o n )
t e s t c a s e s <− l e v e l s ( f a c t o r ( edge2002 $ c i t e r s c ) )
248 t e s t c a s e s <− t e s t c a s e s [ t e s t c a s e s %in% votedata ho$ c i t a t i o n ] # Keep only ca s e s in
s ub j e c t area
250 t r a i n n e t <− casenet [ ca sene t $ c i t e r %in% t r a i n c a s e s , ] # Keep only t r a i n i n g ca s e s
t e s t n e t <− data . frame ( c i t e r=edge2002 $ c i t e r s c , c i t e d=edge2002 $ c i t e d )
252 t e s t n e t <− t e s t n e t [ t e s t n e t $ c i t e r %in% t e s t c a s e s , ]
254 combnet <− rbind ( t ra inne t , t e s t n e t ) # Train ing ca s e s c i t a t i o n s and Lower
court c i t a t i o n s
256 # 6 .1 Reduce Networks to Needed Data
case sused <− c ( t r a i n c a s e s , t e s t c a s e s )
258
combnet [ , 1 ] <− as . cha rac t e r ( combnet [ , 1 ] )
260 combnet [ , 2 ] <− as . cha rac t e r ( combnet [ , 2 ] )
262 keeps <− apply ( combnet [ , 1 : 2 ] , 1 , f unc t i on ( x ) a l l ( x %in% casesused ) )
# Create keep l i s t −− any rows in which c i t e r and c i t e d are in the case sused l i s t
264
combnet . edge <− combnet [ keeps , ]
266 colnames ( combnet . edge ) <− c ( ” c i t e r ” , ” c i t e d ” )
268 # 6 .2 Build adjacency matrix
combnet . net <− graph . data . frame ( combnet . edge , d i r e c t e d=TRUE, v e r t i c e s=data . frame (
case sused ) ) # Ensure that network has a l l c a s e s as v e r t i c i e s
270 combnet . adj <− get . adjacency ( combnet . net , spa r s e=TRUE)
combnet . adj <− combnet . adj [ s o r t ( rownames ( combnet . adj ) ) , ]
272 combnet . adj <− combnet . adj [ , s o r t ( colnames ( combnet . adj ) ) ]
274 # 6 .3 Check lower t r i a n g u l a r
# The adjacency matrix i s not p e r f e c t l y lower t r i a n g u l a r because o f c i t a t i o n between
ca s e s from same day
276
#a l l ( upperTr iangle ( ca sene t . adj ) == 0) # Not complete ly upper t r i a n g u l a r
278 t e s t <− combnet . adj ∗ upper . t r i ( combnet . adj ) # Mask o f f a l l o f the lower t r i a n g l e
# Look only at the v i o l a t i o n s
280 # a l l ( l owerTr iang l e ( t e s t ) == 0) # Sanity check
282 which ( as . matrix ( t e s t ) != 0 , a r r . in=TRUE) # The v i o l a t i o n s are in ca s e s very
c l o s e to each other
284 # 6 . 3 . 1 Remove o f f e n d i n g ca s e s
# For now , d e l e t e the o f f e n d i n g c i t a t i o n s
286 # You could r eo rde r the matrix to dea l with t h i s problem , but i t ’ s too con fus ing
# And i f you are p r e d i c t i n g with in the year , you won ’ t s ee the se anyway
288
combnet . adj <− combnet . adj ∗ lower . t r i ( combnet . adj )
290 #a l l ( upperTr iang le ( combnet . adj ) == 0) # Ver i fy that i t i s now lower t r i a n g u l a r
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292 # 6 . 3 . 2 Make sure adjacency matrix i s b inary
# which ( as . matrix ( combnet . adj ) > 1 , a r r . in=TRUE) # Small number o f v a r i a t i o n s (
don ’ t know why)
294 combnet . adj [ which ( as . matrix ( combnet . adj ) > 1 , a r r . in=TRUE) ]
296 combnet . adj [ combnet . adj != 0 ] <− 1 # Wipe them out
298 # 6 .4 Separate in to t e s t and t r a i n i n g groups
K <− l ength ( t r a i n c a s e s )
300 K t i l <− l ength ( t e s t c a s e s )
combnet adj t r <− combnet . adj [ 1 :K, 1 :K]
302 combnet adj ho <− combnet . adj [ (K+1) : (K+K t i l ) , 1 :K]
304 # 7 . Case−Level Data
# 7 .1 Organize the Data
306 c a s e l i s t <− data . frame ( c i t a t i o n=SCJDcases$ newlex i sCi te , d i sp=SCJDcases$
ca s eD i spo s i t i on , term=SCJDcases$term ,
d i r e c t i o n=SCJDcases$ d e c i s i o n D i r e c t i o n , l c D i s p o s i t i o n D i r e c t i o n=SCJDcases$
l c D i s p o s i t i o n D i r e c t i o n , lawSupp=SCJDcases$lawSupp , i s s u e=SCJDcases$ i s s u e )
308
c a s e l i s t $ l ower ideo <− NA
310 c a s e l i s t $ l ower ideo [ c a s e l i s t $ l c D i s p o s i t i o n D i r e c t i o n==”1” ] <− 0
c a s e l i s t $ l ower ideo [ c a s e l i s t $ l c D i s p o s i t i o n D i r e c t i o n==”2” ] <− 1
312
c a s e l i s t $ ideovote <− NA
314 c a s e l i s t $ ideovote [ c a s e l i s t $ d i r e c t i o n==”1” ] <− 0
c a s e l i s t $ ideovote [ c a s e l i s t $ d i r e c t i o n==”2” ] <− 1
316
# 7 .2 Do Lookup Action To Build Case Outcome Dataframe
318 index case t r <− match ( t r a i n c a s e s , c a s e l i s t $ c i t a t i o n )
casedata t r <− c a s e l i s t [ index case tr , ]
320
#data . frame ( casedata t r $ c i t a t i o n , l e v e l s ( votedata t r $ c i t a t i o n ) ) # Sanity Check
322 #a l l . equal ( as . cha rac t e r ( casedata t r $ c i t a t i o n ) , l e v e l s ( votedata t r $ c i t a t i o n ) )
324 index case ho <− match ( t e s t c a s e s , c a s e l i s t $ c i t a t i o n )
casedata ho <− c a s e l i s t [ index case ho , ]
326
#data . frame ( casedata ho$ c i t a t i o n , l e v e l s ( votedata ho$ c i t a t i o n ) ) # Sanity Check
328 #a l l . equal ( as . cha rac t e r ( casedata ho$ c i t a t i o n ) , l e v e l s ( votedata ho$ c i t a t i o n ) )
330 # 7 .3 Check that f u l l datase t a l s o works
casedata f u l l <− rbind ( casedata tr , casedata ho )
332 data . frame ( casedata f u l l $ c i t a t i o n , l e v e l s ( votedata f u l l $ c i t a t i o n ) ) # Sanity Check
a l l . equal ( as . cha rac t e r ( casedata f u l l $ c i t a t i o n ) , l e v e l s ( votedata f u l l $ c i t a t i o n ) )
334
# 8 . Prepare I d e o l o g i c a l Agreement Matrix
336 # Can ’ t use t h i s on t e s t i n g set , u n l e s s we s t a r t i n f e r r i n g i d e o l o g i c a l agreement
338 # S e l e c t s e t you are us ing
casedata <− casedata t r
340 votedata <− votedata t r
342 make . agreematr ix <− f unc t i on ( x ) {
C <− l ength ( x )
344 R <− matrix (NA, C, C)
f o r ( i in 1 :C) {





# 8 .1 Agreement based on manual i d e o l o g i c a l coding ( Model 3)
352 AgreeZideo <− make . agreematr ix ( casedata $ ideovote )
354 # 8 .2 Agreement based on judge j o i n s
# votedata i s a l i s t i n g o f a l l votes
356 agreedata <− data . frame ( j u s t i c e=votedata $ j u s t i c e , c i t a t i o n=votedata $ c i t a t i o n , j o i n=
131
votedata $ j o i n )
358 j u s t i c e s <− l e v e l s ( agreedata $ j u s t i c e )
ca s e s <− l e v e l s ( agreedata $ c i t a t i o n )
360 J <− l ength ( j u s t i c e s )
K <− l ength ( ca s e s )
362
agreematr ix <− array ( data=NA, dim=c (J ,K,K) , dimnames=c ( ” j u s t i c e ” , ” case1 ” , ” case2 ” ) )
364 f o r ( j in 1 : J ) {
j o i nda ta <− agreedata [ agreedata $ j u s t i c e==j u s t i c e s [ j ] , ] # Take j u s t that
j u s t i c e ’ s data
366 j o i n v e c t o r <− rep (NA, K)
f o r ( i in 1 : nrow ( j o inda ta ) ) {
368 j o i n v e c t o r [ as . i n t e g e r ( j o inda ta $ c i t a t i o n [ i ] ) ] <− j o i nda ta $ j o i n [ i ]
}




# 8 . 2 . 1 Count up judge agreement ( Model 4)
374 # Recode
agreematr ix4 <− agreematr ix
376 agreematr ix4 [ agreematr ix4==0] <− −1
agreematr ix4 [ i s . na ( agreematr ix4 ) ] <−0
378
AgreeZjo in <− colSums ( agreematr ix4 )
380
# 8 . 2 . 2 . Latent judge agreement model ( Model 5)
382 # For the l a t e n t model , you don ’ t want any NAs
# Just want the i n s t a n c e s o f data
384
AgreeZlatent <− data . frame ( case1 = NA, case2 = NA, agree = NA)
386 t a l l y <− 0
388 f o r ( j in 1 : J ) {
j o i nda ta <− agreedata [ agreedata $ j u s t i c e==j u s t i c e s [ j ] , ] # Take j u s t that
j u s t i c e ’ s data
390 jo inmat r ix <− make . agreematr ix ( j o inda ta $ j o i n ) # Create agreement matrix
rownames ( j o inmat r ix ) <− j o i nda ta $ c i t a t i o n
392 colnames ( j o inmat r ix ) <− j o i nda ta $ c i t a t i o n
j o i n t a b l e <− melt ( j o inmat r ix ) # Melt matrix back to data . frame
o f Z k l
394 colnames ( j o i n t a b l e ) <− c ( ” case1 ” , ” case2 ” , ” agree ” )
396 AgreeZlatent <− rbind ( AgreeZlatent , j o i n t a b l e )
}
398
AgreeZlatent <− AgreeZlatent [−1 , ] # Remove NA p la c eho ld e r
400 AgreeZlatent $ case1 <− f a c t o r ( AgreeZlatent $ case1 )
AgreeZlatent $ case2 <− f a c t o r ( AgreeZlatent $ case2 )
402
AgreeZlatent <− AgreeZlatent [ as . cha rac t e r ( AgreeZlatent $ case1 ) > as . cha rac t e r (
AgreeZlatent $ case2 ) , ]
404
# 9 . Prepare STAN ( Phase 1)
406 # Note that when pas s ing a matrix to STAN, you want to convert Boolean to numbers
408 # j o i n = whether j u s t i c e concurred with the major i ty op in ion
# vote = whether j u s t i c e voted to a f f i r m lower court (1 = af f i rm , 0 = r e v e r s e )
410
agree dat <− l i s t (
412 K = nrow ( combnet adj t r ) ,
N z = nrow ( AgreeZlatent ) ,
414 AgreeZ = AgreeZlatent $ agree ,
416 case1 z = as . numeric ( AgreeZlatent $ case1 ) ,





agree f i t <− stan ( f i l e = paste ( f i l ename , ” agree . stan ” , sep=”” ) , i n i t=”random” , data
= agree dat , i t e r = 1000 , cha ins = 1)
422 agree f i t
# save ( agree f i t , votedata tr , votedata ho , casedata tr , casedata ho , case lookup ,
f i l e=paste ( f i l ename , ”Agree . Rdata ” , sep =””) )
424
# 10 . Prepare STAN ( Phase 2)
426
agree r e s u l t s <− get p o s t e r i o r mean( agree f i t )
428
y <− agree r e s u l t s [ grep ( ”y \\ [ ” , rownames ( agree r e s u l t s ) ) , ] # Cut only part o f
t ab l e with coo rd ina t e s
430 alpha a <− agree r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” alpha a” , rownames ( agree r e s u l t s ) ) , ] # Cut only
part o f t a b l e with coo rd ina t e s
c i t e dat <− l i s t (
432 K = nrow ( combnet adj t r ) ,
y = y ,
434 alpha a = alpha a ,
C i ta t i on = as . matrix ( combnet adj t r ) # STAN doesn ’ t r e c o g n i z e
spar s e matrix
436 )
438 c i t e f i t <− stan ( f i l e = paste ( f i l ename , ” c i t e . stan ” , sep=”” ) , i n i t=”random” , data =
c i t e dat , i t e r = 1000 , cha ins = 1)
440 c i t e f i t
#save ( c i t e f i t , agree f i t , votedata tr , votedata ho , casedata tr , casedata ho ,
combnet adj tr , combnet adj ho , case lookup , f i l e=paste ( f i l ename , ” . Rdata ” , sep
=””) )
442
444 # 11 . Proc rus te s Ana lys i s
rawdata <− e x t r a c t ( c i t e f i t )
446 coords <− rawdata$x # Bind both t r a i n i n g and holdout s e t s f o r Proc rus te s
procdata <− aperm ( coords , c ( 2 , 3 , 1 ) ) # Permute matrix dimensions
448 p r o c r u s t e s . out <− procGPA( procdata )
#save ( p r o c r u s t e s . out , c i t e f i t , agree f i t , votedata tr , votedata ho , casedata tr ,
casedata ho , combnet adj tr , combnet adj ho , case lookup , f i l e=paste ( f i l ename , ”
Proc . Rdata ” , sep =””) )
450
#12 . PREDICTION MODEL
452
# 12 .1 Get p r e v i o u s l y est imated data
454 # Saves time
#load (” l a t e n t 6 c . Rdata ”)
456 #load (” la t ent6cProc . Rdata ”)
458 c i t e r e s u l t s <− get p o s t e r i o r mean( c i t e f i t )
agree r e s u l t s <− get p o s t e r i o r mean( agree f i t )
460
alpha c <− c i t e r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” alpha c” , rownames ( c i t e r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
462 d e l t a <− c i t e r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” d e l t a \\ [ ” , rownames ( c i t e r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
beta <− c i t e r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” beta ” , rownames ( c i t e r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
464 x <− data . frame ( x1=p r o c r u s t e s . out$mshape [ , 1 ] , x2=p r o c r u s t e s . out $mshape [ , 2 ] )
sigma gamma <− c i t e r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” sigma gamma” , rownames ( c i t e r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
466 sigma x1 <− c i t e r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” sigma x1” , rownames ( c i t e r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
sigma x2 <− c i t e r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” sigma x2” , rownames ( c i t e r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
468 rho x <− c i t e r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” rho x” , rownames ( c i t e r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
470 alpha a <− agree r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” alpha a” , rownames ( agree r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
y <− agree r e s u l t s [ grep ( ”y \\ [ ” , rownames ( agree r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
472 sigma y <− agree r e s u l t s [ grep ( ” sigma y” , rownames ( agree r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
474
# 12 .2 J u s t i c e case votes
476 # Actual J u s t i c e Votes on Test Set
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vote ac tua l <− data . frame ( j u s t i c e = votedata ho$ j u s t i c e , c i t a t i o n = votedata ho$
c i t a t i o n , c a s e a f f i r m = ! as . l o g i c a l ( votedata ho$ s imp led i sp ) ,
478 j o i n = votedata ho$ j o i n )
vote ac tua l $ a f f i rm vo t e <− ! xor ( vote ac tua l $ ca s ea f f i rm , vote ac tua l $ j o i n )
480
# J u s t i c e Jo ins ( Agreement ) on Train ing Set
482 agreedata <− data . frame ( j u s t i c e=votedata t r $ j u s t i c e , c i t a t i o n=votedata t r $ c i t a t i o n ,
j o i n=votedata t r $ j o i n )
484 Vtable <− ca s t ( agreedata , j u s t i c e ˜ c i t a t i o n )
rownames ( Vtable ) <− Vtable [ , 1 ]
486 Vtable <− Vtable [ ,−1]
488 Vmatrix <− ( as . matrix ( Vtable ) ) # Convert away from l i s t
rownames ( Vmatrix ) <− rownames ( Vtable )
490 colnames ( Vmatrix ) <− colnames ( Vtable )
492 Vmatrix [ Vmatrix==TRUE] <− 1
Vmatrix [ Vmatrix==FALSE] <− −1
494 Vmatrix [ i s . na ( Vmatrix ) ] <− 0
496 # 12 .3 Sanity Checks
# data . frame ( l e v e l s ( vote ac tua l $ j u s t i c e ) , rownames ( Vmatrix ) ) # j u s t i c e l i s t
matches
498 # data . frame ( l e v e l s ( vote ac tua l $ c i t a t i o n ) , rownames ( combnet adj ho ) ) # holdout case
names match
500 # 12 .4 Set up t e s t i n g ve c to r s
N <− nrow ( vote ac tua l )
502 pred j u s t i c e <− as . numeric ( vote ac tua l $ j u s t i c e )
pred case <− as . numeric ( vote ac tua l $ c i t a t i o n )
504
# 12 .5 Set up STAN
506 p r e d i c t dat <− l i s t (
K = nrow ( combnet adj t r ) ,
508 K t i l = nrow ( combnet adj ho ) ,
510 alpha c = alpha c ,
d e l t a = del ta ,
512 beta = beta ,
x = x ,
514 C i ta t i on = as . matrix ( combnet adj ho ) , # STAN doesn ’ t r e c o g n i z e
spar s e matrix
516 sigma x1 = sigma x1 ,
sigma x2 = sigma x2 ,
518 rho x = rho x ,
520 sigma gamma = sigma gamma,
522 alpha a = alpha a ,
y = y ,
524 sigma y = sigma y ,
526 N = nrow ( vote ac tua l ) ,
j u s t i c e = pred j u s t i c e ,
528 casename = pred case ,




534 p r e d i c t f i t <− stan ( f i l e = paste ( f i l ename , ” p r e d i c t . stan ” , sep=”” ) , i n i t=”random” ,
data = p r e d i c t dat , i t e r = 1000 , cha ins = 1)
save ( p r e d i c t f i t , c i t e f i t , agree f i t , p r o c r u s t e s . out , votedata tr , votedata ho ,
casedata tr , casedata ho , combnet adj tr , combnet adj ho , case lookup , f i l e=paste
( f i l ename , ” . Rdata” , sep=”” ) )
536
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# 13 . Ca l cu la te P r e d i c t i o n s
538 p r e d i c t r e s u l t s <− get p o s t e r i o r mean( p r e d i c t f i t )
p a <− p r e d i c t r e s u l t s [ grep ( ”p a \\ [ ” , rownames ( p r e d i c t r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
540 p r <− p r e d i c t r e s u l t s [ grep ( ”p r \\ [ ” , rownames ( p r e d i c t r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
542 p r e d i c t i o n <− round (p a / (p a + p r ) )
vote ac tua l $ p r e d i c t i o n <− p r e d i c t i o n
544 vote ac tua l
t ab l e ( vote ac tua l $ a f f i rmvote , vote ac tua l $ p r e d i c t i o n )
Additional Analysis
1 # I n i t i a l i z a t i o n
rm( l i s t = l s ( ) ) # c l e a r a l l
3
setwd ( ”/ Users / ekcheng /Documents/ D i s s e r t a t i o n /Chapter3/Code/” )
5 load ( ” l a t en t7d . Rdata” )
7 # Load data from end o f l a t ent7d
# Has Ruger data manually added
9 votecomp <− read . csv ( ”RugerPred . csv ” )
11 # 30% P r e d i c t i v e accuracy o f the model with SCJD outcomes
acc . model <− t ab l e ( votecomp$ a f f i rmvote , votecomp$ p r e d i c t i o n )
13 ( acc . model [ 1 , 1 ] + acc . model [ 2 , 2 ] ) / sum( acc . model )
15 # P r e d i c t i v e accuracy o f Ruger (82%)
# Have to remove Madigan v . Telemarket ing As soc i a t e s because i t wasn ’ t granted c e r t
u n t i l a f t e r study s t a r t e d
17 votecomp2 <− votecomp [ ! i s . na ( votecomp$ ruge ra c tua l ) , ]
acc . rugerSCJD <− t ab l e ( votecomp2$ rugerpred , votecomp2$ a f f i rm vo t e )
19 ( acc . rugerSCJD [ 1 , 1 ] + acc . rugerSCJD [ 2 , 2 ] ) / sum( acc . rugerSCJD )
21 # P r e d i c t i v e accuracy o f Ruger (80%)
# Have to remove Madigan v . Telemarket ing As soc i a t e s because i t wasn ’ t granted c e r t
u n t i l a f t e r study s t a r t e d
23 votecomp2 <− votecomp [ ! i s . na ( votecomp$ ruge ra c tua l ) , ]
acc . rugerweb <− t ab l e ( votecomp$ rugerpred , votecomp$ ruge ra c tua l )
25 ( acc . rugerweb [ 1 , 1 ] + acc . rugerweb [ 2 , 2 ] ) / sum( acc . rugerweb )
27 # 40% P r e d i c t i v e accuracy o f the model with Ruger outcomes
acc . modelweb <− t ab l e ( votecomp$ rugerac tua l , votecomp$ p r e d i c t i o n )
29 ( acc . modelweb [ 1 , 1 ] + acc . modelweb [ 2 , 2 ] ) / sum( acc . modelweb )
31 # Calcu la te P r e d i c t i o n s
p r e d i c t r e s u l t s <− get p o s t e r i o r mean( p r e d i c t f i t )
33 p a <− p r e d i c t r e s u l t s [ grep ( ”p a \\ [ ” , rownames ( p r e d i c t r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
p r <− p r e d i c t r e s u l t s [ grep ( ”p r \\ [ ” , rownames ( p r e d i c t r e s u l t s ) ) , ]
35
p r e d i c t i o n <− round (p a / (p a + p r ) )
37 vote ac tua l $ p r e d i c t i o n <− p r e d i c t i o n
vote ac tua l




# STAN model f i l e f o r Supreme Court l a t e n t space c l a s s i f i e r
2 # Based on Eq . 1
4 data {
int<lower=1> K; // number o f ca s e s
6 int<lower =0, upper=1> Cita t i on [K,K] ; // c i t a t i o n matrix
r e a l alpha a ; // Agreement model output




12 r e a l alpha c ; // i n t e r c e p t f o r c i t a t i o n model
vec to r [ 2 ] x [K] ; // 2−D l a t e n t p o s i t i o n f o r t r a i n i n g ca s e s
14 rea l<lower =0,upper=100> sigma x1 ;
r ea l<lower =0,upper=100> sigma x2 ;
16 rea l<lower=−1,upper=1> rho x ;
r e a l gamma[K] ;
18 r e a l d e l t a [K] ;
r ea l<lower =0,upper=100> sigma gamma; // hyperparameter f o r random e f f s
20 rea l<lower =0,upper=100> sigma d e l t a ;
r e a l beta ;
22 }
24 model {
vec to r [ 2 ] mu;
26 matrix<lower =0>[2 ,2] Sigma x ;
Sigma x [ 1 , 1 ] <− square ( sigma x1 ) ;
28 Sigma x [ 2 , 2 ] <− square ( sigma x2 ) ;
Sigma x [ 1 , 2 ] <− rho x ∗ sigma x1 ∗ sigma x2 ;
30 Sigma x [ 2 , 1 ] <− Sigma x [ 1 , 2 ] ;
32 mu[ 1 ] <− 0 ;
mu[ 2 ] <− 0 ;
34
// hype rp r i o r s
36 sigma x1 ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ; // Suggested in STAN manual p .147
sigma x2 ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ;
38 rho x ˜ uniform (−1 , 1) ;
40 sigma gamma ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ;
sigma d e l t a ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ;
42
// p r i o r s
44 f o r ( i in 1 :K) {
x [ i ] ˜ mult i normal (mu, Sigma x ) ;
46 }
48 alpha c ˜ normal (0 ,100) ;
gamma ˜ normal (0 , sigma gamma) ;
50 de l t a ˜ normal (0 , sigma d e l t a ) ;
beta ˜ normal (0 ,100) ;
52
// model
54 f o r ( k in 2 :K) {
f o r ( l in 1 : ( k−1) ) {
56 Ci ta t i on [ k , l ] ˜ b e r n o u l l i l o g i t (
alpha c + gamma[ k ] + d e l t a [ l ] − squared d i s t ance ( x [ k ] , x [ l ] )










4 int<lower=1> K; // number o f ca s e s
int<lower=1> N z ; // agreement obs e rva t i on s
6 int<lower =0, upper=1> AgreeZ [N z ] ; // agree matrix
i n t case1 z [N z ] ; // case1 f o r agreement




12 r e a l alpha a ; // i n t e r c e p t f o r c i t a t i o n model
r e a l y [K] ; // 1−D l a t e n t p o s i t i o n f o r id eo l ogy




18 // hype rp r i o r s
sigma y ˜ cauchy (0 , 5 ) ;
20
// p r i o r s
22 alpha a ˜ normal (0 ,100) ;
y ˜ normal (0 , sigma y ) ;
24
// model
26 f o r ( i in 1 :N z ) {
AgreeZ [ i ] ˜ b e r n o u l l i l o g i t (
28 alpha a − ( y [ case1 z [ i ] ] − y [ case2 z [ i ] ] ) ˆ2
) ;
30 }
} // end o f model s e c t i o n
Prediction Model
1 # STAN model f i l e f o r Supreme Court l a t e n t space c l a s s i f i e r





7 int<lower=1> K; // number o f t r a i n i n g ca s e s
int<lower=1> K t i l ; // number o f t e s t ca s e s
9
r e a l alpha c ; // c i t a t i o n model
11 r e a l d e l t a [K] ; //
r e a l beta ;
13 vec to r [ 2 ] x [K] ; // l a t e n t coo rd ina t e s
int<lower =0, upper=1> Cita t i on [K t i l , K ] ; // c i t a t i o n
15
rea l<lower=0> sigma x1 ;
17 rea l<lower=0> sigma x2 ;
r ea l<lower=−1, upper=1> rho x ;
19
r ea l<lower=0> sigma gamma;
21
r e a l alpha a ; // agreement model
23 r e a l y [K] ; //
r ea l<lower=0> sigma y ;
25
int<lower=1> N; // Des i red P r e d i c t i o n s
27 int<lower=1> j u s t i c e [N ] ;
int<lower=1> casename [N ] ;
29 int<lower=1> J ;





35 vec to r [ 2 ] x ho [K t i l ] ; // 2−D l a t e n t p o s i t i o n f o r t e s t ca s e s
r e a l gamma[K t i l ] ;




// d e c l a r a t i o n s −− STAN r e q u i r e s v a r i a b l e d e c l a r a t i o n s f i r s t
43 vec to r [ 2 ] mu;
matrix<lower =0>[2 ,2] Sigma x ;
45
Sigma x [ 1 , 1 ] <− square ( sigma x1 ) ;
47 Sigma x [ 2 , 2 ] <− square ( sigma x2 ) ;
Sigma x [ 1 , 2 ] <− rho x ∗ sigma x1 ∗ sigma x2 ;
49 Sigma x [ 2 , 1 ] <− Sigma x [ 1 , 2 ] ;
51 mu[ 1 ] <− 0 ;
mu[ 2 ] <− 0 ;
53
// p r i o r s
55 f o r ( k t i l in 1 :K t i l ) {
x ho [ k t i l ] ˜ mult i normal (mu, Sigma x ) ;
57 }
59 gamma ˜ normal (0 , sigma gamma) ;
y ho ˜ normal (0 , sigma y ) ;
61
// model
63 f o r ( k t i l in 1 :K t i l ) {
f o r ( l in 1 :K) {
65 Ci ta t i on [ k t i l , l ] ˜ b e r n o u l l i l o g i t (
alpha c + gamma[ k t i l ] + d e l t a [ l ] − squared d i s t anc e ( x ho [ k t i l ] , x [ l ] )





} // end o f model s e c t i o n
73
generated q u a n t i t i e s {
75 // d e c l a r a t i o n s
r ea l<lower =0, upper=1> theta [K t i l , K ] ;
77 r ea l<lower =0, upper=1> p a [N ] ;
r ea l<lower =0, upper=1> p r [N ] ;
79
f o r ( k t i l in 1 :K t i l ) {
81 f o r ( l in 1 :K) {




f o r ( i in 1 :N) {
87 p a [ i ] <− 1 ;
p r [ i ] <− 1 ;
89
f o r ( l in 1 :K) {
91 i f (V[ j u s t i c e [ i ] , l ] == 0) {
p a [ i ] <− p a [ i ] ;
93 p r [ i ] <− p r [ i ] ;
}
95 e l s e {
p a [ i ] <− p a [ i ] ∗ ( theta [ casename [ i ] , l ] ˆ ( 0 . 5 ∗ (1 + V[ j u s t i c e [ i ] , l ] ) ) )
97 ∗ ( (1 − theta [ casename [ i ] , l ] ) ˆ ( 0 . 5 ∗ (1 − V[ j u s t i c e [ i ] , l ] ) ) ) ;
99 p r [ i ] <− p r [ i ] ∗ ( theta [ casename [ i ] , l ] ˆ ( 0 . 5 ∗ (1 − V[ j u s t i c e [ i ] , l ] ) ) )
138
∗ ( (1 − theta [ casename [ i ] , l ] ) ˆ ( 0 . 5 ∗ (1 + V[ j u s t i c e [ i ] , l ] ) ) ) ;
101 }
}
103 }
}
139
